The commons with capital markets

We explore commons problems when agents have access to capital markets. The commons has a high intrinsic rate of return but its fruits cannot be secured by individual agents. Resources transferred to the capital market earn lower returns, but are secure. In a two period model, we assess the consequences of market access for the commons' survival and welfare; we compare strategic and competitive equilibria. Market access generally speeds extinction, with negative welfare consequences. Against this, it allows intertemporal smoothing, a positive effect. In societies in which the former effect dominates, market liberalisation may be harmful. We reproduce the multiple equilibria found in other models of competitive agents; when agents are strategic, extinction dates are unique. Strategic agents generally earn their surplus by delaying the commons' extinction; in unusual cases, strategic agents behave as competitive ones even when their numbers are small.commons, capital markets, Washington Consensus, property rights

The Road to Extinction: Commons with Capital Markets

We study extinction in a commons problem in which agents have access to capital markets. When the commons grows more quickly than the interest rate, multiple equilibria are found for intermediate commons endowments. In one of these, extinction is hastened and welfare decreases in the endowment, a resource curse. An extraction tax reduces welfare in this 'cursed' equilibrium, increases it in the other equilibrium in which the commons is eventually depleted, and expands the set of commons stocks that are never depleted. Capital market access harms societies with low commons endowments. In the limit, as marginal extraction costs become constant, `jump extinctions' occur. Finally, when the commons grows less quickly than the interest rate, there is a unique extinction date for each endowment level.commons, capital markets, extinction, resource curse, storage, multiple equilibria, rational expectations equilibrium

The Road to Extinction: Commons with Capital Markets

We study extinction in a commons problem in which agents have access to capital markets. When the commons grows more quickly than the interest rate, multiple equilibria are found for intermediate commons endowments. In one of these, welfare decreases as the resource becomes more abundant, a `re- source curse'. As marginal extraction costs become constant, market access instantly depletes the commons. Without markets - the classic environment - equilibria are unique; extinction dates and welfare increase with the endow- ment. When the endowment is either very abundant or very scarce, market access improves welfare. As marginal costs of extraction from the commons become constant, market access can reduce welfare if the subjective discount rate exceeds the interest rate.commons, capital markets, perfect foresight, extinction, resource curse, storage

Policy compromises: corruption and regulation in a dynamic democracy

This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with political corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency and is supported by a majority of voters. Voters reelect politicians based on observed performance. We study Markov-perfect equilibria of the resulting game, and demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate some corruption and inefficient regulation in political equilibrium. Efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth. Political corruption entails excessive stabilization of aggregate fluctuations.

Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability

We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be efficient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities.fiscal federalism, local public goods, externalities, performance voting, turnout uncertainty, electoral accountability

The road to extinction: commons with capital markets

Competitive agents extract in continuous time from a commons. Capital market access allows them to both save and borrow against their extraction stream. When the commons asset grows more quickly than the privately stored one, multiple equilibria are found for intermediate commons endowments. One of these has the extinction date and welfare decrease in the endowment, a resource curse. When the commons asset grows less quickly than the privately stored one, there is a unique extinction date for each endowment level. In the limit, as marginal extraction costs become constant, `jump extinctions' occur. In cases with multiple equilibria: welfare is increased for low initial stock levels when agents do not have access to capital markets, but decreased otherwise; and an extraction tax reduces welfare in the `cursed' equilibrium, increases it in the other finite extinction equilibrium and expands the set of commons stocks that are never extinguishedcommons, capital markets, extinction, resource curse, storage, multiple equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium

A STUDY ON THE CONSUMER PREFERENCE TOWARDS INVERTER IN PERAMBALUR TOWN

This research paper considers most common factors influencing consumer preference and behaviour towards purchasing of power inverter. The paper identifies the consumer preference in Perambalur town towards power inverter. The objectives of paper describe pre-purchase and post purchasing behaviour of the consumer and activities of showrooms. The survey questions are created using a combination of suggestions from consumer own questions and covers a variety of topics including buying preferences, brands, inverter choice, product features, micro inverters & power optimizers, service & warranty, inverter pricing. Key words: consumer, preference, power inverter, Perambalu

PERFORMANCE APPRASIAL SYSTEM A MANATEC ELECTRONICSEMPLOYEES IN PUDUCHERRY

Performance appraisal is the process of evaluating employee performance on the job in terms of job requirements. Its deciding the value of the work done by an individual. The purpose of performance appraisal has shifted from an evaluation of employees to the identification of their potential and development. The main purpose of performance appraisal is to secure information necessary for making objective and decisions on employees. Key words: evaluating, employee performance, potential, development

A STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF COMPANY – EVENTS IN STOCK PRICES (SENSEX STOCKS)

The stock market fluctuated by many factors. The main factors are the events like bonus, dividend, stock split, repurchase of shares, dividend announcement etc. This study conducted the event like bonus, stock split and dividend. Depending upon the events the share will moved. This research highlights the impact of events on the behaviour of stock prices and their abnormal returns. The researchers have used popular event window study and abnormal returns. Keywords: Abnormal returns, Announcement date, corporate actions, Economic Activities, Event window, Stock price behavior