Experimental Philosophy, Noisy Intuitions, and Messy Inferences

Much discussion about experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology has been framed in terms of the reliability of intuitions, and even when it has not been about reliability per se, it has been focused on whether intuitions meet whatever conditions they need to meet to be trustworthy as evidence. But really that question cannot be answered independently from the questions, evidence for what theories arrived at by what sorts of inferences? I will contend here that not just philosophy's sources of evidence, but also its inferential resources, are in great need of closer examination

The Methodological Necessity of Experimental Philosophy

Must philosophers incorporate tools of experimental science into their methodological toolbox? I argue here that they must. Tallying up all the resources that are now part of standard practice in analytic philosophy, we see the problem that they do not include adequate resources for detecting and correcting for their own biases and proclivities towards error. Methodologically sufficient resources for error- detection and error-correction can only come, in part, from the deployment of specific methods from the sciences. However, we need not imagine that the resulting methodological norms will be so empirically demanding as to require that all appeals to intuition must first be precertified by a thorough vetting by teams of scientists. Rather, I sketch a set of more moderate methodological norms for how we might best include these necessary tools of experimental philosophy

Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-Fitting: A methodological argument for JTB?

The developing body of empirical work on the "Gettier effect" indicates that, in general, the presence of a Gettier-type structure in a case makes participants less likely to attribute knowledge in that case. But is that a sufficient reason to diverge from a JTB theory of knowledge? I argue that considerations of good model selection, and worries about noise and overfitting, should lead us to consider that a live, open question. The Gettier effect is perhaps so transient, and so sensitive to other, epistemologically-inappropriate factors, that it raises the question of whether it ought to be counted as something to include in our theories -- or as a piece of noise to be excluded from them

Normativity and epistemic intuitions

Journal ArticleIn this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizable group of epistemological projects -- a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition -- would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in section 2. The second claim is that while the jury is still out, there is now a substantial body of evidence suggesting that some of those empirical hypotheses are true. Much of this evidence derives from an ongoing series of experimental studies of epistemic intuitions that we have been conducting. A preliminary report on these studies will be presented in section 3. In light of these studies, we think it is incumbent on those who pursue the epistemological projects in question to either explain why the truth of the hypotheses does not undermine their projects, or to say why, in light of the evidence we will present, they nonetheless assume that the hypotheses are false. In section 4, which is devoted to Objections and Replies, we'll consider some of the ways in which defenders of the projects we are criticizing might reply to our challenge. Our goal is not to offer a conclusive argument demonstrating that the epistemological projects we will be criticizing are untenable. Rather, our aim is to shift the burden of argument. For far too long, epistemologists who rely heavily on epistemic intuitions have proceeded as though they could simply ignore the empirical hypotheses we will set out. We will be well satisfied if we succeed in making a plausible case for the claim that this approach is no longer acceptable

Innateness as closed process invariance

Journal ArticleAlthough we are enthusiastic about a Darwinian approach to culture, we argue that the overview presented in the target article does not sufficiently emphasize the crucial explanatory role that psychology plays in the study of culture. We use a number of examples to illustrate the variety of ways by which appeal to psychological factors can help explain cultural phenomena

Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy

Standard philosophical methodology which proceeds by appeal to intuitions accessible "from the armchair" has come under criticism on the basis of empirical work indicating unanticipated variability of such intuitions. Loose constitutivity---the idea that intuitions are partly, but not strictly, constitutive of the concepts that appear in them---offers an interesting line of response to this empirical challenge. On a loose constitutivist view, it is unlikely that our intuitions are incorrect across the board, since they partly fix the facts in question. But we argue that this ratification of intuitions is at best rough and generic, and can only do the required methodological work if it operates in conjunction with some sort of further criteria of theory selection. We consider two that we find in the literature: naturalness (Brian Weatherson, borrowing from Lewis) and charity (Henry Jackman, borrowing from Davidson). At the end of the day, neither provides the armchair philosopher complete shelter from extra-armchair inquiry

The helicase Ded1p controls use of near-cognate translation initiation codons in 5' UTRs.

The conserved and essential DEAD-box RNA helicase Ded1p from yeast and its mammalian orthologue DDX3 are critical for the initiation of translation1. Mutations in DDX3 are linked to tumorigenesis2-4 and intellectual disability5, and the enzyme is targeted by a range of viruses6. How Ded1p and its orthologues engage RNAs during the initiation of translation is unknown. Here we show, by integrating transcriptome-wide analyses of translation, RNA structure and Ded1p-RNA binding, that the effects of Ded1p on the initiation of translation are connected to near-cognate initiation codons in 5' untranslated regions. Ded1p associates with the translation pre-initiation complex at the mRNA entry channel and repressing the activity of Ded1p leads to the accumulation of RNA structure in 5' untranslated regions, the initiation of translation from near-cognate start codons immediately upstream of these structures and decreased protein synthesis from the corresponding main open reading frames. The data reveal a program for the regulation of translation that links Ded1p, the activation of near-cognate start codons and mRNA structure. This program has a role in meiosis, in which a marked decrease in the levels of Ded1p is accompanied by the activation of the alternative translation initiation sites that are seen when the activity of Ded1p is repressed. Our observations indicate that Ded1p affects translation initiation by controlling the use of near-cognate initiation codons that are proximal to mRNA structure in 5' untranslated regions

Two-Photon Interferometry for High-Resolution Imaging

We discuss advantages of using non-classical states of light for two aspects of optical imaging: creating of miniature images on photosensitive substrates, which constitutes the foundation for optical lithography, and imaging of micro objects. In both cases, the classical resolution limit given by the Rayleigh criterion is approximately a half of the optical wavelength. It has been shown, however, that by using multi-photon quantum states of the light field, and multi-photon sensitive material or detector, this limit can be surpassed. We give a rigorous quantum mechanical treatment of this problem, address some particularly widespread misconceptions and discuss the requirements for turning the research on quantum imaging into a practical technology.Comment: Presented at PQE 2001. To appear in Special Issue of Journal of Modern Optic

Effective Lagrangians and Parity-Conserving Time-Reversal Violation at Low Energies

Using effective Lagrangians, we argue that any time-reversal-violating but parity-conserving effects are too small to be observed in flavor-conserving nuclear processes without dramatic improvement in experimental accuracy. In the process we discuss other arguments that have appeared in the literature.Comment: Revised manuscript, 11 pages, RevTex, epsf.st