New Developments in the Search for the Topology of the Universe

Multi-connected Universe models with space idenfication scales smaller than the size of the observable universe produce topological images in the catalogs of cosmic sources. In this review, we present the recent developments for the search of the topology of the universe focusing on three dimensional methods. We present the crystallographic method, we give a new lower bound on the size of locally Euclidean multi-connected universe model of $3000 h^{-1} \hbox{Mpc}$ based on this method and a quasar catalog, we discuss its successes and failures, and the attemps to generalise it. We finally introduce a new statistical method based on a collecting correlated pair (CCP) technique.Comment: 20 pages, 13 figures, Proceedings of the XIXth Texas meeting, Paris 14-18 december 1998, Proceedings of the XIXth Texas meeting, Eds. E. Aubourg, T. Montmerle, J. Paul and P. Peter, article-no: 04/2

Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility

Society's demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as an alternative response to market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We first draw on recent developments in the "psychology and economics" of prosocial behavior to shed light on this trend, which reflects a complex interplay of genuine altruism, social or self image concerns, and material incentives. We then link individual concerns to corporate social responsibility, contrasting three possible understandings of the term: the adoption of a more long-term perspective by firms, the delegated exercise of prosocial behavior on behalf of stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate philanthropy. For both individuals and firms we discuss the benefits, costs and limits of socially responsible behavior as a means to further societal goals.corporate social responsibility, socially responsible investment, image concerns, shareholder value

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this "overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.

SELF-CONFIDENCE AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

This paper studies the interactions between an individual self-steem and his social environment, whether in the workplace, at school, or in personal relationships. A person generally has only imperfect knowledge of his own ability (or long-term pay) in pursuing a task, and will undertake it only if he has succinct self-confidence. People who interact with him (parent, spouse, friend, teacher, manager, colleague, etc.) often have complementary information about his ability, but also a vested interest in his completing the task. This generates an incentive for such principals to distort their signals so as to manipulate the agent’s self-confidence. We first study situations where an informed principal chooses an incentive structure, such as offering payments or rewards, delegating a task, or simply giving encouragement. We show that rewards may be weak reinforcers in the short term and that, as stressed by psychologists, they may have hidden costs in that they become negative reinforcers once withdrawn. By offering a low–powered incentive scheme, the principal signals that she trusts the agent. Conversely, rewards (extrinsic motivation) have a limited impact on the agent’s current performance, and reduce his intrinsic motivation to undertake similar tasks in the future. Similarly, empowering the agent is likely to increase his motivation and effort, while offers of help or assistance may create dependence. More generally, we identify under which conditions the hidden costs of rewards are a myth or a reality. We then consider the fact that people often criticize or downplay the achievements of their spouse, child, colleague, coauthor, subordinate or teammate. We formalize such situations of ego–bashing, and argue that they may reflect battles for dominance. By lowering the other’s ego, an individual may gain (or regain) real authority within the relationship. Finally, we turn to the case where it is the agent who has superior information, and may attempt to signal it through a variety of self–presentation strategies. In particular, people with low self–esteem often deprecate their own accomplishments in order to obtain leniency (a lowering of expectancies) or a “helping hand?on various obligations. Such strategies are costly: they are met with disapproval, and may back…re if the desired indulgence is denied. We analyze this signaling game, and characterize the levels of self–esteem that give rise to self–deprecation.Selfconfidence, selfpresentation, motivation, rewards, incentives, standards, signaling, psychology and economics

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

We build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this overjustification effect can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior, and those where disclosing one’s generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality or publicity of incentives. Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social welfare by requiring agents to engage in inefficient sacrifices.altruism, rewards, motivation, overjustification effect, crowding out, identity, social norms