5,545 research outputs found

    Explant Analysis of Total Disc Replacement

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    Explant analysis of human disc prostheses allow early evaluation of the host response to the prosthesis and the response of the prosthesis from the host. Furthermore, early predictions of failure and wear can be obtained. Thus far, about 2-3% of disc prostheses have been removed. Observed wear patterns are similar to that of appendicular prostheses including abrasions/scratching, burnishing, surface deformation, fatigue, and embedded debris. Chemically the polymeric components have shown little degradation in short-term implantation. In metal on metal prostheses the histologic responses consist of large numbers of metallic particles with occasional macrophages and giant cells. Only rare cases of significant inflammatory response from polymeric debris have been seen

    Did the Devil Make Them Do It? The Effects of Religion and Religiosity in Public Goods and Trust Games

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    We test whether religious affiliation and participation in religious services are associated with behavior in public goods and trust games. Overall, religious affiliation is unrelated to individual behavior. However, we find some weak evidence that among subjects attending religious services, increased participation is associated with behavior in both public goods and trust games.Public goods, experiments, religion, and trust

    Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games

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    We test the conventional wisdom that political ideology is associated with generosity or compassion by comparing the behavior of experimental subjects in public goods or trust games. We find that self-described liberals and those identifying more closely with the Democrat party are just as likely to free-ride as conservatives or Republican-leaners; likewise, political ideology is unrelated to observed trusting behavior or trustworthiness in a bilateral trust game.Political Party, Free Rider

    Inequality, Group Cohesion, and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis

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    Recent studies argue that inequality reduces group cohesiveness and dampens support for expenditures on public goods and social programs. In light of competing theoretical explanations and mixed empirical evidence of the effect of inequality on public goods provision, we conduct a test using a public goods experiment. Our design introduces inequality by manipulating the levels and distributions of fixed payments given to subjects for participating in the experiment. When made salient through public information about each individuals standing within the group, inequality in the distribution of fixed payments reduces contributions to the public good for all group members.Public Good, Inequality, Free Rider

    The Principle of Party Presentation

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    Our adversarial system of adjudication is characterized by active parties and (relatively) passive judges; the parties identify the issues in dispute, and the judge decides those issues. Sua sponte decision-making—whereby a judge raises and decides new issues not presented by the parties—undermines this adversarial system. For decades, courts and commentators have struggled to explain when sua sponte decision-making may be appropriate. That issue was particularly important to the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who has been described as “The Great Proceduralist.” In a series of oral arguments and opinions during her tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg repeatedly invoked the “principle of party presentation”—a term used in comparative procedure literature to describe the principle that the parties, not the judge, should determine the issues to be decided in a case—and identified real limits to judicial discretion in raising new issues. One of her last opinions, in United States v. Sineneng-Smith (2020), reaffirmed a robust principle of party presentation and rebuked a court of appeals that raised a new issue without sufficient justification, relegated the parties to a secondary role in the litigation, and ultimately disregarded the issues they presented. In Justice Ginsburg’s opinions, including Sineneng-Smith, litigants and judges alike may find useful guideposts that constrain judicial discretion in deciding whether to raise new issues sua sponte. Judges considering whether to raise a new issue sua sponte should determine whether they are required, forbidden, or permitted to do so; and where permitted, they should explain how specific institutional interests of the judiciary balance or outweigh the parties’ interest in controlling the litigation. If a judge wishes to depart from the principle of party presentation, the judge should explain the specific circumstances and the interests that make the case exceptional—something more than the judge’s having what he or she thinks is a “better” theory of the case

    An Experimental Study of the Effects of Inequality and Relative Deprivation on Trusting Behavior

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    Several non-experimental studies report that income inequality and other forms of population-based heterogeneity reduce levels of trust in society. However, recent work by Glaeser et al. (2000) calls into question the reliability of widely used survey-based measures of trust. Specifically, survey responses regarding trust attitudes did not reflect subjects actual behavior in a trust game. In this paper, we conduct a novel experimental test of the effects of inequality on trust and trustworthiness. Our experimental design induces inequality by varying the show-up fees paid to subjects, in contrast to previous experiments that focus on broad cultural or national differences in trust. We do not find robust support for the hypothesis that inequality per se dampens trusting behavior among all subjects; however, we do find some evidence that trust and rustworthiness are influenced by an individuals relative position in the group. Finally, we confirm previous findings that common survey-based measures of social trust are not associated with actual trusting behavior.Trust, social capital, heterogeneity, inequality, experiment

    Did the Devil Make Them Do It? The Effects of Religion in Public Goods and Trust Games*

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    We test whether religious affiliation and participation in religious services are associated with behavior in public goods and trust games. Overall, religious affiliation is unrelated to individual behavior. However, we find some weak evidence that among subjects attending religious services, increased participation is associated with behavior in both public goods and trust games

    Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games

    Get PDF
    We test the conventional wisdom that political ideology is associated with generosity or compassion by comparing the behavior of experimental subjects in public goods or trust games. We find that self-described liberals and those identifying more closely with the Democrat party are just as likely to free-ride as conservatives or Republican-leaners; likewise, political ideology is unrelated to observed trusting behavior or trustworthiness in a bilateral trust game

    Inequality, Group Cohesion, and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis

    Get PDF
    Recent studies argue that inequality reduces group cohesiveness and dampens support for expenditures on public goods and social programs. In light of competing theoretical explanations and mixed empirical evidence of the effect of inequality on public goods provision, we conduct a test using a public goods experiment. Our design introduces inequality by manipulating the levels and distributions of fixed payments given to subjects for participating in the experiment. When made salient through public information about each individual's standing within the group, inequality in the distribution of fixed payments reduces contributions to the public good for all group members
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