Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization in Simple Plurality Elections with Probabilistic Voters

In this paper I examine single member, simple plurality elections with n > 2 probabilistic voters and show that the maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability of victory are “generically different” in a specific sense. More specifically, I first describe finite shyness (Anderson and Zame (2000)), a notion of genericity for infinite dimensional spaces. Using this notion, I show that, for any policy x in the interior of the policy space and any candidate j, the set of n-dimensional profiles of twice continuously differentiable probabilistic voting functions for which x simultaneously satisfies the first and second order conditions for maximization of j’s probability of victory and j’s expected vote share at x is finitely shy with respect to the set of n-dimensional profiles of twice continuously differentiable probabilistic voting functions for which x satisfies the first and second order conditions for maximization of j’s expected vote share.Equivalence, Genericity, Candidate objectives, Probabilistic voting

Loss Aversion, Presidential Responsibility, and Midterm Congressional Elections

I explore a behavioral model of political participation, first introduced by Quattrone and Tversky [1988], based on the primitives of prospect theory, as defined by Kahneman and Tversky [1979]. The model offers an alternative explanation for why the President’s party tends to lose seats in midterm congressional elections. The model is examined empirically and compared against competing explanations for the “midterm phenomenon”.Loss aversion, midterm elections, congressional elections, negative voting, midterm effect

Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Capacity

In this paper we investigate how “civil service” personnel management interacts with bureaucratic discretion to create high capacity, expert bureaucracies populated by policy-motivated agents. We build a model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship specific) policy expertise, and may be either policy-motivated or policy-indifferent. We show that under specific conditions on the nature of expertise and bureaucratic discretion over policy choices, merit system protections for job tenure encourage the development of expertise and problem solving capacity in the bureaucracy. In addition, we identify conditions under which typical civil service rules encourage policy-motivated bureaucrats to enter and remain in public service, and policy- indifferent bureaucrats to leave it.Bureaucracy, Expertise, Discretion, Civil Service

“Wir streiken!”: Music and Political Activism in Cold War Germany

Using print media such as band biographies, books, and journals that address youth, popular culture, and music in the German context, this thesis analyzes how music and musicians influenced political protest movements in West Germany during the Cold War and how, in turn, protest movements fostered the career of musicians. The relationship between music and social change in Germany throughout the Cold War is complicated and contains many aspects. This thesis focuses mainly on the effect American and British music had on divided Germany and examines how these influences helped shape the cultural climate in which political protests emerged. It further addresses the question of how we understand the fact that the success of the bands often outlived the political protest movements

Life of Lucius Compton : the mountaineer evangelist

https://place.asburyseminary.edu/firstfruitsheritagematerial/1167/thumbnail.jp

Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making

Important conceptualizations of both interest groups and bureaucratic agencies suggest that these institutions provide legislatures with greater information for use in policy making. Yet little is known about how these information sources interact in the policy process as a whole. In this paper we consider this issue analytically, and develop a model of policy making in which multiple sources of information – from the bureaucracy, an interest group, or a legislature’s own in-house development – can be brought to bear on policy. Lobbyists begin this process by selecting a venue – Congress or a standing bureaucracy – in which to press for a policy change. The main findings of the paper are that self-selection of lobbyists into different policy making venues can be informative per se; that this self-selection can make legislatures willing to delegate more authority to ideologically distinct bureaucratic agents; and that delegation of authority, while it takes advantage of agency expertise, can nevertheless lead to an increase in the legislature’s own in-house information gathering (e.g., hearings). Changes within the Federal Trade Commission during the 1970s are reinterpreted in the context of our model.Delegation, Lobbying, Bureaucracy, Venue Choice, Discretion

Empathy, Ethics, and Empowerment: Supervising the Transpersonal Therapist

This grounded theory study addressed the question What model explains the essential qualities, skills, and competencies of an effective supervisory relationship for transpersonal therapists in training? It emerged out of a recognition that current training models for supervisors were not inclusive of competencies to address the needs of therapist trainees who are oriented toward a transpersonal approach to psychotherapy. The results of 22 interviews with trainees and supervisors surfaced a fundamental tension within the supervisory relationship in the distinction among the primary responsibility of the supervisor for ensuring client welfare, and encouraging supervisees to develop their personal therapeutic orientation and the self of the therapist. Emergent themes describe the nature of a supervisory relationship that encourages development of all of the gifts of the therapist while training for competence

Comparison of Raw Acceleration from the GENEA and ActiGraph™ GT3X+ Activity Monitors

Purpose: To compare raw acceleration output of the ActiGraph™ GT3X+ and GENEA activity monitors. Methods: A GT3X+ and GENEA were oscillated in an orbital shaker at frequencies ranging from 0.7 to 4.0 Hz (ten 2-min trials/frequency) on a fixed radius of 5.08 cm. Additionally, 10 participants (age = 23.8 ± 5.4 years) wore the GT3X+ and GENEA on the dominant wrist and performed treadmill walking (2.0 and 3.5 mph) and running (5.5 and 7.5 mph) and simulated free-living activities (computer work, cleaning a room, vacuuming and throwing a ball) for 2-min each. A linear mixed model was used to compare the mean triaxial vector magnitude (VM) from the GT3X+ and GENEA at each oscillation frequency. For the human testing protocol, random forest machine-learning technique was used to develop two models using frequency domain (FD) and time domain (TD) features for each monitor. We compared activity type recognition accuracy between the GT3X+ and GENEA when the prediction model was fit using one monitor and then applied to the other. Z-statistics were used to compare the proportion of accurate predictions from the GT3X+ and GENEA for each model. Results: GENEA produced significantly higher (p \u3c 0.05, 3.5 to 6.2%) mean VM than GT3X+ at all frequencies during shaker testing. Training the model using TD input features on the GENEA and applied to GT3X+ data yielded significantly lower (p \u3c 0.05) prediction accuracy. Prediction accuracy was not compromised when interchangeably using FD models between monitors. Conclusions: It may be inappropriate to apply a model developed on the GENEA to predict activity type using GT3X+ data when input features are TD attributes of raw acceleration

A Theory of Voting in Large Elections

This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters’ strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and then proceed to show that, with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters’ utilities, a Nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory. This equilibrium (1) consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters’ utilities, (2) exists even when voters can abstain, and (3) is unique when there are only 2 candidates