Interstate Cigarette Bootlegging: Extent, Revenue Losses, and Effects of Government Intervention

In this paper, we develop and estimate a model of commercial smuggling in which some, but not all, firms smuggle a portion of the cigarettes they sell. The model is used to examine the effects on interstate cigarette smuggling of the Contraband Cigarette Act and a change in the federal excise tax. We find that both policies have unintentional effects. While the Contraband Cigarette Act was imposed to reduce interstate smuggling, we find it had the opposite effect. In contrast, an increase in the federal tax is not intended to affect smuggling, but we find it increases the portion of cigarette sales that is commercially smuggled.

Who is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing

Historically, commercial use of university research has been viewed in terms of spillovers. Recently, there has been a dramatic increase in technology transfer through licensing as universities attempt to appropriate the returns from faculty research. This change has prompted concerns regarding the source of this growth - specifically, whether it suggests a change in the nature of university research. We develop an intermediate input model to examine the extent to which the growth in licensing is due to the productivity observable inputs or driven by a change in the propensity of faculty and administrators to engage in commercializing university research. We model licensing as a three stage process, each involving multiple inputs. Nonparametric programming techniques are applied to survey data from 65 universities to calculate total factor productivity (TFP) growth in each state. To examine the sources of TFP growth, the productivity analysis is augmented by survey evidence from business who license-in university inventions. Results suggest that increased licensing is due primarily to an increased willingness of faculty and administrators to license and increased business reliance on external R&D rather than a shift in faculty research.

Are Faculty Critical? Their Role in University-Industry Licensing

Understanding the nature of the involvement of faculty in university licensing is im-portant for understanding how technology is transferred through licensing as well as more controversial issues, such as the need for university licensing. Using data from a survey of firms that actively license-in from universities we explore the importance of faculty in the licensing and development of inventions, as well as how and why they are used and how the use of faculty relates to characteristics of firms. In particular we find that the use of faculty through sponsored research in lieu of a license is closely related to the amount of basic research conducted by firms whereas the use of faculty within the terms of a license is related to the prevalence of personal contacts between industry R&D researchers and university faculty.

The Disclosure and Licensing of University Inventions

We examine the interplay of the three major university actors in technology transfer from universities to industry: the faculty, the technology transfer office (TTO), and the central administration. We model the faculty as an agent of the administration, and the TTO as an agent of both the faculty and the administration. Empirical tests of the theory are based on evidence from our survey of 62 US research universities. We find that the TTOs reported licensing objectives are influenced by their views of faculty and administration, which supports the assumption that the TTO is a dual agent. The theory yields predictions for whether or not faculty disclose inventions and if so, at what stage, which in turn affects license contract terms. We also examine how the portion of inventions disclosed at different stages varies with faculty quality. Quality is found to be inversely related to the share of license income allotted to faculty.

Are Universities Patent Trolls?

Hold-up is a primary component of patent litigation and patent licensing today. Universities are engaged in an unprecedented surge in patenting. At the confluence of these seemingly unrelated developments is a growing frustration on the part of industry with the role of universities as patent owners. Time and again, when I talk to people in a variety of industries, their view is that universities are the new patent trolls. In this article, I argue that universities should take a broader view of their role in technology transfer. University technology transfer ought to have as its goal maximizing the social impact of technology, not merely maximizing the university’s licensing revenue. Sometimes those goals will coincide with the university’s short-term financial interests. Sometimes universities will maximize the impact of an invention on society by granting exclusive licenses for substantial revenue to a company that will take the invention and commercialize it. Sometimes, but not always. At other times a non-exclusive license, particularly on a basic enabling technology, will ultimately maximize the invention’s impact on society by allowing a large number of people to commercialize in different areas, to try out different things and see if they work, and the like. University policies might be made more nuanced than simply a choice between exclusive and non-exclusive licenses. For example, they might grant fieldspecific exclusivity, or exclusivity only for a limited term, or exclusivity only for commercial sales while exempting research, and they might condition continued exclusivity on achievement of certain dissemination goals. Particularly in the software context, there are many circumstances in which the social impact of technology transfer is maximized either by the university not patenting at all or by granting licenses to those patents on a royalty-free basis to all comers. Finally, I think we can learn something about the raging debate over who is a patent troll and what to do about trolls by looking at university patents. Universities are non-practicing entities. They share some characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is broadly defined, but they are not trolls. Asking what distinguishes universities from trolls can actually help us figure out what concerns us about trolls. What we ought to do is abandon the search for a group of individual companies to define as bad actors. In my view, troll is as troll does. Universities will sometimes be bad actors. So will non-manufacturing patent owners. So will manufacturing patent owners. Instead of singling out bad actors, we should focus on the bad acts and the laws that make them possible

Conveying Quality and Value in Emerging Industries: Star Scientists and the Role of Learning in Biotechnology

Managers of private entrepreneurial firms face obstacles in raising capital both in placing a value on a firm and conveying value to investors. These problems are exacerbated when the firm is small, has limited assets (except for human capital) and has yet to have a lead product. In such cases metrics are necessary to convey the value of the firm to investors. Here we explore the importance within the biotechnology industry of the non-financial metrics firms used to convey value during two important initial public offerings (IPO) windows (1989 to 1992 and 1996 to 2000). We also examine whether there was a change over time in the importance of various metrics in determining the value of a biotechnology firm. We find that firms with an affiliated Nobel laureate succeeded in raising the value of their firms by more than $30 million compared to firms without a Nobel laureate during the first period, suggesting that a Nobel laureate served as a powerful signal of firm value. Our results also suggest that the biotechnology regime changed and the Nobel Prize lost its luster as a signal of value in the second period. The importance of several other non-financial metrics changed as well. We conclude that these non-financial metrics of value change in relative importance to potential investors and financial markets as learning occurs and as an industry matures.

Replication and scientific standards in applied economics a decade after the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking project

Research

An Analysis of Productive Efficiency of University Commercialization Activities.

In this paper, we examine the productivity of commercial activity by US universities in the past six years. While it is generally acknowledged that there has been a dramatic increase in university licensing and patenting, there is little understanding as to the extent to which this is the result of increased resources devoted to commercialization or to technical change in commercialization, where technical change has the standard definition of any increase in outputs that cannot be attributed to an increase in inputs.UNIVERSITIES ; PRODUCTIVITY

Intellectual Property Revenue Sharing as a Problem for University Technology Transfer

The Bayh-Dole Act, often credited with the explosion of university technology transfer, requires universities to incentivize invention disclosure by sharing the royalties generated by patent licensing with inventors. Many scholars have debated the effectiveness of university implementation of this requirement, and, indeed, the low rate of invention disclosure by academic researchers to the university is often a bottleneck in the technology-transfer process. Unfortunately, most discussions focusing on inventor compliance with Bayh-Dole Act requirements have explored faculty-inventor motivations. However, in most cases, university inventions are joint products of a group of university members including not only faculty but also post-doctoral researchers or graduate students. This collaborative nature of scientific research seems to have been lost in the design of the technology-transfer system. Some scholars have discussed inventorship determinations and the impact of incorrect inventor identification in pre-America Invents Act patent law. Generally, however, the dynamic interactions between joint inventors with different positions within the university are a little studied area of the technology-transfer process. Less well studied is the Bayh-Dole Act requirement that all inventors share in the revenue from a university licensed patent. The distribution of licensing revenue among inventors creates a question of how to divide the portion of the royalties allocated to inventors by the university. This Article explores that revenue distribution. To the extent that the university asks the input of the inventors, many of the problems in the initial recognition of students and post-doctoral fellows as joint inventors become again important in assigning a percentage of the revenue. Additionally, the negotiation power imbalance between joint inventors may indicate that the university should play a larger role in revenue allocation than it does in initial inventor determinations

KNOWLEDGE FROM RESEARCH AS A QUASI-PUBLIC GOOD

Knowledge is a special quasi-public good which is delivered by several types of institutions, including public and private universities. Knowledge to be produced in bigger quantities, the state should contribute with budgetary financial support as subsidies or grants to cover a part of expenses. States are supporting research from public resources, especially the basic research which enjoy a smaller interest from the private research units due its small potential to be implemented and recovered throughout price. Public co-founding of research generates problems regarding the regime of patents’ ownership because financing bodies have divergent opinion regarding the utility of research in society’s development. There are different approaches offered in solving this problem, taking into account the forms of realizing this quasi-public good, approaches based especially on different type of joint-ventures. Academic research, perceived as a very important and income generating activity, is done in a very large scale of combinations between universities and private entities. These complicated relations generates information asymmetry specific to principal-agent relations in economy. The control of information asymmetry level is important because a high level corresponds to inefficient use of funds and smaller satisfaction of general needs.Knowledge, Quasi-public goods, Information Asymmetry