Genetic Recombination as a Chemical Reaction Network

The process of genetic recombination can be seen as a chemical reaction network with mass-action kinetics. We review the known results on existence, uniqueness, and global stability of an equilibrium in every compatibility class and for all rate constants, from both the population genetics and the reaction networks point of view

Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case

In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous- time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier by Brown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently been suggested as a plausible boundedly rational learning process in games. In the current paper we study this Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics for the case of continuous strategy spaces. We show that for continuous payoff functions, the set of rest points of the dynamics coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the underlying game. We also study the asymptotic stability properties of rest points. While strict Nash equilibria may be unstable, we identify sufficient conditions for local and global asymptotic stability which use concepts developed in evolutionary game theory.learning in games, evolutionary stability, BNN

Time averages, recurrence and transience in the stochastic replicator dynamics

We investigate the long-run behavior of a stochastic replicator process, which describes game dynamics for a symmetric two-player game under aggregate shocks. We establish an averaging principle that relates time averages of the process and Nash equilibria of a suitably modified game. Furthermore, a sufficient condition for transience is given in terms of mixed equilibria and definiteness of the payoff matrix. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic stability of pure equilibria.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/08-AAP577 the Annals of Applied Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aap/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics

We present a class of games with a pure strategy being strictly dominated by another pure strategy such that the former survives along most solutions of the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics.Nash map, BNN dynamics, Dominated strategies

Robust permanence for interacting structured populations

The dynamics of interacting structured populations can be modeled by $\frac{dx_i}{dt}= A_i (x)x_i$ where $x_i\in \R^{n_i}$, $x=(x_1,\dots,x_k)$, and $A_i(x)$ are matrices with non-negative off-diagonal entries. These models are permanent if there exists a positive global attractor and are robustly permanent if they remain permanent following perturbations of $A_i(x)$. Necessary and sufficient conditions for robust permanence are derived using dominant Lyapunov exponents $\lambda_i(\mu)$ of the $A_i(x)$ with respect to invariant measures $\mu$. The necessary condition requires $\max_i \lambda_i(\mu)>0$ for all ergodic measures with support in the boundary of the non-negative cone. The sufficient condition requires that the boundary admits a Morse decomposition such that $\max_i \lambda_i(\mu)>0$ for all invariant measures $\mu$ supported by a component of the Morse decomposition. When the Morse components are Axiom A, uniquely ergodic, or support all but one population, the necessary and sufficient conditions are equivalent. Applications to spatial ecology, epidemiology, and gene networks are given

Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games

We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games (also know as games of identical interest). Some applications of these result to stochastic learning models are given.Games, Learning, Best Response Dynamics, Stochastic Fictitious Play, Mixed Strategy Equilibria, Zero Sum Games

Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.Evolutionary game theory, evolutionary game dynamics, nonconvergnece, dominated strategies

Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each generalized best reply correspondence we define a generalized best reply dynamics as a differential inclusion based on it. We call a face of the set of mixed strategy profiles a minimally asymptotically stable face (MASF) if it is asymptotically stable under some such dynamics and no subface of it is asymptotically stable under any such dynamics. The set of such correspondences (and dynamics) is endowed with the partial order of point-wise set-inclusion and, under a mild condition on the normal form of the game at hand, forms a complete lattice with meets based on point-wise intersections. The refined best reply correspondence is then defined as the smallest element of the set of all generalized best reply correspondences. We ultimately find that every Kalai and Samet's (1984) persistent retract, which coincide with Basu and Weibull's (1991) CURB sets based, however, on the refined best reply correspondence, contains a MASF. Conversely, every MASF must be a Voorneveld's (2004) prep set, again, however, based on the refined best reply correspondence.Evolutionary game theory, best response dynamics, CURB sets, persistent retracts, asymptotic stability, Nash equilibrium refinements, learning