Optimal Asset Allocation in Asset Liability Management

We study the impact of regulations on the investment decisions of a defined benefits pension plan. We assess the influence of ex ante (preventive) and ex post (punitive) risk constraints on the gains to dynamic, as opposed to myopic, decision making. We find that preventive measures, such as Value-at-Risk constraints, tend to decrease the gains to dynamic investment. In contrast, punitive constraints, such as mandatory additional contributions from the sponsor when the plan becomes underfunded, lead to very large utility gains from solving the dynamic program. We also show that financial reporting rules have real effects on investment behavior. For example, the current requirement to discount liabilities at a rolling average of yields, as opposed to at current yields, induces grossly suboptimal investment decisions.

Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry

Using the value that a mutual fund extracts from capital markets as the measure of skill, we find that the average mutual fund has used this skill to generate about $3.2 million per year. Large cross-sectional differences in skill persist for as long as ten years. Investors recognize this skill and reward it by investing more capital with better funds. Better funds earn higher aggregate fees, and a strong positive correlation exists between current compensation and future performance. The cross-sectional distribution of managerial skill is predominantly reflected in the cross-sectional distribution of fund size, not gross alpha

Journal of Financial Economics

We propose a new method of testing asset pricing models that relies on quantities rather than just prices or returns. We use the capital flows into and out of mutual funds to infer which risk model investors use. We derive a simple test statistic that allows us to infer, from a set of candidate models, the risk model that is closest to the model that investors use in making their capital allocation decisions. Using our method, we assess the performance of the most commonly used asset pricing models in the literature

The Cost of Debt

We estimate firm-specific marginal cost of debt functions for a large panel of companies between 1980 and 2007. The marginal cost curves are identified by exogenous variation in the marginal tax benefits of debt. The location of a given company’s cost of debt function varies with characteristics such as asset collateral, size, book-to-market, asset tangibility, cash flows, and whether the firm pays dividends. By integrating the area between benefit and cost functions we estimate that the equilibrium net benefit of debt is 3.5% of asset value, resulting from an estimated gross benefit of debt of 10.4% of asset value and an estimated cost of debt of 6.9%. We find that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute approximately half of the total ex ante cost of debt.

Financial Valuation of PBGC Insurance with Market-Implied Default Probabilities

In this paper, we use financial valuation techniques to measure the unfunded liabilities associated with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) single-employer pension insurance program. This is an alternative approach to the calculations of expected future PBGC payouts in the PBGC exposure reports. The PBGC insurance is akin to an exchange option, a financial instrument that allows a party to exchange one risky asset for another. Calculating the value of this option for each PBGC-covered plan provides a measure of the fair market price of the PBGC guarantee that is consistent with the finance principles of risk-neutral pricing. That is, the market valuation method reflects the fact that bad outcomes tend to coincide with times when losses are particularly painful. The valuation we perform also reflects the fact that PBGC insurance is triggered only in the case of bankruptcy by drawing on the default probabilities implied by the credit ratings of insured plans. Under the baseline parameters, the PBGC’s insurance of the unfunded liabilities has a financial value of $358 billion, net of the estimated present value of PBGC premiums

On the Timing and Pricing of Dividends

We present evidence on the term structure of the equity premium. We recover prices of dividend strips, which are short-term assets that pay dividends on the stock index every period up to period T and nothing thereafter. It is short-term relative to the index because the index pays dividends in perpetuity. We find that expected returns, Sharpe ratios, and volatilities on short-term assets are higher than on the index, while their CAPM betas are below one. Short-term assets are more volatile than their realizations, leading to excess volatility and return predictability. Our findings are inconsistent with many leading theories

Matching Capital and Labor

We establish an important role for the firm by studying capital reallocation decisions of mutual fund firms. The firm\u27s decision to reallocate capital among its mutual fund managers adds at least $474,000 a month, which amounts to over 30% of the total value added of the industry. We provide evidence that this additional value added results from the firm\u27s private information about the skill of its managers. The firm captures this value because investors reward the firm following a capital reallocation decision by allocating additional capital to the firm\u27s funds

The Term Structure of Interest Rates in a DSGE Model with Recursive Preferences

We solve a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which the representative household has Epstein and Zin recursive preferences. The parameters governing preferences and technology are estimated by means of maximum likelihood using macroeconomic data and asset prices, with a particular focus on the term structure of interest rates. We estimate a large risk aversion, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution higher than one, and substantial adjustment costs. Furthermore, we identify the tensions within the model by estimating it on subsets of these data. We conclude by pointing out potential extensions that might improve the model’s fit.DSGE models, Epstein-Zin preferences, likelihood estimation, yield curve

Decentralized Decision Making In Investment Management

The article addresses the investment problem of a pension fund in which a centralized decision maker, the Chief Investment Officer (CIO), employs multiple asset managers to implement investment strategies in separate asset classes. The investment management division of pension funds is typically structured around traditional asset classes such as equities, fixed income, and alternative investments. The asset allocation decisions are made in at least two stages. Firstly, the CIO allocates capital to the different asset classes, each managed by a different asset manager. Secondly, each manager decides how to allocate the funds made available to him, that is, to the assets within his class. The CIO of the fund therefore faces a tradeoff between the benefits of decentralization, driven by the market timing and stock selection skills of the managers, and the costs of delegation and decentralization. The optimal portfolio of the asset managers can be decomposed into two components. The first component is the standard myopic demand that optimally exploits the risk-return trade-off. The second component minimizes the instantaneous return variance and is therefore labeled the minimum-variance portfolio. The minimum variance portfolio substitutes for the riskless asset in the optimal portfolio of the asset manager. The two components are then weighted by the risk attitude of the asset manager to arrive at the optimal portfolio