U.S. Grand Strategy

On 1 May 1919, the acting secretary of the Navy, Franklin D, Roosevelt, wrote the Secretary of State as follows: It is a fundemental principle that the foreign policy of our government is in the hands of the State Department….As it is upon our foreign policy that naval estimates must be based, it will be recognized that the Navy Departments has a vital interest in this question. It is probable that certain policies are of such immportance to our national interest that they must be defended at all cost. On the other hand certain policies are not, by the expense they would entail, justified if they lead to war

Thinking Systemically about China

Aaron Friedberg's comprehensive and insightful discussion of the theoretical bases for alternative expectations of future U.S.-China relations ends by explaining how various elements highlighted by liberal, realist, and constructivist perspectives might be combined.' I would like to offer an extension that builds on Friedberg's penultimate paragraph. Obviously, these examples are stark, if not overdrawn. They are intended neither to be definitive nor to contradict Friedberg's analysis, but to show that thinking more systematically about the sort of nonlinear dynamics that make politics so fascinating and hard to manage can be fruitful

We’re Safer than You Think

This article examines terrorism, arguing that the goal of terrorists is to invoke fear into individuals. The consequences of terrorist attacks in San Bernardino and Paris, among other places, is that the perceptions that terrorism is a threat to national security are high. This work contends that such fears are unwarranted as it is more likely that one dies in a traffic accident than a terrorist attack. Delving into the International Relations literature, this article highlights the current debates about terrorism and threats to security

The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons

Jervis writes "perhaps the most striking characteristic of the postwar world is just that-it can be called "postwar" because the major powers have not fought each other since 1945. Such a lengthy period of peace among the most powerful states is unprecedented. Almost as unusual is the caution with which each superpower has treated the other". He discusses the change in the balance of powers before and after the introduction of nuclear weapons, and the attitudes on the international stage during and after these changes

Le débat sur les notions de dissuasion et de sécurité

This article deals with two general arguments about how nuclear weapons might produce or prevent war, both based on themes present in pre-nuclear eras. The first debate is over whether traditional military policies increase or decrease the likelihood of war, whether a policy relying on implicit or explicit threats deter or provoke. The second debate centers on how nuclear weapons are brought into the framework of force and threats, and how deterrence can be mode most effective, through a posture of deterrence by denial versus deterrence by punishment. Involved in these arguments are disputes over international politics, the nature and intentions of the Soviet Union, and the changes brought about by nuclear weapons

Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics

This article explores the conception of realism by political science scholar Hans Morgenthau and his contribution to the scientific study of international politics in the U.S. Morgenthau's stress on the centrality of the national interest was important in the U.S. context for what it denied: that states should follow either sub-national or supra-national interests. As central to the analysis as the national interest was power. Perhaps his most famous sentence is that the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Morgenthau's conception of realism does not lead to specific policy prescriptions or detailed propositions for empirical research

Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War

Robert Jervis argues that arms control in the post-Cold War era must be pursued as an adjunct to, not a substitute for, ways of dealing with sources of conflict and methods of managing disputes. He shows that while some of the potential causes of war are likely to lie within the military arena, there is little reason to believe they will be the most potent ones

Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?

Under the security dilemma, tensions and conflicts can arise between states even when they do not intend them. Some analysts have argued that the Cold War was a classic example of a security dilemma. This article disputes that notion. Although the Cold War contained elements of a deep security dilemma, it was not purely a case in which tensions and arms increased as each side defensively reacted to the other. The root of the conflict was a clash of social systems and of ideological preferences for ordering the world. Mutual security in those circumstances was largely unachievable. A true end to the Cold War was impossible until fundamental changes occurred in Soviet foreign policy

War and Misperception

War is most likely if you overestimate others' hostility but underestimate their capabilities. War can occur without misperception, but rarely. Misperception is inaccurate inferences, miscalculations of consequences, and misjudgments about how others will react to one's policies, and may include military optimism, pessimism about long-term diplomatic and military prospects, incorrectly anticipated consequences. Scholars (Jervis included) generally focus on misperceptions of intentions, not situations. On average, states are more likely to overestimate others' hostility, inferring threatening motives from actions that a disinterested observer would consider at least partially cooperative, and underestimate the extent to which their own actions can be seen as threats. When others do feel threatened and react, the first state views these moves as confirmation of aggression

Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?

Terrorist attacks on the United States, Spain and the United Kingdom have underlined the differing responses of Europe and the United States to the 'new terrorism'. This article analyses these responses through the prism of historically determined strategic cultures. For the last four years the United States has directed the full resources of a 'national security' approach towards this threat and has emphasized unilateralism. Europe, based on its own past experience of terrorism, has adopted a regulatory approach pursued through multilateralism. These divergences in transatlantic approaches, with potentially major implications for the future of the relationship, have appeared to be mitigated by a revised American strategy of counterterrorism that has emerged during 2005. However, this article contends that while strategic doctrines may change, the more immutable nature of strategic culture will make convergence difficult. This problem will be compounded by the fact that neither Europe nor America have yet addressed the deeper connections between terrorism and the process of globalization