Russian influence on news media in Belarus

This article investigates Russian media influence in Belarus during the second half of 2010, when an “information war” broke out between Moscow and Minsk. Samples of news content are analysed to reveal the varying portrayals of Russia generated by leading broadcasters and publishers; interviews with media professionals shed light on the forces which shaped the news. The article considers the outcomes of the information war and argues that the impact of Russian news exports lay more in their capacity to provoke than their capacity to “elicit attraction” as envisaged by the literature on soft power

While Russia’s narrative on Ukraine has been misleading, it should not be excluded from media reports in the West

Throughout the Ukraine crisis there has been persistent criticism from the West that the Russian media have presented intentionally misleading information on the conflict. Joanna Szostek writes that while there are legitimate concerns about the standard of reporting in organisations such as the state-funded broadcaster RT, to ban or exclude Russian perspectives from western media would be counter-productive. She argues that the best way to generate dialogue between both sides would be for western media organisations to engage with the issue tactfully by making a commitment to explain the fears and resentments underlying Russian (and Ukrainian separatist) views

The Power of Detraction: Belarusian Reporting of Russian Social Problems During "Information War"

The mass media play a prominent role in contemporary international relations. Foreign policy success is said to depend not on military or economic power alone, but on "whose story wins". Governments therefore construct "strategic narratives" to position, legitimize and characterize themselves in international affairs. In doing so, they tend to project negative characterizations of their rivals and adversaries. There has been less scholarly attention devoted to this "detractive" dimension of state-led efforts to persuade global audiences than to the "attractive" dimension, which is associated with the concept of soft power. However, the former has become increasingly salient, particularly in the post-Soviet region, where acrimonious "information wars" fought between Russia and some of its neighbours via the mass media are regular occurrences. This article contributes to the emerging literature on strategic narratives in international relations through a case study of the Belarusian state media and their reporting of Russian social problems. It focuses on the latter half of 2010, a period of heightened tension between Moscow and Minsk, when the Belarusian leadership was trying to legitimize its actions in the face of harsh criticism from the Kremlin. Empirically, the article is based on qualitative analysis of content from the leading state-controlled media in Belarus (three TV channels and one newspaper), plus interviews with editorial staff from those media outlets. The article demonstrates how reporting of Russian social policy in the Belarusian state-controlled media was carefully orchestrated to serve particular goals. By instructing editors to highlight instances of social neglect in Russia, the Belarusian leadership sought to undermine the public reputation of its critics in Moscow while simultaneously reaffirming close ties with Russia on the basis that bilateral discord was attributable to the Russian elite rather than any rifts with the ever "fraternal" Russian people. The research in this article provides a timely addition to scholarship that focuses exclusively on the positive-sum communication activities of governments in international relations

What happens to public diplomacy during information war? Critical reflections on the conceptual framing of international communication

Discussions about state-sponsored communication with foreign publics are increasingly framed in the language of “information war” rather than “public diplomacy,” particularly in Eastern Europe. For example, media projects supported by Western governments to engage Ukrainian audiences, and Ukrainian government efforts to engage international audiences via the media, are considered necessary responses in the information war with Russia. This article highlights several potentially problematic assumptions about communicative influence that are embedded in the language of information war. First is the assumption that communication can be targeted like a weapon to achieve a predictable impact. Second is the assumption that audiences engage with communication from an adversary because they are “vulnerable.” Third is the assumption that “winning” in an information war means getting citizens to believe particular facts. Although these assumptions may hold to some degree, this article argues that adopting them uncritically can have detrimental consequences in policymaking

Russia and the News Media in Ukraine:A Case of “Soft Power”?

The mass media are closely associated with the concept of “soft power.” In Russia, as in the West, politicians believe that favorable foreign media coverage can facilitate their foreign policy success. This article considers news coverage of Russia in Ukraine, a geopolitically important state where Russian “news exporters” have been a prominent feature of the media landscape in recent years. Using content analysis and original interviews with editorial staff, the article reveals factors that shaped reporting about Russia in Ukraine in 2010–2011. It demonstrates that news providers in Ukraine that had a Russian shareholder or partner tended to be more restrained in their criticism of Russia than comparable news providers without such Moscow connections. Yet it also reveals diversity among Russia’s news exporters: some clearly served Kremlin interests, while others were commercially driven and balanced demands from Moscow against the demands of their audience. The findings are relevant to assessments of Russian regional influence, as they highlight opportunities and challenges facing the Kremlin in its aspiration to secure an advantage from “Russian” media operating in the post-Soviet republics. More broadly, this article questions whether the conceptual framework of “soft power” is adequate to capture the complexities of Russian involvement in Ukraine’s media environment

Defence and Promotion of Desired State Identity in Russia’s Strategic Narrative

This article examines how the Russian state promotes and protects its preferred self-identity, using the conceptual framework of ‘strategic narrative’. Nation branding practices, including state-funded ‘mega-projects’ like the Sochi Olympics, have contributed to the narrative by characterising Russia as a welcoming, attractive destination. However, a more salient feature of Russia’s strategic narrative is intense ‘anti-Western’ and ‘anti-American’ political and media discourse, formulated to defend against rival, threatening narratives projected from other countries. Through analysis of official statements and state television content, this article demonstrates how determination to protect ‘great power’ and ‘European’ identities underlay Russia’s strategic narrative in 2014. It considers responses which the narrative has prompted, arguing that desired results in domestic reception have been achieved at the expense of unsatisfactory results internationally. Heavy-handed attacks on the identities of other states boost collective self-esteem among Russian citizens, but they fail to produce – and arguably obstruct – desired responses among foreign audiences

What happens to public diplomacy during information war? Critical reflections on the conceptual framing of international communication

Discussions about state-sponsored communication with foreign publics are increasingly framed in the language of “information war” rather than “public diplomacy,” particularly in Eastern Europe. For example, media projects supported by Western governments to engage Ukrainian audiences, and Ukrainian government efforts to engage international audiences via the media, are considered necessary responses in the information war with Russia. This article highlights several potentially problematic assumptions about communicative influence that are embedded in the language of information war. First is the assumption that communication can be targeted like a weapon to achieve a predictable impact. Second is the assumption that audiences engage with communication from an adversary because they are “vulnerable.” Third is the assumption that “winning” in an information war means getting citizens to believe particular facts. Although these assumptions may hold to some degree, this article argues that adopting them uncritically can have detrimental consequences in policymaking

The Media Battles of Ukraine's EuroMaidan

In November 2013, mass protests broke out in Ukraine when President Yanukovych chose not to sign a planned Association Agreement with the European Union. Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) became ‘EuroMaidan’ as huge crowds of demonstrators expressed their anger at the government. This essay examines the part played by journalists during EuroMaidan and the struggles around media resources that were central to these dramatic recent events in Ukrainian politics. Attention is devoted to journalist activism, the use of social networks, the emergence of new information sources, and the behaviour of leading national TV channels. Attempts to suppress anti-government narratives are described and their impact assessed. The essay identifies three weaknesses which combined to undermine Yanukovych’s position in the ‘battle for the narrative’: (1) dissent and activism among Ukraine’s professional journalist community; (2) the autonomous nature and increasing accessibility of online communication; and (3) the sensitivity of media-owning oligarchs to public and international opinion

Revolution in progress? Continuity and change in Ukrainian politics

No abstract available