Keck Spectroscopy of Faint 3 < z < 7 Lyman Break Galaxies: III. The Mean Ultraviolet Spectrum at z=4

We present and discuss the mean rest-frame ultraviolet spectrum for a sample of 81 Lyman Break Galaxies (LBGs) selected to be B-band dropouts with a mean redshift of z=3.9 and apparent magnitudes z_AB<26. Most of the individual spectra are drawn from our ongoing survey in the GOODS fields with the Keck DEIMOS spectrograph, and we have augmented our sample with published data taken with FORS2 on the VLT. In general we find similar trends in the spectral diagnostics to those found in the earlier, more extensive survey of LBGs at z=3 undertaken by Shapley et al (2003). Specifically, we find low-ionization absorption lines which trace the presence of neutral outflowing gas are weaker in galaxies with stronger Lyman-alpha emission, bluer UV spectral slopes, lower stellar masses, lower UV luminosities and smaller half-light radii. This is consistent with a physical picture whereby star formation drives outflows of neutral gas which scatters Lyman-alpha and gives rise to strong low-ionization absorption lines, while increasing the stellar mass, size, metallicity, and dust content of galaxies. Typical galaxies are thus expected to have stronger Lyman-alpha emission and weaker low-ionization absorption at earlier times (higher redshifts). Indeed, our mean spectrum at z=4 shows somewhat weaker low-ionization absorption lines than at z=3 and available data at higher redshift indicates a rapid decrease in low-ionization absorption strength with redshift. We argue that the reduced low-ionization absorption is likely caused by a decrease in the covering fraction and/or velocity range of outflowing neutral gas at earlier epochs. Our continuing survey will enable us to extend these diagnostics more reliably to higher redshift and determine the implications for the escape fraction of ionizing photons which governs the role of early galaxies in cosmic reionization. [Abridged]Comment: 17 pages, 12 figures, submitted to ApJ. Comments welcom

"Seize the state, seize the day": state capture, corruption, and influence in transition

The main challenge of the transition has been to redefine how the state interacts with firms, but little attention has been paid to the flip side of the relationship : how firms influence the state - especially how they exert influence on, and collude with public officials to extract advantages. Some firms in transition economies have been able to shape the rules of the game to their own advantage, at considerable social cost, creating what the authors call a"capture economy"in many countries. In the capture economy, public officials, and politicians privately sell under-provided public goods, and a range of rent-generating advantages"a la carte"to individual firms. The authors empirically investigate the dynamics of the capture economy, on the basis of new firm-level data from the 1999 Business Environment and enterprise performance survey (BEEPS), which permits the unbundling of corruption into meaningful, and measurable components. they contrast state capture (firms shaping, and affecting formulation of the rules of the game through private payments to public officials, and politicians) with influence (doing the same without recourse to payments), and with administrative corruption ("petty"forms of bribery in connection with the implementation of laws, rules, and regulations). They develop economy-wide measures for these phenomena, which are then subject to empirical measurement utilizing the BEEPS data. State capture, influence, and administrative corruption are all shown to have distinct causes, and consequences. Large incumbent firms with formal ties to the state tend to inherit influence as a legacy of the past, and tend to enjoy more secure property, and contractual rights, and higher growth rates. To compete against these influential incumbents, new entrants turn to state capture as a strategic choice - not as a substitute for innovation, but to compensate for weaknesses in the legal, and regulatory framework. When the state under-provides the public goods needed for entry and competition,"captor"firms purchase directly from the state, such private benefits as secure property rights, and removal of obstacles to improved performance - but only in a capture economy. Consistent with empirical findings in previous research on petty corruption, administrative corruption - unlike both capture and influence - is not associated with specific benefits for the firm. The focus of reform should be shifted toward channeling firms'strategies in the direction of more legitimate forms of influence, involving societal"voice", transparency reform, political accountability, and economic competition, Where state capture has distorted reform to create (or preserve) monopolistic structures, supported by powerful political interests, the challenge is particularly daunting.Roads&Highways,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Decentralization,Economic Theory&Research,National Governance,National Governance,Governance Indicators,Economic Theory&Research,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Microfinance

Far From Home: Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies?

Based on the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) of firms in transition countries, which unbundles corruption to measure different types of corrupt transactions and provide detailed information on the characteristics and performance of firms, we find that: i) corruption reduces FDI inflows and attracts lower quality investment in terms of governance standards; ii) in misgoverned settings, FDI firms may magnify the problems of state capture and procurement kickbacks, while paying a lower overall bribe burden than domestic firms; iii) FDI firms undertake those forms of corruption that suit their comparative advantages, generating substantial gains for them and challenging the premise that they are coerced, which makes it difficult to develop effective constraints on such behavior; and, iv) transnational legal restrictions to prevent bribery had not led to higher standards of corporate conduct among foreign investors by the year 2000. Rather than being construed as a case against foreign investment; we argue that state capture is created and maintained through restrictions on competition and entry in strategic sectors. Thus, enhancing competition by attracting a wider, more diverse set of FDI firms is critical to the broader strategic framework of fighting state capture and corruption.foreign direct investment, FDI, kickbacks, state capture, bribery, corporate governance, corruption, governance, transition economies

Measuring Governance, Corruption and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies

Recent studies have focussed on the characteristics and policies of the state to explain the extent and causes of corruption, with little attention paid to the role played by firms. Consequently, the links between corporate governance and national governance have been unexplored. This paper summarises the results of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) across 20 transition economies, providing an assessment of governance and corruption from the perspective of firms. The BEEPS is part of the global World Business Environment Survey being carried out by the World Bank. The survey design permits an in-depth empirical analysis of governance and corruption, unbundling governance into its component dimensions. This allows a more detailed quantitative assessment of corruption, a more nuanced understanding of the causes of the problem and as a result a stronger foundation for policy advice. Particular attention is paid to 'state capture' by parts of the corporate sector (i.e. the propensity of firms to shape the underlying 'rules of the game' including 'purchase' of legislation and court decisions). The survey also provides measures of other dimensions of 'grand corruption', such as that related to public procurement. Typically, cross-country surveys suffer from a potential bias if firms have a tendency to systematically over- or under-estimate the extent of problems in their own country. We implement a simple method for evaluating the extent of this 'country perception bias' and find little evidence pointing to such bias in the BEEPS.Governance, corruption, state capture, transition economies

Measuring governance, corruption, and State capture - how firms and bureaucrats shape the business environment in transition economies

As a symptom of fundamental institutional weaknesses, corruption needs to be viewed within a broader governance framework. It thrives where the state is unable to reign over its bureaucracy, to protect property and contractual rights, or to provide institutions that support the rule off law. Furthermore, governance failures at the national level cannot be isolated from the interface between the corporate and state sectors, in particular from the heretofore under-emphasized influence that firms may exert on the state. Under certain conditions, corporate strategies may exacerbate mis-governance at the national level. An in-depth empirical assessment of the links between corporate behavior and national governance can thus provide particular insights. The 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) - the transition economies component of the ongoing World Business Environment Survey - assesses in detail the various dimensions of governance from the perspective of about 3,000 firms in 20 countries. After introducing the survey framework and measurement approach, the authors present the survey results, focusing on governance, corruption, and state capture. By unbundling governance into its many dimensions, BEEPS permits an in-depth empirical assessment. The authors pay special attention to certain forms of grand corruption, notably state capture by parts of the corporate sector - that is, the propensity of firms to shape the underlying rules of the game by"purchasing"decrees, legislation, and influence at the central bank, which is found to be prevalent in a number of transition economies. The survey also measures other dimensions of grand corruption, including those associated with public procurement, and quantifies the more traditional ("prettier") forms of corruption. Cross-country surveys may suffer from bias if firms tend to systematically over- or underestimate the extent of problems within their country. The authors provide a new test of this potential bias, finding little evidence of country perception bias in BEEPS.Small Scale Enterprise,Decentralization,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Small and Medium Size Enterprises,National Governance,Governance Indicators,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance

Macroscopic and microscopic studies of electrical properties of very thin silicon dioxide subject to electrical stress

The electrical characteristics of various size tunnel switch diode devices, composed of Al/SiO2/n-Si/p+-Si layers, which operate with a range of parameters (such as current densities in excess of 104 A/cm2) that stress the oxide layer far beyond the levels used in typical thin oxide metal-oxide semiconductor research have been examined. It is found that the first time a large current and electric field are applied to the device, a "forming" process enhances transport through the oxide in the vicinity of the edges of the gate electrode, but the oxide still retains its integrity as a tunnel barrier. The device operation is relatively stable to stresses of greater than 107 C/cm2 areally averaged, time-integrated charge injection. Duplication and characterization of these modified oxide tunneling properties was attempted using scanning tunneling microscopy (STM) to stress and probe the oxide. Electrical stressing with the STM tip creates regions of reduced conductivity, possibly resulting from trapped charge in the oxide. Lateral variations in the conductivity of the unstressed oxide over regions roughly 20–50 nm across were also found

Propulsion Overview of the Orion Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) Flight-Test Vehicle

The NASA Orion Flight Test Office was tasked with conducting a series of flight tests in several launch abort scenarios to certify that the Orion Launch Abort System is capable of delivering astronauts aboard the Orion Crew Module to a safe environment, away from a failed booster. The first of this series was the Orion Pad Abort 1 Flight-Test Vehicle, which was successfully flown on May 6, 2010 at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. This presentation provides a concise overview of the three propulsive subsystems used on the Pad Abort 1 Flight-Test Vehicle. Although the Constellation program has been cancelled and the operational role of the Orion spacecraft has significantly evolved, lessons learned from Pad Abort 1 could certainly contribute to the vehicle architecture of many future human-rated space launch vehicle

Prison as Seen by Convict Criminologists

Most criminologists tend to base their view of prison on ideological assumptions gathered from secondary sources, with at best limited entry to the prison world. They nearly always get it wrong, as they systematically exclude the perspectives and real life experiences of their human subjects. These academic researchers have contributed to poor public policy that promotes the violent repression of prisoners in the USA and other countries. In response, Convict Criminologists are ex‐convicts working as criminology and criminal justice professors, along with “non‐con” associates, that insist that as a means for societies to develop humane, effective, and cost efficient prisons, we must develop ways to incorporate the voice of prisoners in our theorizing about, policy recommendations for, and management of the prison