Skyscrapers and Skylines: New York and Chicago, 1885-2007

This paper compares and contrasts the determinants of the market for skyscrapers in Chicago and New York from 1885 to 2007, using annual time series data. I estimate the factors that determine both the number of skyscraper completions and the height of the tallest building completed each year in the two cities. I find that each city responds differently to the same economic fundamentals. Also, regressions test for and find the presence of strategic interaction across the two cities. I also estimate the effects of zoning regulations on height. Compared to New York, Chicago's zoning policies significantly reduced the height of its skyline.New York, Chicago, skyscrapers, building height

Skyscrapers and the Skyline: Manhattan, 1895-2004

This paper investigates the determinants of skyscraper building cycles in Manhattan from 1895 to 2004. We first provide a simple model of the market for tall buildings. Then we empirically estimate the determinants of the time series of the number of skyscraper completions and their average heights over the 110 year period. We estimate the model under the assumption of rational expectations and myopic expectations, and find that the myopic model provides a better fit of the data. Furthermore, we find that several local and national variables determine both the number of completions and the average height of skyscrapers, including New York City area population; national employment in finance, insurance and real estate; building costs; access to financing; property tax rates and zoning regulations.Skyscrapers, building cycles, building height, Manhattan,New York City, myopic expectations, rational expectations

Charter School Performance in New Jersey

This paper investigates charter school performance in New Jersey from 2000 to 2006. The analysis shows that charter schools have lower performance than public schools in the same districts on fourth grade standardized tests for Language and Math, but performance improves as charter schools gain experience. In addition, I find that the N.J. Dept. of Education is effectively closing low-performing charter schools. Lastly, regression results provide evidence of a competitive effect from charter schools to public schools.Charter Schools, Student Achievement, Competition, New Jersey

Organization, Learning and Cooperation

We model the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly framework. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma type game, but also must learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival's output. We show how a firm's profit and cooperation rates are affected by its size, its rival's size and willingness to cooperate and environmental complexity.Artificial Neural Networks, Cooperation, Firm Learning

Organization, learning and cooperation.

This paper models the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly setting. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game, and must also learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters and to its rival’s willingness to cooperate. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival’s output. We show how profit and cooperation rates are affected by the sizes of both firms, their willingness to cooperate, and by environmental complexity. In addition, we investigate equilibrium firm size and cooperation rates.Artificial neural networks;Prisoner’s Dilemma;Cooperation;Firm learning;

Segregation and Strategic Neighborhood Interaction

We introduce social interactions into the Schelling model of residential choice. These social interactions take the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma game played with neighbors. First, we study the Schelling model over a wide range of utility functions and then proceed to study a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma model. These models provide a benchmark for studying a combined model with preferences over like-typed neighbors and payoffs in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game. We study this combined model both analytically and using agent-based simulations. We find that the presence of these additional social interactions may increase or decrease segregation compared to the standard Schelling model. If the social interactions result in cooperation then segregation is reduced, otherwise it is increased.Schelling Tipping Model, Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma, Cooperation, Segregation

Cournot Competition and Endogenous Firm Size

Barr and Saraceno (JEDC, forthcoming) model the firm as a type of artificial neural network (ANN) which plays a repeated Cournot game. Each period, the network/firm must estimate the relationship between environmental conditions and optimal output. Among other results, the paper develops the notion of a Network Size Equilibrium (NSE): which is an optimal network size for each of the players. The concept of NSE allows us to map environmental complexity to a type of industrial structure, i.e., the average network size in equilibrium. This paper builds on the previous work by exploring the dynamic adjustment process of networks. That is to say, we explore how the network (firm) evolves over time in reaction to the environmental complexity and the behavior of its rival. We model how firms endogenously "grow" over time in the adjustment process toward a network size equilibrium by exploring different adjustment algorithms, which may involve different costs. Further we explore the stability and the types of equilibria that can emerge, given different environmental scenarios.Cournot Competition, Neural Networks, Adjustment Dynamics

Firm Structure, Search and Environmental Complexity

In this paper we explore the information processing problem of the firm by modeling the firm as type of network, which is comprised of two kinds of agents, 'searchers' and 'managers.' The searchers explore the external environment and report the information to the managers. We explore the role of centralization/decentralization in organizational structure to see how it affects firm performance. Centralization is defined in terms of the level at which decisions are made. We assume the information processing organization is arranged hierarchically, but that decisions can be made at different levels, and thus centralization directly relates to the quantity of information used in making a decision. We model the external environment as an NK landscape. Via simulations, we explore which type of organizational structure and level of decision making maximizes firm profits, given the complexity of the environmentOrganizational Structure, Decentralization, NK Landscape, Firm Search

Learning, Organizations, and dynamic cournot games

neural netyworks, firm learning, dynamic cournot games

Bedrock Depth and the Formation of the Manhattan Skyline, 1890-1915

Skyscrapers in Manhattan need to be anchored to bedrock to prevent (possibly uneven) settling. This can potentially increase construction costs if the bedrock lies deep below the surface. The conventional wisdom holds that Manhattan developed two business centers--downtown and midtown--because the depth to the bedrock is close to the surface in these locations, with a bedrock "valley" in between. We measure the effects of building costs associated with bedrock depths, relative to other important economic variables in the location of early Manhattan skyscrapers (1890-1915). We find that bedrock depths had very little influence on the skyline; rather its polycentric development was due to residential and manufacturing patterns, and public transportation hubs.skyscrapers, geology, bedrock, sprawl, urban agglomeration