Testing Forbearance Experimentally - Duopolistic Competition of Conglomerate Firms

Like Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and Phillips and Mason (1992) we test experimentally whether conglomerate firms, i.e., firms competing on multiple structurally unrelated markets, can effectively limit competition. Our more general analysis assumes differentiated rather than homogeneous products and distinguishes strategic substitutes as well as complements to test this forbearance hypothesis. Rather than only a partners design we also explore a random strangers design to disentangle effects of forbearance and repeated interaction. Surprisingly, conglomerate firms do not limit competition, they rather foster it. More in line with our expectations we find more cooperation in complement markets than in substitute markets and also more cooperation in a partners than in a strangers matching.Experiment, Forbearance, Competition

European differences in executive pay andcorporate governance

This paper examines the level and stmcture of executive pay across a sample of European economies in the mid- 1990s. Our results indicate that there are significant differences in executive pay across Europe which are explained in large part by the particular job position and Company size. However, after Controlling for these factors we find that country specific effects are important in executive pay determination. Our cross section results indicate that country effects on pay are not wholly eradicated by the effects of the internationalisation of capital and labour markets through factor price equalisation. The effects of different board structures on executive pay turns out to be ambiguous in our sample.Not Reviewe

Executive pay and corporate financial performance. An exploratiove data analysis

The relationship between executive pay and corporate financial performance continues to attract wide academic, media and policy attention. The very high salaries enjoyed by senior executives in corporations in the US are often contrasted with the relatively low pay received by executives in Europe and Asia. Empirical research on executive pay has mainly concentrated on the pay-performance relationship. Although the adopted data sets were very different within and across countries, the results are very similar and show very low payfor- performance elasticities. Despite the similar results, several methodological issues are still uncovered. Almost all studies assume linear or semi-log linear pay functions without applying a test of the adequate functional form. Most models do not allow for variations across corporations, industries, countries and time. It it assumed that pay functions are homogeneous across corporations, variations are captured by the fixed effects in the constants and assumption about the errors. The purpose of the paper is to circumvent these possible misspecifications by adopting an explorative data analysis using nonparametric methods which impose rather weak restrictions on the model. We start with the most general model but use methods that allow for a stepwise closer look by specifying the various objectives of investigation or the model we deduce from the previous results. In particular, we study heterogeneity between various industry groups. The results show quite clearly that all this methodological issues matter empirically, e.g. industry effects are important, assumptions of additivity crucial and nonlinearities strong and leads to underestimations of the elasticities in a standard parametric model. In sum, the results might have far reaching implications for further empirical studies on executive pay. At least, it weakens the concern expressed by many in that field that strong pay-forperformance incentives for executives are missing

Eine Analyse der Dimensionen des Fortune-Reputationsindex

Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Dimensionsstruktur sowie der Verwertbarkeit des Fortune-Reputationsrankings in der wissenschaftlichen Forschung und liefert Erkenntnisse über seine Aussagefähigkeit. Nach Erörterung der theoretischen Grundlagen von Unternehmensreputation als Konstrukt und Asset sowie einem kurzen Überblick zu Messansätzen von Unternehmensreputation liegt der Schwerpunkt des Beitrags auf der Untersuchung der Validität des Fortune-Reputationsindex. Auf Basis von Untersuchungen dieses Ansatzes mit konfirmatorischen Faktoranalysen werden Fragen zur wissenschaftlichen Verwertbarkeit des Index diskutiert und empirisch überprüft. Als Ergebnis ist insbesondere festzustellen, dass sich die Dimensionsstruktur des Index über die Zeit verändert hat und eine zunehmende Bedeutung von nicht-finanziellen Faktoren, bei der Beurteilung von Unternehmen zu verzeichnen ist.Reputation, Fortune-Reputationsindex, Halo-Effekt

Principal-agent-problem, Managerverguetung und Unternehmenserfolg

Summary in EnglishAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekSIGLEDEGerman

Economies of scale and intra-community trade

Summary in GermanSIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

The stability of equilibrium and the persistence-of-profits hypothesis

SIGLEUuStB Koeln(38)-861100220 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Entry, exit, concentration, and market contestability

Summary in GermanSIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Motivation, Kompensation und Performance

Peer Reviewe