44 research outputs found
Presentism, eternalism, and the triviality problem
It is often claimed that the debate between presentism and eternalism is merely verbal, because when we use tensed, detensed or tenseless notions of existence, there is no difference in the accepted metaphysical statements between the adherents of both views. On the contrary, it is shown in this paper that when we express their positions making use, in accordance with intentions of the presentists and the eternalists, of the tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and the detensed or tenseless notion (in the case of the eternalists), the controversy remains deep and very important for us, because both ontological claims express a different attitude to the existence of the flow of time. It is shown that not only does the proposed approach to presentism and eternalism exactly express the intentions of the adherents of both views but it also offers a better understanding of them joining together seemingly different theses maintained by the presentists and the eternalists, and explaining at the same time the dynamism of the presentists' ontology. The paper takes for granted that we should assess metaphysical theories in a similar way as we assess scientific theories, that is on the basis of their explanatory value
How to get out of the labyrinth of time? : lessons drawn from Callender
Callender [2017] claims that contemporary science demonstrates that there is no objective present and no objective flow of time, especially since all sensed events come from the past, our various senses need different amounts of time to react, and there are enough asymmetries in the physical world to explain our experience of time. This paper holds that, although Callender鈥檚 arguments for the subjectivity of the flow of time are unconvincing, the scientific discoveries and arguments he indicates can still be applied to improve theories of the objective flow of time. The paper develops precisely such a theory, one which introduces multiple individual proper presents for all of the objects that make up our world
Science, metaphysics and scentific realism
The paper can be logically divided into two parts. In the first part I distinguish two kinds of metaphysics: basic metaphysics, which affects scientific theories, and a second kind, which is an effect of interpretations of these theories. I try to show the strong mutual relations between metaphysics and science and to point out that the basic metaphysics of science is based on realistic assumptions. In the second part of my paper I suggest that we should consider the basic metaphysics of science and its realistic foundations in order to better understand scientific realism and to properly resolve the debate around it. The methodology of Imre Lakatos is applied in the paper
In defence of an argument against truthmaker maximalism
The paper analyses the argument proposed by Milne (2005) against truthmaker maximalism and shows that the objections raised to this argument by de Sa and Zardini, and Rodriguez-Pereyra are misguided because the first one misuses the vagueness of some terms; and the second one is based on a fallacy of petitio principii (this is exactly the same type of objection as it was raised by Rodriguez-Pereyra against the Milne鈥檚 argument)
Meyer鈥檚 struggle with presentism or how we can understand the debate between presentism and eternalism
The paper consists of two parts. The first critically analyses
Meyer鈥檚 [2005] version of the triviality objection to presentism (according
to which, presentism is either trivial or untenable), and tries to show that
his argument is untenable because - contrary to what he claimed - he did
not take into account the entire possible spectrum of interpretations of the
presentist鈥檚 thesis. In the second, positive part of the paper, it is shown
that a leading form of tensed theory of time postulates the same ontology
as presentism and that it avoids the triviality problem which means that it
can be used to generate an alternative formulation of presentism which is
no longer vulnerable to the triviality objection
How to Get out of the Labyrinth of Time? Lessons Drawn from Callender
Callender [2017] claims that contemporary science demonstrates that there is no objective present and no objective flow of time, especially since all sensed events come from the past, our various senses need different amounts of time to react, and there are enough asymmetries in the physical world to explain our experience of time. This paper holds that, although Callender鈥檚 arguments for the subjectivity of the flow of time are unconvincing, the scientific discoveries and arguments he indicates can still be applied to improve theories of the objective flow of time. The paper develops precisely such a theory, one which introduces multiple individual proper presents for all of the objects that make up our world
Weak interactions : asymmetry of time or asymmetry in time?
The paper analyzes the philosophical consequences of the recent discovery of direct violations of the time-reversal symmetry of weak interactions. It shows that although we have here an important case of the time asymmetry of one of the fundamental physical forces which could have had a great impact on the form of our world with an excess of matter over antimatter, this asymmetry cannot be treated as the asymmetry of time itself but rather as an asymmetry of some specific physical process in time. The paper also analyzes the consequences of the new discovery for the general problem of the possible connections between direction (arrow) of time and time-asymmetric laws of nature. These problems are analyzed in the context of Horwich鈥檚 Asymmetries in time: problems in the philosophy of science (1987) argumentation, trying to show that existence of a time鈥揳symmetric law of nature is a sufficient condition for time to be anisotropic. Instead of Horwich鈥檚 sufficient condition for anisotropy of time, it is stressed that for a theory of asymmetry of time to be acceptable it should explain all fundamental time asymmetries: the asymmetry of traces, the asymmetry of causation (which holds although the electrodynamic, strong and gravitational interactions are invariant under time reversal), and the asymmetry between the fixed past and open future. It is so because the problem of the direction of time has originated from our attempts to understand these asymmetries and every plausible theory of the direction of time should explain them
Presentism and the notion of existence
The aim of this paper is to make presentism a dynamic view of reality by basing it on a notion of dynamic existence, that is, on a notion of existence which has a dynamic character. The paper shows that both of the notions of existence which are used in metaphysical theories of time (in presentism and eternalism) have a static character and, while such a notion is useful for eternalists, it is useless for presentists if they want to make their view able to remain in agreement with our everyday experience and self-consistent. It is demonstrated that both empirical and theoretical arguments indicate that the presentist should replace the notion of this static existence with the notion of a dynamic existence and that this maneuver allows the presentist to treat his/her existential thesis as equivalent to the thesis that time flows. Not only does this strategy allow us to express presentism in a simple, homogenous way which remains in agreement with our experience, but also permits us to solve some of the difficult problems which presentism faces, such as, for example, the objection of triviality and the question about the rate of time passage. Moreover, such an approach to presentism allows us to solve fundamental metaphysical problems concerning time such as the problem of the openness of the future and the fixity of the past, direction of causation, and relations between presentism and persistence through time by endurance
On fundamental differences between time and space
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Entropy and the Direction of Time
The paper tries to demonstrate that the process of the increase of entropy does not explain
the asymmetry of time itself because it is unable to account for its fundamental asymmetries, that
is, the asymmetry of traces (we have traces of the past and no traces of the future), the asymmetry
of causation (we have an impact on future events with no possibility of having an impact on the
past), and the asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future, To this end, the approaches of
Boltzmann, Reichenbach (and his followers), and Albert are analysed. It is argued that we should
look for alternative approaches instead of this, namely we should consider a temporally asymmetrical
physical theory or seek a source of the asymmetry of time in metaphysics. This second approach may
even turn out to be complementary if only we accept that metaphysics can complement scientific
research programmes