Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea\u27

Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlaw- ful if the agent conducting the act has a `guilty mind\u27 (`mens rea\u27). Dif- ferent law systems distinguish different modes of mens rea. For instance, American law distinguishes between `knowingly\u27 performing a criminal act, `recklessness\u27, `strict liability\u27, etc. I will show we can formalize several of these categories. The formalism I use is a complete stit-logic featuring operators for stit-actions taking effect in `next\u27 states, S5-knowledge op- erators and SDL-type obligation operators. The different modes of `mens rea\u27 correspond to the violation conditions of different types of obligation definable in the logic

Minimal Semantics for Action Specifications in First-order Dynamic Logic

In this paper we investigate minimal semantics for First Order Dynamic Logic formulas. The goal is to be able to write action specifications in a declarative pre/post-condition style. The declarative specification of actions comes with some well known problems: the frame problem, the qualification problem and the ramification problem. We incorporate the assumptions that are inherent to both the frame and qualification problem into the semantics of Dynamic Logic by defining orderings over Dynamic Logic models. These orderings allow us to identify for each declarative Dynamic Logic action specification a unique intended model. This unique model represents the system that must be associated with the specification given the prefential semantics that is defined by the orderings

What an Agent Ought To Do

This paper reviewes Horty\u27s 2001 book `Agency and Deontic Logic\u27. We place Horty\u27s research I a broader context and discuss the relevancy for logics for multi-agent systems

A Deontic Logic Analysis of Autonomous Systems' Safety

We consider the pressing question of how to model, verify, and ensure that autonomous systems meet certain \textit{obligations} (like the obligation to respect traffic laws), and refrain from impermissible behavior (like recklessly changing lanes). Temporal logics are heavily used in autonomous system design; however, as we illustrate here, temporal (alethic) logics alone are inappropriate for reasoning about obligations of autonomous systems. This paper proposes the use of Dominance Act Utilitarianism (DAU), a deontic logic of agency, to encode and reason about obligations of autonomous systems. We use DAU to analyze Intel's Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) proposal as a real-world case study. We demonstrate that DAU can express well-posed RSS rules, formally derive undesirable consequences of these rules, illustrate how DAU could help design systems that have specific obligations, and how to model-check DAU obligations.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figures, In 23rd ACM International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Contro

On Floating Conclusions

When there are two lines of argument that contradict each other but still end up with the same conclusion, this conclusion is called a floating conclusion. It is an open topic in skeptical defeasible reasoning if floating conclusions ought to be accepted. Inter- estingly, the answer seems to be changing for different examples. In this paper, we propose a solution for explaining the different treatments of the floating conclusion in the various examples from the literature. We collect the examples from the literature, extend them with additional examples and test various hypotheses for explaining the difference by means of the examples. We will argue for a framework that accepts a floating conclusion by default but allows for reasons to deviate from the default in order to reject it. These reasons nicely explain the different underlying patterns of our intuitions