Unlocking the Potential of the Congressional Review Act

The Congressional Review Act (CRA) permits Congress to overturn rules issued by federal agencies with a simple majority in each chamber. Traditionally, the CRA has been used as a negative tool, to cancel regulations adopted during the prior administration, including the 14 Obama-era rules Congress overturned during the first four months of the Trump administration. This Issue Brief by Professors Jody Freeman and Matthew Stephenson of Harvard Law School argues that the CRA's fast-track procedures have "substantially greater unrealized potential" and could be used as an affirmative tool to advance policy priorities without being subject to filibuster. In light of unprecedented congressional obstructionism, Freeman and Stephenson argue that exploring this nontraditional use of the CRA is "essential to the health of our democracy" and to returning Congress to its job of legislating

Regulatory Horcruxes

The regulator that designs and first implements a federal regulatory program does not always have the ability to control the timing and process of how that regulatory program will, in this Symposium’s language, “exit.” As the 2016 election has demonstrated, the initiating regulator cannot necessarily plan in advance for the program’s expiration, diminution, or scaling back. A successor instead wields this power. Whether one views this as a terrible thing or a salutary feature of democracy depends in part upon one’s relationship to the regulatory status quo, but also implicates broader questions about policy stability and democratic accountability. At the very least, however, this fact raises several important questions about strategic regulatory design. First, is it possible to insulate or harden regulatory programs from successor exit? And second, when, if ever, would this be a good thing? This Article offers a systematic account of how regulators can make regulatory exit more challenging by looking outward, beyond the walls of a single, primary federal agency to other potential regulators or co-regulators, including secondary federal agencies, the states, and private actors. This Article identifies as a potential antidote to regulatory exit a constellation of strategic techniques that I call regulatory horcruxes—much like the horcruxes Lord Voldemort created by placing portions of his soul into multiple external objects in order to ensure his immortality. An initiating regulator, be it Congress or a federal agency, can use such horcruxes in an effort to make successor exit more difficult by splitting programs beyond the walls of a single federal agency into other institutions. This Article first offers an analytical framework laying out five primary types of horcrux. It then examines horcruxes from a normative perspective, evaluating the comparative benefits and costs of their use in terms of their potential impact both on the durability of regulatory programs and on the quality of democratic deliberation. It acknowledges that horcruxes are an imperfect solution. Although dispersal or fragmentation of regulatory authority may insulate a program from deregulatory pressure, the fragmented regulatory program may exist in a weakened form that cannot accomplish as much as more direct, centralized regulation can. The Article concludes by offering a research agenda, including suggestions for further empirical research

Open-Access Losses and Delay in the Assignment of Property Rights

Even though formal property rights are the theoretical response to open access involving natural and environmental resources, they typically are adopted late after considerable waste has been endured. Instead, the usual response in local, national, and international settings is to rely upon uniform rules and standards as a means of constraining behavior. While providing some relief, these do not close the externality and excessive exploitation along unregulated margins continues. As external costs and resource values rise, there finally is a resort to property rights of some type. Transfers and other concessions to address distributional concerns affect the ability of the rights arrangement to mitigate open-access losses. This paper outlines the reasons why this pattern exists and presents three empirical examples of overfishing, over extraction from oil and gas reservoirs, and excessive air pollution to illustrate the main points.

The State Response to Climate Change: 50 State Survey

This survey accompanies Global Climate Change and U.S. Law, Second Edition (Michael B. Gerrard and Jody Freeman, eds, 2014). It compiles state legislation, rules and executive orders that specifically address climate change as of the end of April 2014. It also includes a wide variety of state activities that may have an impact on greenhouse gases including legislation related to energy efficiency and renewable energy. The focus of this material is to provide readers with an understanding of the range of state activity that may contribute to greenhouse gas reduction and climate change. Some types of energy efficiency, alternative fuels and renewable energy legislation (such as tax credits for hybrid vehicles) are very similar from state to state; some laws have a short duration and therefore may not be codified (such as temporary tax credits); energy legislation is being enacted at an increasing pace. As a result, not all energy efficiency, alternative fuels and renewable energy legislation and other activity in every state are included in this compilation

Supervising Outsourcing: The Need for Better Design of Blended Governance

We are long past the “vending machine”-style privatization of government functions – where the government contracts to buy a discrete product or service at a set price, whether aircraft components or landscaping. Government is increasingly enlisting, or collaborating with, private entities for functions long perceived as distinctly public. Private entities may make policy explicitly (through standards that agencies later adopt) or implicitly (through the third party verification of compliance with regulatory objectives). For example, the Department of Health and Human Services relies on the recommendations of an American Medical Association committee of specialist physicians to establish Medicare physician payments, while the US Department of Agriculture relies on private and state organizations to certify that food meets federal organic standards. Not only do these appear to be public functions, and important ones, but private actors also are exercising considerable discretion and sophisticated judgment in carrying them out. Meanwhile, as the examples suggest, many of these outsourcing relationships are far from the fairly structured principal–agent relationship that characterizes traditional outsourcing by contract

The Limits of Executive Power: The Obama-Trump Transition

I. Introduction II. Overview of Presidential Transitions III. Climate Change as an Illustration of Policy Change ... A. Obama-Era Climate Change Policy ... B. Trump Administration Changes to Climate Change Policy IV. Constraints on Presidential Policy Reversals V. Conclusion VI. Question and Answer Session ... A. Question 1—Failure to Comply with Paris Accord … B. Question 2—Informal Agency Rulemaking ... C. Question 3—The Kyoto Protocol ... D. Question 4—Chevron Deference ... E. Question 5—Separation of Power

Introduction & Coda, Multi-Party Dispute Resolution, Democracy and Decision Making: Vol. II of Complex Dispute Resolution

The Complex Dispute Resolution series collects essays on the development of foundational dispute resolution theory and practice and its application to increasingly more complex settings of conflicts in the world, including multi-party and multi-issue decision making, negotiations in political policy formation and governance, and international conflict resolution. Each volume contains an original introduction by the editor, which explores the key issues in the field. All three volumes feature essays which span an interdisciplinary range of fields, law, political science, game theory, decision science, economics, social and cognitive psychology, sociology and anthropology and consider issues in the uses of informal and private processes, as well as more formal and public processes. The essays question whether the development of universal theoretical insights about conflict resolution is possible with variable numbers of parties and issues and in multi-cultural and multi-jural settings. Each volume also presents a coda, summarizing key issues in the field and suggesting further avenues for research. The second volume (and the introductory essay here) applies the theoretical foundations and practices of primary processes in dispute resolution–negotiation, mediation, arbitration and some hybrid processes in both public and private, informal and formal settings to more complex multi-party and multi issue settings, and asks whether foundational theories must be altered when there are more parties and issues. What difference do larger numbers make in theory and practice of dispute resolution and decision making? Other theoretical and empirical observations of the role of third party neutrals and facilitators in multi-party settings are explored, and applied disciplines such as game theory and decision sciences are applied to complex dispute resolution settings. Illustrations of uses of these processes in different substantive areas, e.g. legal disputes, public policy decision making, politics and governance, environmental matters, institutional relations, and high conflict settings are provided. The volume collects classic articles in multi-party, multi-issue theory and practice while interrogating the issues of how the numbers of parties and issues, different contexts and cultures challenges our efforts to create generalizable theory and practice of human conflict resolution. The review essay also discusses recent efforts to seek correspondences and learning from application of conflict resolution theory and practice to the work on deliberative democracy and political decision making. The coda suggests avenues for future research. Some attention is paid to issues of ethics and political theory, as well as evaluation of efficacy, in the use of third party facilitators in public policy and governance disputes