Disinflationary boom in a price-wage spiral model

This paper analyses the impact of the disinflation policy timing on the sign and the magnitude of the sacrifice ratio in a modified price and wage staggered model of Blanchard (1986). When wages are updated every four quarters and prices every two quarters, we show that a “cold-turkey” disinflation is associated to an output boom when the policy is implemented during the last period of life of the wage contract and a recession the other quarters.Disinflation policy, Shock timing, Sacrifice ratio, Price and wage staggered contracts.

Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment inthe Presence of Global EnvironmentalProblems

This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of negotiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce their emissions. we call this behaviour precautionary commitment.Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue. we also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinated global co-operation can result from a strategic actionfrom the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions.global environmental problems; coalition; unilateralcommitment; precautionary commitment.

Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players

This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations.Strategic bargaining, Non-monolithic players, Scission, Noncooperative game-theory

North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.Bargaining theory; Asymmetric information; Climate change;International cooperation.

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.Bargaining theory, asymmetric information, climate change, international cooperation

Bycatch ITQ Management in Oligopolistic Fisheries

This paper analyzes the effects of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system implemented on bycatch on the global harvest level of oligopolistic fisheries. We show that the impact of changes in the total allowable catch (TAC) on the equilibrium harvest level depends on the degree of returns to scale in harvest. In particular, a reduction in the TAC may lead to a rise in activity in fisheries characterized by some amount of increasing returns to scale. Besides, these effects appear to be stronger, the fiercer the competition within fisheries.oligopolistic competition, fisheries, bycatch, ITQs

North-South Climate Change Negotiations:<br />a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0048-5829International audienceThis article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement

Sustainable coalitions in the commons

It is well known that the non-cooperation among agents harvesting a renewable resource is critical for its sustainable management. The present paper gives insights on the complex balance between coalitions structure, resource state or dynamics and agents’ heterogeneity to avoid bio-economic collapses. A model bringing together coalition games and a viability approach is proposed to focus on the compatibility between bio-economic constraints and an exploited common stock dynamics. It is examined to what extent cooperation promotes sustainability. Based on the Shapley value, a measure of the marginal contribution of the users to the sustainability of the resource is proposed. It suggests that the stability of the grand coalition occurs for large enough stocks. By contrast, for lower levels of resource, the most efficient user plays the role of a dictator.Renewable resource, dynamic game, coalition, maxmin strategy, shapley value, viability kernel

Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux

Le présent papier s'articule autour des problèmes environnementaux globaux, et se propose de lier les négociations internationales au comportement de précaution. Cela nous conduit à montrer que le comportement de précaution peut aussi bien survenir à la suite d'un échec des négociations qu'à la conclusion d'un accord. Dans le premier cas, ce comportement a moins d'impact que la coopération de tous, mais tend tout de même à réduire la portée de la défection. Dans le second cas, si un accord est signé entre un petit nombre de pays, le comportement de précaution constitue un moyen d'élargir la portée de la coopération sans déstabiliser la coalition coopérante. Nous montrons, enfin, que l'adoption de sanctions à l’encontre des pays non-coopérants ne garantit pas pour autant l'émergence d'un large mouvement de coopération.Problèmes environnementaux globaux, Coalition, Engagement unilatéral, Stratégie évolutionnaire

A Bio-Economic Model for the Viable Managementof the Coastal Fishery in French Guyana

The coastal fishery in French Guyana is a challenging case study for the implementation of the ecosystem based fishery management. Although the current situation of this small scale fishery could be considered as satisfactory, the viability of the fishery can be questioned. Indeed according to demographic scenarios, the growth of the population will generate an increase of local food demand and therefore growing fishing pressures. Moreover, there is no direct regulation for limiting the fishing catches. Models and quantitative methods to tackle this sustainability issue are still lacking for such mall-scale fisheries mainly because of the various complexities underlying the systems including the heterogeneity of the production factors, the weak selectivity of fleets and high fish biodiversity levels. In the present paper, we both use numerical simulations and a viability perspective to deal with such a problem. We first build a multi-species multi-fleets dynamic model relying on thirteen exploited species and four types of fleets. It accounts for potential trophic interactions, fishing effort and the corresponding costs and revenues. The model was fit on data collected since 2006 by Ifremer: daily production and efforts data, as well as economic data from a survey on the production costs and selling prices in 2009.The co-viability of the system under different scenarios of fishing efforts is studied through ecological and economic performances. The biological viability constraints focus on biodiversity index as species richness or trophic index while economic viability constraints intend to guarantee profitability to all the fleets.Keywords: Fisheries Economics, Fish and Aquaculture Sectors Development, Bioeconomic Analysis of Fisherie