Automation and Job Polarization: On the Decline of Middling Occupations in Europe [CERGE-WP]

Using data from 10 Western European countries, I provide evidence that the fall in prices of information technologies (IT) is associated with a lower share of employment in middle wage occupations and a higher share of employment in high wage occupations.The decline in IT prices has no robust effect on the share of employment in the lowest paid occupations. Similar results hold within gender, age and education-level groups,with notable differences in these groups. For instance, the share of employment in high wage occupations among females has increased more than among males with the fall in IT prices. This is consistent with arguments that women hold a comparative advantage in communication and social skills, which are complementary to IT and in demand in high wage occupations

Trade in Information Technologies and Changes in the Demand for Occupations

I use data from the World Input-Output Database and show that trade in information technologies (IT) has a significant contribution to the growth in foregin intermediate goods in 2001-2014 period. China has become one of the major foregin suppliers of IT and has strongly contributed to the rise in trade in IT. The growth in IT imports from China is associated with lower IT prices in sample European countries. The fall in IT prices has increased the demand for high wage occupations and reduced the demand for low wage occupations. From 20 to 95 percent of the variation in the demand for occupations stemming from the fall in IT prices can be attributed to the trade with China

Intellectual Property and Product Market Competition Regulations in a Model with Two R&D Performing Sectors

I analyze the impact of intellectual property and product market competition regulations on innovation and long-run growth in an endogenous growth model with two R&D performing sectors. I show that strengthening intellectual property rights and competition in a sector increases its R&D investments. However, these policies adversely affect R&D investments in the other sector because of increased factor competition between the sectors. As a result, the overall impact of such policies on economic growth is ambiguous. I perform a numerical exercise in an attempt to resolve this ambiguity. This exercise suggests that strengthening intellectual property rights increases economic growth, but higher competition has a very limited effect on growth

On the elasticity of substitution between labor and ICT and IP capital and traditional capital

I estimate CES aggregate production functions for the US, the UK, Japan, Germany, and Spain using data from the EU KLEMS database. I distinguish between three types of capital: information and communication technologies (ICT), intellectual property (IP) capital, and traditional capital. I assume that the aggregate output is produced using labor and these three types of capital and allow for differences in the elasticities of substitution between labor, an aggregate of ICT and IP capital, and traditional capital. The estimated elasticities of substitution between ICT and IP capital are strictly below one for all sample countries implying gross complementarity. ICT and IP capital together are gross substitutes for labor while traditional capital is a gross complement. The results for the US imply that the fast pace of technological progress in ICT and IP capital accumulation together are responsible for about 80 percent of the fall in labor income share

Intellectual Property and Product Market Competition Regulations in a Model with Two R&D Performing Sectors [WP]

I analyze the impact of intellectual property and product market competition regulations on innovation and long-run growth in an endogenous growth model with two R&D performing sectors. I show that strengthening intellectual property rights and competition in a sector increases its R&D investments. However, these policies adversely affect R&D investments of the other sector. The overall impact of such policies on economic growth is ambiguous because of this. I perform a numerical exercise in an attempt of resolving the ambiguity. This exercise suggests that strengthening intellectual property rights can increase economic growth, but higher competition has a very limited effect on growth

The telecommunications industry and economic growth: How the market structure matters

This paper presents an endogenous growth model where the telecommunications industry is the engine of growth. In such a framework, it analyzes how the market structure of the telecommunications industry can matter for its contribution to long-run growth. It shows that policies which increase the number of firms and/or toughen competition imply higher innovative effort in the telecommunications industry and strengthen its contribution. Modeling entry into the telecommunications industry, this paper also shows that the entry either stops after a number of firms have entered or continues permanently. In the long-run, it is socially optimal to have permanent entry. This can necessitate subsidies to entry into the telecommunications industry

The impact of doing business regulations on investments in ICT [WP]

Using industry-level data from 14 OECD countries and doing business indicators of the World Bank, we analyze how country-level regulations of business activities affect investments in information and communication technologies (ICT). We find that investments in ICT decrease with the costs of starting and operating a business and registering property. Investments increase with the strength of legal rights. We also find that higher minimum capital requirement reduces investments in software and the extent of director liability reduces investments in communication technologies

The impact of doing business regulations on investments in ICT

Using industry-level data from 14 OECD countries and doing business indicators of the World Bank, we analyze how country-level regulations of business activities affect investments in information and communication technologies (ICT). We find that investments in ICT decrease with the costs of starting and operating a business and registering property. Investments increase with the strength of legal rights. We also find that investments in software increase with the ability of shareholders to sue managers for misconduct, and investments in communication technologies decline with the extent of director liability for self-dealing

Firm behavior during an epidemic

We derive a model in which firms operate in an epidemic environment and internalize infections among their employees in the workplace. The model is calibrated to fit the moments of the Covid-19 epidemic. We show that firms have incentives to fight against infections and can do so very effectively by increasing teleworking and rotating employees between on-site work, teleworking, and leave. The fight against infections in firms flattens the aggregate infections curve. Subsidies to teleworking reduce infections and save lives. Subsidies to sick leave reduce the cost of sick workers and raise workplace infections. Firms delay and weaken the fight against infections during economic downturns. We also consider the problem of a government that values output and lives. We show that the government prefers to severely restrict the epidemic by tolerating short-term output losses when it has a high valuation of lif

Firm behavior during an epidèmic

We derive a model in which firms operate in an epidemic environment and internalize infections among their employees in the workplace. The model is calibrated to fit the moments of the Covid-19 epidemic. We show that firms have incentives to fight against infections and can do so very effectively by increasing teleworking and rotating employees between on-site work, teleworking, and leave. The fight against infections in firms flattens the aggregate infections curve. Subsidies to teleworking reduce infections and save lives. Subsidies to sick leave reduce the cost of sick workers and raise workplace infections. Firms delay and weaken the fight against infections during economic downturns. We also consider the problem of a government that values output and lives. We show that the government prefers to severely restrict the epidemic by tolerating short-term output losses when it has a high valuation of life