FDI, Allocation of Talents and Differences in Regulation

This paper presents evidence on the effect of countries proximity in regulation on bilateral FDI flows. By exploiting the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics and data on nationwide regulation levels, we find a significant negative effect of the absolute value of the difference between countries indexes of regulation on the associated bilateral flows of FDIs, controlling for each country regulation level. Motivated by this evidence, we build a model where agents are heterogeneous and differ in their abilities to be entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs may engage in FDIs, which entails incurring additional fixed costs, one of which is the cost of learning the foreign regulation. In this framework, more similar regulations foster FDI, raise wages, output and productivity. The increase in productivity is the consequence of very efficient foreign entrepreneurs driving out of the market inefficient local firms, improving the allocation of talent in the economy as a whole.Multinational Firms, Heterogeneous Agents, Policy Harmonization

Employment Turnover and Unemployment Insurance

Two features distinguish European and US labor markets. First, most European countries have substantially more generous unemployment insurance. Second, the duration of unemployment and employment spells are substantially higher in Europe - employment turnover is lower. We show that self-insurance, i.e., saving and borrowing, is a good substitute for unemployment insurance when turnover is high as in the US. If the insurance system is less than perfectly actuarially fair, the employed median voter will prefer to self-insure instead of having unemployment insurance if turnover is high. We also show that high unemployment insurance make unemployed more willing to wait for a job with low separation rates. This could make both high turnover/low insurance (US) and low turnover/high insurance (Europe) stable equilibria. Low turnover also leads to a strong divergence between the long and short run interest of the employed. In abscence of devices such that the median voter can bind future voters to some level of insurance, the voting cycle must thus be long in order to support a high level of insurance.labor markets; unemployment insurance; employment turnover; self-insurance; median voter; stable equilibria

Who’s Afraid of a Globalized World? Foreign Direct Investments, Local Knowledge and Allocation of Talents

We study the distributional effects of globalization within a model of heterogeneous agents where both managerial talent and knowledge of the local economic environment are required in order to set up a firm in a given country. Therefore, agents willing to set up a firm in a foreign country need to incur a learning cost that depends on how different is the foreign entrepreneurial environments from the domestic one. In this context, we show that globalization fosters FDI and raises wages, output and productivity. Moreover, it benefits workers and highly talented multinational entrepreneurs, while harming low-ability domestic producers. The effects of openness follow from highly efficient foreign entrepreneurs driving inefficient local firms out of the market. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the implications of the model, showing a significant negative effect of the distance between nationwide regulations indexes on bilateral FDI flows.Multinational Firms, Heterogeneous Agents, Policy Harmonization

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau : an experiment on social insurance

We perform an experiment on social insurance to provide a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. There is no social contract by which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau

Intergenerational Mobility and the Informative Content of Surnames

We propose an alternative method for measuring intergenerational mobility. Traditional methods based on panel data provide measurements that are scarce, difficult to compare across countries and almost impossible to get across time. In particular this means that we do not know how intergenerational mobility is correlated with growth, income or the degree of inequality. Our proposal is to measure the informative content of surnames in one census. The more information does the surname have on the income of an individual, the more important is background in determining outcomes; and thus, the less mobility there is. The reason for this is that surnames inform on family relationships because the distribution of surnames is necessarily much skewed. A large percentage of the population is bound to have a very unfrequent surname. For them the partition generated by surnames is very informative on family linkages. First, we develop a model whose endogenous variable is the joint distribution of surnames and income. Then we explore the relationship between mobility and the informative content of surnames. We allow for assortative mating to be a determinant of both. Then, we use our methodology to show that in a large Spanish region the informative content of surnames is large and consistent with the model. We also show that it has increased over time, indicating a substantial drop in the degree of mobility. Finally, using the peculiarities of the Spanish surname convention we show that the degree of assortative mating has also increased over time, in such a manner that might explain the decrease in mobility observed. Our method allows us to provide measures of mobility comparable across time. It should also allow us to study other issues related to inheritance.inheritance, birth-death processes, cross-sectional data, population genetics

The gains from economic integration

This paper measures the effect of political integration, such as sharing a national state or economic union, on the degree of trade integration. Consistently with previous work, we find large border effects. However, such estimates may be biased and overestimate the effects of borders because of endogeneity: selection into sharing a political space is correlated with affinities for trade. We propose a method to address this and we produce estimates which are closer to the causal effect. We then conduct speculative exercises showing the costs and benefits of the changing levels of integration associated with: the independence of Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country from the UK and Spain (but remaining within the European Union); the UK's exit from the EU; the break-up of the EU itself; and closer integration within the EU so that its internal borders appear similar to the internal borders of individual countries (as opposed to its current state of being simply a closely integrated group of countries). We find that the border effect between countries is an order of magnitude larger than the border effect associated with the European Union

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that can explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility, unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote over unemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects of insurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration. Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their current location, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent's attachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UI reduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The main result is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiple steady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment, low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one 'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility and low unemployment insurance.Employment, migration, geographical mobility, political equilibrium, unemployment insurance, voting

The names in Spain are mainly not in vain: Intergenerational mobility and the informational content of surnames

The paper presents a (genetic) model of the joint distribution of surnames and income. It shows that we can infer how important background is by looking at how informative surnames are. Extensions of the model allow for the possibility of assortative mating, and the introduction of ethnic differences in the income process (due to discrimination or any other reason).This paper was presented at the launch of SIRE, November 2007 and has also been published as CEPR Discussion Paper Number 81

Intergenerational Mobility and the Informative Content of Surnames

We propose a new methodology for measuring intergenerational mobility in economic wellbeing. Our method is based on the joint distribution of surnames and economic outcomes. It circumvents the need for intergenerational panel data, a long-standing stumbling block for understanding mobility. A single cross-sectional dataset is su cient. Our main idea is simple. If `inheritance' is important for economic outcomes, then rare surnames should predict economic outcomes in the cross-section. This is because rare surnames are indicative of familial linkages. Of course, if the number of rare surnames is small, this won't work. But rare surnames are abundant in the highly-skewed nature of surname distributions from most Western societies. We develop a model that articulates this idea and shows that the more important is inheritance, the more informative will be surnames. This result is robust to a variety of di erent assumptions about fertility and mating. We apply our method using the 2001 census from Catalonia, a large region of Spain. We use educational attainment as a proxy for overall economic well-being. Our main nding is that mobility has decreased among the di erent generations of the 20th century. A complementary analysis based on sibling correlations con rms our results and provides a robustness check on our method. Our model and our data allow us to examine one possible explanation for the observed decrease in mobility. We nd that the degree of assortative mating has increased over time. Overall, we argue that our method has promise because it can tap the vast mines of census data that are available in a heretofore unexploited manner