Self-Defense and Rights

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1976, given by Judith Jarvis Thomson, an American philosopher

Uma defesa do aborto

Resumo O artigo analisa os argumentos contrários ao direito da mulher à interrupção voluntária da gravidez, fundamentando assim sua posição em defesa do direito ao aborto. A análise das contradições nos discursos do “direito à vida” ultrapassa as situações nas quais há risco de morte da mãe ou nas quais a gravidez decorreu de estupro. A consideração da mãe como pessoa moral inclui, na posição sustentada no texto, o direito a assegurar a própria vida e a escolher como esta vida será vivida. Nesta análise, o aborto é discutido em suas implicações políticas, morais e filosóficas. Palavras-chave: aborto; direito à vida; indivíduo; obrigação moral; gestação; escolha.   Abstract The article examines arguments opposing women’s right to voluntary interruption of pregnancy, thus basing its own stance in favor of the right to abortion.  Examination of contradictions in “right to life” discourses goes beyond life-threatening situations or pregnancies resulting from rape. Considering the mother as a moral person includes, in the stance sustained in the text, the right to guarantee her own life and to choose how it is going to be lived. In this analysis, abortion is debated for its political, moral, and philosophical implications. Key words: abortion; right to life; individual; moral obligation; pregnancy; choice.&nbsp

Nietzsche’s meta-axiology: against the skeptical readings

In this paper, I treat the question of the meta-axiological standing of Nietzsche's own values, in the service of which he criticizes morality. Does Nietzsche, I ask, regard his perfectionistic valorization of human excellence and cultural flourishing over other ideals to have genuine evaluative standing, in the sense of being correct, or at least adequate to a matter-of-fact? My goal in this paper is modest, but important: it is not to attribute to Nietzsche some sophisticated meta-axiological view, because I am doubtful that he has one. It is, however, to show that Nietzsche's texts do not necessitate the sceptical meta-axiological positions that have been attributed to him in the recent secondary literature. And it is thereby to suggest that we need not give up on the idea that Nietzsche takes the values he champions to have genuine evaluative standing – not because he has some sophisticated realist theory to this effect, but in a more philosophically unreflective way

A justification of whistleblowing

Penultimate version accepted for publicationWhistleblowing is the act of disclosing information from a public or private organization in order to reveal cases of corruption that are of immediate or potential danger to the public. Blowing the whistle involves personal risk, especially when legal protection is absent, and charges of betrayal, which often come in the form of legal prosecution under treason laws. In this article we argue that whistleblowing is justified when disclosures are made with the proper intent and fulfill specific communicative constraints in addressing issues of public interest. Three communicative constraints of informativeness, truthfulness and evidence are discussed in this regard. We develop a ‘harm test’ to assess the intent for disclosures, concluding that it is not sufficient for justification. Along with the proper intent, a successful act of whistleblowing should provide information that serves the public interest. Taking cognizance of the varied conceptions of public interest, we present an account of public interest that fits the framework of whistleblowing disclosures. In particular, we argue that whistleblowing is justified inter alia when the information it conveys is of a presumptive interest for a public insofar as it reveals an instance of injustice or violation of a civil or political right done against and unbeknown to some members of a polity.Project: ‘Change of Direction. Fostering Whistleblowing in the Fight against Corruption’ co-funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union (Grant Agreement Number: HOME/2014/ISFP/AG/EFCE/7233); SFRH/BPD/108669/2015info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio