A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?

An important, though oft neglected, distinction between multilateral treaty obligations separates obligations of the bilateral nature from those of the collective or erga omnes partes type. Multilateral obligations of the bilateral type can be reduced to a compilation of bilateral, state-to-state relations. They can be compared to contracts. Collective obligations, in contrast, cannot be divided into bilateral components. They are concluded in pursuit of a collective interest that transcends the individual interests of the contracting parties. The standard example of such obligations are those arising under a human rights treaty. In domestic law, collective obligations can be compared to criminal law statutes or even domestic constitutions. This essay examines the origins of the distinction between bilateral and collective obligations, as well as its major consequences, both in law of treaties and the law on state responsibility. On that basis, a wider typology of multilateral treaty obligations is suggested. In the exercise, obligations arising under the World Trade Organization are used as a case study. The argument is made that WTO obligations remain essentially of the bilateral type; they are not collective in nature

How Binding Are WTO Rules? A Transatlantic Analysis of International Law

Presented at the University of Tuebingen, 14-16 October 2004 Conference on Changing Patterns of Authority in the Global Political Econom

Book Review

Reviewing Deborah Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System (Oxford University Press, 2005

How Strongly Should We Protect and Enforce International Law?, University of Chicago Law School Workshop, March 2006

Observers of international law are obsessed with trying to explain and predict why and when states comply with international law. Doing so, they have consistently overlooked a logically preceding, but no less important, question: To what extent should states perform their international commitments? Put differently, how strongly should we protect and enforce international law? Worrying as much about over-enforcement of international law as under-enforcement of international law, this article offers a theory of relative normativity. This theory is driven by efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy concerns rather than a hierarchy of values. It makes distinctions between how international law allocates entitlements, how it protects entitlements and how it reacts when rules of protection are broken (back-up enforcement). My central claim is that, much like domestic law, international law is best protected on a sliding scale between strict inalienability and simple liability. From that perspective, both what I call European \u27absolutism\u27 and American \u27voluntarism\u27 must be avoided as extreme and homogeneous normative frameworks

The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization, and Reforming the WTO

In January 2005, at the 10th anniversary of the organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO) issued the long-awaited high-level panel report on The Future of the WTO. This essay explains why the so-called Sutherland Report, named after one of its authors, is likely to be regarded by history as a missed opportunity. The report was written by insiders, focuses on insider problems and offers what are essentially insider-based solutions. The essay addresses two specific foundational problems skirted in the Sutherland report: (i) the WTO\u27s protectionist/producer bias and (ii) the question of coordination and coherence with other international organizations. It also offers an alternative diagnosis of the world trade system and suggests a novel paradigm to assess WTO reform proposals. Finally, some of the proposals in the Sutherland report are examined in light of this novel paradigm

Book Review, Just Trade

Reviewing, Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Inequality and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade (2003

Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of Public International Law

Information-Centric Networking (ICN) is a new research area concerning creating a new network architecture that would be more suitable for both current and the future's network. The MOSES (Mobile Opportunistic Services for Experience Sharing) project is part of this development. The project works with the development and demonstration of the Network of Information (NetInf) protocol, which is an implementation of the ICN concept. This Master’s thesis project is part of the MOSES project and aims to assist the MOSES project with the demonstration of a mobile opportunistic sharing concept based on the NetInf protocol. Demonstrating the MOSES concept in practice requires deep understanding of networking, localization, transport, and dissemination of digital content in an ad hoc network. This implementation requires an analysis of the previous work, development of new functionalities, and finally an analysis of a series of controlled experiments. This Master’s thesis project has designed, implemented, and evaluated an Android application within the MOSES framework by using the previously developed NetInf Android library. This prototype is used to demonstrate how mobile Android users can opportunistically share and disseminate content based on their location using the MOSES/ICN concept. The functionality and efficiency of the prototype Android application built during this thesis project has been analyzed and evaluated by conducting a series of controlled experiments under the supervision of MOSES researchers. The results of these controlled experiments has provided insight for MOSES researchers as well as explored the concept of using ICN (NetInf) for opportunistic content distribution. The experiment results aim at assisting MOSES researchers to extend and further develop the prototype application and the involved algorithms to create a fully functional mobile application for experience sharing services tailored to large-scale events.Information-Centric Networking (ICN) är ett nytt forskningsområde för att bygga en ny nätverksarkitektur mer passande för dagens och framtida nätverk. MOSES projektet är en del av denna utveckling och arbetar med utveckling och demonstration av Network of Information (NetInf) protokollet, som är en implementering av ICN konceptet. Detta examensarbete är en del av MOSES (Mobile Opportunistic Services for Experience Sharing) projektet som syftar till att bistå MOSES projektet med demonstrationen av "mobile opportunistic sharing" konceptet som bygger på NetInf protokollet. Att demonstrera MOSES konceptet i praktiken krävs djupt förståelse om nätverk, lokalisering, transport och spridning av digitalt data i en "ad hoc" och infrastruktur miljö. Genomförandet av denna implementering kräver en analys av tidigare arbete, utveckling av nya funktioner och slutligen analys av genomförda experiment och resultaten. Detta examensarbete har utformat, genomfört och utvärderat en Android applikation inom ramen för MOSES med hjälp av tidigare utvecklat NetInf Android bibliotek. Denna prototyp används för att visa hur mobila Android användare opportunistiskt kan dela och sprida innehåll baserat på deras plats med hjälp av MOSES/ICN konceptet. Funktionaliteten och effektiviteten av prototypen byggd under detta examensarbete har analyserats och utvärderats genom att utföra en serie kontrollerade experiment under ledning av MOSES forskare. Resultaten av dessa kontrollerade experiment har gett insikt åt MOSES forskare samt utforskat konceptet att använda ICN (NetInf) för opportunistisk distribution av innehåll. Experimentens resultat syftar till att hjälpa MOSES forskare att utöka och vidareutveckla prototypen och de involverade algoritmer för att skapa en fullt fungerande mobil applikation för "experience sharing services" anpassad för stora evenemang

Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO-NAFTA “Spaghetti Bowl” Is Cooking

With the Doha round in trouble, the so-called spaghetti bowl of multilateral trade rules and proliferating regional trade deals, is, once again, prominently on the radar screen of the international trade community. Perfect examples of this image are the longstanding US-Canada softwood lumber and US-Mexico sweetener disputes. Both trade spats, extensively litigated in NAFTA and the WTO, are close to reaching a climax. Fueling the suspense is that the WTO and NAFTA may reach different results

The Transformation of World Trade

This Article contests the traditional view of the evolution of the world trade system. Rather than a unidirectional process of legalization focused exclusively on the system\u27s normative structure, Part I of the Article, The Explosion of the GATT Club, recounts the transformation from GATT to WTO as a bidirectional interaction between law and politics; in particular, between the system\u27s legal-normative structure and its political, decision making branch Part II of this Article, The Threat of a WTO Fortress, challenges the view that a choice must be made between politics and law or, put differently, between, on the one hand, democratic representation, participation, contestation, and the inherent flexibility that comes with it and, on the other hand, discipline, pre-commitment, and some degree of government by experts or export driven interests shielded from capture and popular ignorance. On the contrary, my claim is that a legitimate and efficient trading system requires both politics and law, or more particularly, appropriate balances between participation and discipline, flexibility and pre-commitment, accountability and insulation, popular support and expertise, and input and output legitimacy

Rien Ne Va Plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulation From Market Access in GATT and GATS

Depending on how one classifies market intervention, trade liberalization disciplines can be lenient or strict. Perhaps the most important distinction in this respect is that between government intervention labeled as a market access restriction and that defined as domestic regulation. Both the GATT and the GATS declare market access restrictions (such as import quotas or limitations on the number of service suppliers) to be, in principle, prohibited. In contrast, domestic regulations (such as internal taxes, health standards, and safety requirements) are treated with much more deference. They are, in essence, only prohibited when discriminatory or more trade restrictive than necessary. Notwithstanding these major legal consequences, the distinction between market access and domestic regulation remains unclear. Based on a recent WTO dispute condemning the United States for banning online gambling, this article is an attempt to clarify the distinction. Starting from broad similarities, it finds crucial differences in this respect between GATT and GATS. For both, however, the paper\u27s basic point is that a domestic regulation should not be regarded as a market access restriction simply because it has the effect of banning certain imports. To do otherwise risks seriously undermining the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members beyond anything imagined by the drafters of the WTO treaty