MySpace and Facebook: Applying the Uses and Gratifications Theory to Exploring Friend-Networking Sites

The increased use of the Internet as a new tool in communication has changed the way people interact. This fact is even more evident in the recent development and use of friend-networking sites. However, no research has evaluated these sites and their impact on college students. Therefore, the present study was conducted to evaluate: (a) why people use these friend-networking sites, (b) what the characteristics are of the typical college user, and (c) what uses and gratifications are met by using these sites. Results indicated that the vast majority of college students are using these friend-networking sites for a significant portion of their day for reasons such as making new friends and locating old friends. Additionally, both men and women of traditional college age are equally engaging in this form of online communication with this result holding true for nearly all ethnic groups. Finally, results showed that many uses and gratifications are met by users (e.g., “keeping in touch with friends”). Results are discussed in light of the impact that friend-networking sites have on communication and social needs of college students

Improving use of statistical information by jurors by reducing confusion of the inverse

Doctor of PhilosophyDepartment of PsychologyJames ShanteauIn many situations, people are called on to make judgments about the likelihood of an event. Research has shown that when people make these judgments, they frequently equate or confuse conditional probabilities with other conditional probabilities. This equating or confusing of conditional probabilities is known as the confusion of the inverse. Research investigating this problem typically focuses on clinical and medical decision-making and the use of statistical evidence to make diagnoses. However, one area in which the confusion of the inverse has not been studied is in juror decision-making. Thus, the purpose of this dissertation was to (1) determine if the confusion of the inverse influences juror decision-making, (2) interpret reasons why this confusion occurs, and (3) attempt to eliminate it from juror decision-making. Jurors were presented with four court cases gathered from local and federal courthouses in a small Mid-western city. In each of the four cases, a single piece of evidence was presented (statistical only) which was to be used when rendering verdicts. Finally, each case contained juror instructions for the specific case type: murder, kidnapping, arson, sexual assault. Overall, jurors fell prey to the confusion of the inverse, equating the probability of the data given the hypothesis [P(D|H)] with the probability of the hypothesis given the data [P(H|D)]. However, the research was unable to reduce the effect, much less eliminate it from the task. Interestingly, jurors tended to ignore the statistical evidence (i.e., estimations about probability of a match) in favor of their own personal believe in the strength of the evidence. Although the original intent of reducing/eliminating the confusion of the inverse was not accomplished, the dissertation did accomplish three things. First, researchers have hypothesized three reasons why people engage in incorrect probabilistic reasoning, and the dissertation affirmed that it is indeed a function of the confusion of conditional probabilities – the confusion of the inverse. Second, it seems that the use of statistical evidence in a trial is ignored by most jurors in favor of their own personal belief in the evidence’s strength. Finally, the criteria needed for “beyond a reasonable doubt” may be too stringent

Examining the Priority Heuristic in Conditions of Resource Need Levels

Within the domain of risky decision making, there are a number of predictive models which are consistent with the hypothesis that human minds are molded for specific behavioral patterns based on environmental cues. Two models are the priority heuristic and risk sensitive foraging. Using a modified version of the traditional risky choice gambles paradigm, a study was designed to tease apart specific predictions made by each of these two models. It was discovered that the best explanation for choice behavior was consistent with risk sensitive foraging. This was true for risky preferences in gambles. Also, decision time predictions from the priority heuristic were not supported. Collectively, this may show additional support for risk-sensitivity driving some human behaviors. It may also carve out the boundaries for the proper “ecology” of the priority heuristic. </jats:p