Did U.S. Bank Supervisors Get Tougher During the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier During the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending?

We test three hypotheses regarding changes in supervisory toughness' and their effects on bank lending. The data provide modest support for all three hypotheses that there was an increase in toughness during the credit crunch period (1989-1992), that there was a decline in toughness during the boom period (1993-1998), and that changes in toughness, if they occurred, affected bank lending. However, all of the measured effects are small, with 1% or less of loans receiving harsher or easier classification, about 3% of banks receiving better or worse CAMEL ratings, and bank lending being changed by 1% or less of assets.

The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trips It's Been

macroeconomics, Transformation, U.S. Banking Industry

Second asymptomatic carotid surgery trial (ACST-2): a randomised comparison of carotid artery stenting versus carotid endarterectomy

Background: Among asymptomatic patients with severe carotid artery stenosis but no recent stroke or transient cerebral ischaemia, either carotid artery stenting (CAS) or carotid endarterectomy (CEA) can restore patency and reduce long-term stroke risks. However, from recent national registry data, each option causes about 1% procedural risk of disabling stroke or death. Comparison of their long-term protective effects requires large-scale randomised evidence. Methods: ACST-2 is an international multicentre randomised trial of CAS versus CEA among asymptomatic patients with severe stenosis thought to require intervention, interpreted with all other relevant trials. Patients were eligible if they had severe unilateral or bilateral carotid artery stenosis and both doctor and patient agreed that a carotid procedure should be undertaken, but they were substantially uncertain which one to choose. Patients were randomly allocated to CAS or CEA and followed up at 1 month and then annually, for a mean 5 years. Procedural events were those within 30 days of the intervention. Intention-to-treat analyses are provided. Analyses including procedural hazards use tabular methods. Analyses and meta-analyses of non-procedural strokes use Kaplan-Meier and log-rank methods. The trial is registered with the ISRCTN registry, ISRCTN21144362. Findings: Between Jan 15, 2008, and Dec 31, 2020, 3625 patients in 130 centres were randomly allocated, 1811 to CAS and 1814 to CEA, with good compliance, good medical therapy and a mean 5 years of follow-up. Overall, 1% had disabling stroke or death procedurally (15 allocated to CAS and 18 to CEA) and 2% had non-disabling procedural stroke (48 allocated to CAS and 29 to CEA). Kaplan-Meier estimates of 5-year non-procedural stroke were 2·5% in each group for fatal or disabling stroke, and 5·3% with CAS versus 4·5% with CEA for any stroke (rate ratio [RR] 1·16, 95% CI 0·86–1·57; p=0·33). Combining RRs for any non-procedural stroke in all CAS versus CEA trials, the RR was similar in symptomatic and asymptomatic patients (overall RR 1·11, 95% CI 0·91–1·32; p=0·21). Interpretation: Serious complications are similarly uncommon after competent CAS and CEA, and the long-term effects of these two carotid artery procedures on fatal or disabling stroke are comparable. Funding: UK Medical Research Council and Health Technology Assessment Programme

Did U.S. bank supervisors get tougher during the credit crunch? Did they get easier during the banking boom? Did it matter to bank lending?

We test three hypotheses regarding changes in supervisory "toughness" and their effects on bank lending. The data provide modest support for all three hypotheses that there was an increase in toughness during the credit crunch period (1989-1992), that there was a decline in toughness during the boom period (1993-1998), and that changes in toughness, if they occurred, affected bank lending. However, all of the measured effects are small, with 1% or less of loans receiving harsher or easier classification, about 3% of banks receiving better or worse CAMEL ratings, and bank lending being changed by 1% or less of assets.Bank supervision ; Credit ; Bank loans

The Effects of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions on Small Business Lending

We examine the effects of bank M&As on small business lending. Our methodology permits empirical analysis of the vast majority of U.S. bank M&As since the late 1970s -- over 6,000 M&As involving over 10,000 banks (some active banks are counted multiple times). We are the first to decompose the impact of M&As on small business lending into static effects associated with a simple melding of the antecedent institutions and dynamic effects associated with post-M&A refocusing of the consolidated institution. We are also the first to estimate the reactions of other banks in local markets to M&As. We find that the static effects of consolidation which reduce small business lending are mostly offset by the reactions of other banks in the amrket, and in some cases also by refocusing efforts of the consolidating institutions themselves

The Effects of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions on Small Business Lending

We examine the effects of bank M&As on small business lending. Our methodology permits empirical analysis of the vast majority of U.S. bank M&As since the late 1970s -- over 6,000 M&As involving over 10,000 banks (some active banks are counted multiple times). We are the first to decompose the impact of M&As on small business lending into static effects associated with a simple melding of the antecedent institutions and dynamic effects associated with post-M&A refocusing of the consolidated institution. We are also the first to estimate the reactions of other banks in local markets to M&As. We find that the static effects of consolidation which reduce small business lending are mostly offset by the reactions of other banks in the amrket, and in some cases also by refocusing efforts of the consolidating institutions themselves

The effects of bank mergers and acquisitions on small business lending

We examine the effects of over 6,000 M&As involving more than 10,000 banks on small business lending. We are the first to decompose the impact of M&As into static effects associated with a simple melding of the antecedent institutions and dynamic effects associated with post-M&A refocusing of the consolidated institution. We are also the first to estimate the reactions of other local banks to M&As. We find that the static effects that reduce small business lending are mostly offset by the reactions of other banks and, in some cases, also by the refocused efforts of the consolidating institutions themselves.Bank mergers ; Bank loans ; Commercial loans ; Small business