International cybernormfremme. Hvordan løsnes hårdknuden?

Der er ikke mange forhåbninger til de igangværende globale drøftelser om normer for ansvarlig statslig adfærd i cyberspace. Men hvorfor er de internationale normforhandlinger strandet og den vestlige koalitions normstrategi fejlet? Og kan en småstat som Danmark være normentreprenøren, der skubber den vestlige cybernormdagsorden fremad? Med afsæt i normlitteraturen i International Politik peger denne artikel på, at den nuværende kamp om internationale cybernormer er karakteriseret ved gensidige beskyldninger om hykleri, hvilket, når det rettes mod USA og dets allierede, hovedsageligt skal forstås i lyset af Snowden-afsløringerne og manglende anerkendelse af den efterretningsnorm, der dominerer i cyberspace. En begyndende vestlig åbenhed om og nuancering af statslig brug af cyberkapaciteter giver mulighed for, at Danmark kan blive et foregangsland, der udvikler de nødvendige politiske afklaringer og deler ”best practices” og derved bidrager med de vigtige referencepunkter, som andre stater kan finde tiltrængt inspiration i. Men det kræver, at danske myndigheder er villige til internt at afveje og nå til enighed om en række svære spørgsmål om, hvornår og hvor meget man ønsker at bruge hackere i udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitikken og eksternt investerer diplomatisk

Abstracts

Abstracts of each articl

The cyberwar mirage and the utility of cyberattacks in war: How to make real use of Clausewitz in the age of cyberspace

Cyberwar is everywhere - in the media, in the military, among politicians and in academia. It is the new weapon of mass discussion. But there is no such thing as cyberwar. This observation, however, does not render cyberattacks unimportant. The article revisits the debate on Carl von Clausewitz's On War (1832), and examines the utility of cyberattacks as a tool in future war. In doing so, the article not only targets the misunderstandings and exaggerations prevalent in the literature, but demonstrates that Clausewitz's On War, albeit being two centuries old, is a valuable analytical lens in making sense of the relationship between cyberattacks and war. Drawing on the Clauzewitzian trinity, the article finds that cyberattacks can be useful tools in warfare, particularly in the initial stages of war. They are easily deployable and have already proven capable of causing physical damage. However, the article argues that cyberattacks remain inferior to conventional military weaponry, ultimately rendering cyberwar - understood as a war fought primarily through cyberspace - unlikely

Terrorism in cyberspace: challenges in planning and executing political violence online

The Internet is often presented as a devastating tool in the hands terrorists. This is a truth in need of modification. Drawing on insights from studies of Sunni extremists, Breivik and Anonymous, the article assesses claims about terrorists’ use of the Internet in planning and executing political violence. It finds, first, that the anarchical, anonymous Internet spurs mistrust and fragmentation, rendering it more, not less difficult for terrorists to maintain a coherent strategy. Second, the article notes how most violent individuals seek real life interactions, guns and explosions rather than organize terrorism online or hacking in solitude behind a computer screen. It is primarily the socially marginalized who find the Internet appealing in organizing and executing terrorism

En ”digital Genèvekonvention” er ikke i Danmarks interesse.

Although Denmark, as a small-state actor, has an interest in global IT security and clarity of international norms in cyber space, this article argues that it is not in Denmark’s interest to pursue a “Digital Geneva Convention,” the proposal currently being put forward by Microsoft. Starting negotiations on a comprehensive digital convention would risk reopening already concluded international agreements and undermining on-going, non-binding negotiations. It also overlooks the gains that states’ security apparatuses legitimately pursue in cyberspace. This, however, does not mean that a small state like Denmark should stay passive in the field of international cyber politics. On the contrary, the continuing political uncertainty in cyberspace provides small states with the possibility of “punching above their weight”. Prioritizing Danish cyber engagements in the EU, NATO, the UN and in non-governmental fora as well as enhancing cooperation with the private sector in both Denmark and internationally, would strengthen Denmark’s political profile internationally and security in cyberspace more generally

Terrorisme i cyberspace: udfordringer ved organisering og udførelse af politisk vold online

Internettet præsenteres ofte som et farligt redskab i hænderne på terrorister. Det er dog ikke nødvendigvis sandheden. Artiklen trækker på indsigter fra studier af sunniekstremistiske grupper, Anders B. Breivik og Anonymous og diskuterer terroristers anvendelse af internettet i organiseringen og udførelsen af terrorisme. Jeg vil argumentere for, at det anarkiske og anonyme internet fører mistillid og fragmentering med sig, hvilket gør det sværere for grupper at opretholde en fælles strategi og det fælles fjendebillede. Artiklen styrker derfor fortællingen om, at det hovedsageligt er ekskluderede og socialt marginaliserede enspændere, der ender med at planlægge voldshandlinger i isolation bag computerskærmen. I forlængelse heraf vil jeg pege på, at hovedparten af potentielle terrorister drages af fysisk interaktion, våben og eksplosioner – og ikke udviklingen af komplekse cybervåben