How much do U.S. corporations know (and care) about bilateral investmenttreaties? Some hints from new survey evidence

New evidence shows that top U.S. corporations are surprisingly unfamiliar with -- and/or lack confidence in -- bilateral investment treaties that are designed to benefit their investments in other countries. To understand whether or not such treaties "work," it is necessary to find out how and why they do, or do not, form part of firms' investment decision-making

Eli Lilly and the International Investment Law Challenge to a Neo-Federal IP Regime

This Article examines the implications of the Eli Lilly case-and international investment law (IIL) more generally-for the operation of an international intellectual property (IP) regime that functions along the lines of the neo-federalist model developed by Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss. The neo-federalist model involves a world in which the international IP regime grants national political communities substantial discretion to pursue their own visions of the normatively proper balance between the rights of IP creators and of those who seek to use it. Importantly, that discretion involves the ability to alter the existing normative balance in either the direction of more or fewer rights for IP creators. Under this view, the international IP regime is not, and should not be construed, either as a universal and comprehensive IP code, nor as a one-way ratchet that only permits member-state experimentation in favor of IP creators. Yet, that sort of systemic rigidity is precisely what the claimant in Eli Lilly sought to impose through the IIL regime. While it is true that the claimant, Eli Lilly, lost its case, a close reading of the award, along with an appreciation of the dynamics of HL, suggests that substantial danger remains. Using Eli Lilly as a case study, this Article explores the challenges that the IL system poses for the realization of the neo-federalist vision

Sacrificing sovereignty: bilateral investment treaties, international arbitration, and the quest for capital

This dissertation examines the phenomenon of bilateral investment treaties, or BITs. Developing countries have increasingly turned to these treaties as a means of offering credible promises to foreign investors of favorable treatment, ostensibly in order to induce greater investment flows. My analysis is three-pronged. First, I argue that only certain kinds of BITs are likely to have much of an effect on investment flows-namely, those that contain binding state pre-consents to investor-initiated arbitration. I present the first comprehensive analysis of the dispute-settlement content of existing treaties. This data-collection effort informs the statistical analyses presented in later chapters. Second, I argue that the willingness of developing countries to enter into BITs should depend in predictable ways on the partisan character of their governing elites. I present results from a large-n statistical analysis that shows that partisanship indeed matters in predicting the likelihood that BITs will be embraced as a mechanism to attract foreign investment. Finally, I present a large-n statistical analysis of the effectiveness of BITs at attracting additional foreign investment. I find very limited evidence that strong BITs are of much use in the so-called "competition for capital". The finding is of great potential significance to developing countries, who have in the past appeared to blindly embrace BITs as a significant part of their development strategies. My results suggest that while BITs may be likely to impose significant sovereignty costs on developing countries, they are unlikely to provide much in the way of off-setting benefits

美国企业是否重视双边投资协定？来自最新调查的证据与启示

新的证据表明，美国一些顶级公司对于双边投资条约的目的是造福其在其他国家的投资，表现出令人惊奇的陌生，或者是信心不足。 为了了解这样的条约是否有效，关键是要懂得他们是如何以及为什么构成公司的投资决策的一部分

Fortune or Evil? The Effect of Inward Foreign Direct Investment on Corruption ∗

Economic integration is a double-edged sword. It provides opportunities of advancement for individuals in countries embracing the global economy and leads to the diffusion of ideas of good governance. Yet, some forms of integration are associated with the deterioration of local standards and practices. In this paper, we analyze how a specific form of economic integration, foreign direct investment (FDI), relates to a specific governance outcome in host countries: the prevalence of corruption. We argue that the relationship between inward FDI and corruption depends on the underlying conditions in the host country. We test the hypotheses of the non-linear relationship of FDI and corruption in an instrumental variable two-stage least squares setting. The results indicate that FDI is associated with higher levels of corruption in less developed countries but not in developed countries. We also find that FDI is associated with higher levels of corruption in autocracies

Rule-Makers or Rule-Takers? Exploring the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is an effort by the United States and the European Union to reposition themselves for a world of diffuse economic power and intensified global competition. It is a next-generation economic negotiation that breaks the mould of traditional trade agreements. At the heart of the ongoing talks is the question whether and in which areas the two major democratic actors in the global economy can address costly frictions generated by their deep commercial integration by aligning rules and other instruments. The aim is to reduce duplication in various ways in areas where levels of regulatory protection are equivalent as well as to foster wide-ranging regulatory cooperation and set a benchmark for high-quality global norms. In this volume, European and American experts explain the economic context of TTIP and its geopolitical implications, and then explore the challenges and consequences of US-EU negotiations across numerous sensitive areas, ranging from food safety and public procurement to economic and regulatory assessments of technical barriers to trade, automotive, chemicals, energy, services, investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms and regulatory cooperation. Their insights cut through the confusion and tremendous public controversies now swirling around TTIP, and help decision-makers understand how the United States and the European Union can remain rule-makers rather than rule-takers in a globalising world in which their relative influence is waning