Sommes-nous libres ?

[1] Il n’est pas sûr que ceux qui croient à la liberté agissent autrement que ceux qui n’y croient pas. L’incertitude est fâcheuse en un siècle où seules comptent les conséquences empiriques. Mais on ne se débarrasse pas si aisément de la métaphysique. Car a-t-on le droit de punir un criminel qui se croirait libre mais ne le serait pas ? La détermination des actions humaines par l’éducation et la société est l’argument majeur de ceux, aujourd’hui nombreux et puissants, qui s’opposent aux sanc..

De la connaissance sensible et de la parité qu’elle manifeste entre l’homme et l’animal

1 [Manuscrit 8*.9] [1] Qu’on tente de déterminer par l’expérience le point de rupture entre l’animal et l’homme : tous les vivants possédant à quelque degré des formules élémentaires qui permettent de percevoir le milieu, de réagir à ses sollicitations et de s’adapter à ses exigences, on cherchera un critère dans les manifestations d’une organisation plus complexe. Mais, observé du dedans ou du dehors, l’homme lui-même ne laisse pas apercevoir d’une façon précise et directe comment se fait le..

Difficulties of logic and philosophical problems in Russell's Principia Mathematica

The author shows that the difficulties of a purely logical nature which follow from the « ramified » version of the theory of types, set out by Russell in Principia Mathematica, (difficulties relating in particular to the axiom of infinity and the axiom of reductibility) can in no circumstances be dissociated from their philosophical consequences. Involving at one and the same time the ontological statute of classes, the principle of indiscernables and the very notion of meaning, these consequences are examined from the angle of Quine's objections and bearing in mind the distinction between « expression » and « indication ». Russell himself introduced in 1940 in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth.L'A. montre que les difficultés d'ordre purement logique qui découlent de la version « ramifiée » de la théorie des types mise en place par Russell dans les Principia Mathematica (et qui ont trait, notamment à l'axiome de l'infini et à l'axiome de réductibilité) ne peuvent en aucun cas être dissociées de leurs conséquences philosophiques. Celles-ci — qui concernent à la fois le statut ontologique des classes, le principe des indiscernables et la notion même de signification — sont examinées à la lumière tant des objections de Quine que de la distinction entre « expression » et « indication » introduite en 1940 par Russell dans Signification et vérité

Effets moraux de l’accélération de l’histoire

[1] Les paléontologues constatent que, mesuré en genres, le taux d’évolution de nos ancêtres et collatéraux directs a été exceptionnellement rapide. En 160 millions d’années, on compte seulement huit genres d’ammonites. Il faut encore 60 millions d’années pour huit genres de chevaux, mais il n’en faut plus que 12 millions pour quatre genres d’hominoïdes et un seul, le dernier, pour trois genres d’hominidés. Pour expliquer une telle accélération, on suppose que la sélection a dû agir sur un no..

Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory

This monographic chapter explains how expected utility (EU) theory arose in von Neumann and Morgenstern, how it was called into question by Allais and others, and how it gave way to non-EU theories, at least among the specialized quarters of decion theory. I organize the narrative around the idea that the successive theoretical moves amounted to resolving Duhem-Quine underdetermination problems, so they can be assessed in terms of the philosophical recommendations made to overcome these problems. I actually follow Duhem's recommendation, which was essentially to rely on the passing of time to make many experiments and arguments available, and evebntually strike a balance between competing theories on the basis of this improved knowledge. Although Duhem's solution seems disappointingly vague, relying as it does on "bon sens" to bring an end to the temporal process, I do not think there is any better one in the philosophical literature, and I apply it here for what it is worth. In this perspective, EU theorists were justified in resisting the first attempts at refuting their theory, including Allais's in the 50s, but they would have lacked "bon sens" in not acknowledging their defeat in the 80s, after the long process of pros and cons had sufficiently matured. This primary Duhemian theme is actually combined with a secondary theme - normativity. I suggest that EU theory was normative at its very beginning and has remained so all along, and I express dissatisfaction with the orthodox view that it could be treated as a straightforward descriptive theory for purposes of prediction and scientific test. This view is usually accompanied with a faulty historical reconstruction, according to which EU theorists initially formulated the VNM axioms descriptively and retreated to a normative construal once they fell threatened by empirical refutation. From my historical study, things did not evolve in this way, and the theory was both proposed and rebutted on the basis of normative arguments already in the 1950s. The ensuing, major problem was to make choice experiments compatible with this inherently normative feature of theory. Compability was obtained in some experiments, but implicitly and somewhat confusingly, for instance by excluding overtly incoherent subjects or by creating strong incentives for the subjects to reflect on the questions and provide answers they would be able to defend. I also claim that Allais had an intuition of how to combine testability and normativity, unlike most later experimenters, and that it would have been more fruitful to work from his intuition than to make choice experiments of the naively empirical style that flourished after him. In sum, it can be said that the underdetermination process accompanying EUT was resolved in a Duhemian way, but this was not without major inefficiencies. To embody explicit rationality considerations into experimental schemes right from the beginning would have limited the scope of empirical research, avoided wasting resources to get only minor findings, and speeded up the Duhemian process of groping towards a choice among competing theories

Le tome II de La Philosophie de l’algèbre. Dossier documentaire

International audienc

Grandeur et fragilité du réalisme moral : la division du travail, l'idée de justice, le Bien

Vuillemin Jules. Grandeur et fragilité du réalisme moral : la division du travail, l'idée de justice, le Bien . In: Bulletin de la Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques, tome 4, n°7-12, 1993. pp. 335-346