Religious Reasons for Campbell's View of Emotional Appeals in Philosophy of Rhetoric

This is the author's accepted manuscript.Reading Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric from a rhetorical perspective--as an attempt to address issues relevant to religious rhetoric--I argue that Campbell's aims of preparing future ministers to preach and defending the authority of revealed religion shaped, first, his conception of inventing and presenting emotional appeals and, second, his key assumptions about reason and passion. The essay adds a chapter to accounts of the relationship between reason and passion in sacred rhetorics and in rhetorical traditions more generally, and addresses the question of what Campbell's theory of rhetoric may aim to inculcate or cultivate emotionally and why

Scriptures of the World's Religion -2th ed.

xx + 517 hlm., 23 cm

HUME\u27S MORAL SKEPTICISM

With recent publications by Norton, MacIntyre, Fogelin and others, the issue of Hume\u27s moral skepticism has become a matter of concern. Contrary to the views of Norton and MacIntyre, I argue in my dissertation that Hume is a moral skeptic because his moral theory follows an explicit skeptical methodology or pattern established in his theory of the understanding. In the first chapter I identify an antecedent and consequential skeptical methodology in Book I of the Treatise. The antecedent type is characterized by a three step pattern where, first, boundaries of the understanding are set, second, a theory is defended (such as an internally perceived necessary connection), and, third, a rival vulgar theory is refuted (such as an externally perceived necessary connection). I then argue that the theories Hume defends are ones which proceed from strong natural propensities (or principles of the imagination). Hume\u27s consequential skepticism begins excessively when he shows his own theories to ultimately be contradictory. The problems remain theoretical, however, and he prescribes no doubt. This analysis of skepticism in Book I provides the basis for both identifying and understanding the skeptical features of Hume\u27s moral theory. As a theory of moral sentiment, Hume\u27s account of morality has its epistemological foundation in his theory of the passions. Chapter Two exposes this foundation. In Chapters Three and Four I argue that four features of his moral theory are skeptical in the antecedent sense: first, his denial that a spectator\u27s moral approval is a rational judgment, second, that an agent\u27s moral actions are initiated by a caused or determined will, third that some virtues are matters of convention (e.g. promising), and fourth, that some virtues have an apparent nonmoral character (e.g. wit or good sense). With each of these issues I show how Hume\u27s arguments exhibit the three steps of the antecedent skeptical pattern, and that his theories rest on strong principles of the imagination. In Chapter Five I defend a developmental interpretation of Hume\u27s consequential moral skepticism. I argue that when initially writing the Treatise Hume believed his theories of the passions and morals were free from contradiction. I show further that he changed his mind about this in the Appendix, and that his later moral Enquiry exhibits consequential moral skepticism. I end by noting the metaethical consequences of Hume\u27s moral skepticism

Scriptures of the world's religions

xviii, 542 p.; 24 cm

Socrates to sartre and beyond : A history of philosophy

Buku ini menjelaskan tentang sejarah dan pengelompokan filsafat dalam sebuah disiplin ilmu dan dijelaskan peranan beberapa tokoh filsafat dan pemikirannya

IEP

Título tomado de la página de inicio. Visitado el 19 de abril de 2011Title from title from title screen (viewed Apr. 19, 2011).Sumario: "The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy was founded in 1995 for the purpose of providing detailed, scholarly information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy." Articles are currently from three sources: (1) original contributions by specialized philosophers around the Internet; (2) adaptations of material written by the editors for classroom purposes; and (3) adaptations from public domain sources (typically from two or more sources for per article). The IEP offers access to a keyword site search engine and is free of charge to all Internet users. It is continuously revised and updated.Sumario: La Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy se creó en 1995 con el fin de proporcionar información académica más detallada sobre temas clave y filósofos en todos los ámbitos de la filosofía. Los artículos son en la actualidad de tres fuentes: (1) las contribuciones originales de filósofos especializados en torno a Internet, (2) adaptaciones de material escrito por los editores para sus clases, y (3) adaptaciones de fuentes de dominio público (por lo general a partir de dos o más fuentes por artículo). El IEP ofrece acceso a un motor de búsqueda de palabras clave del sitio y es gratis para todos los usuarios de Internet. Se actualiza y modifica constantemente.Mode of access: World Wide Web.Modo de acceso: World Wide Web

Socrates to Sartre and beyond: a history of philosophy

xiv, 498 hlm.: 24 c

IEP

Título tomado de la página de inicio. Visitado el 19 de abril de 2011Title from title from title screen (viewed Apr. 19, 2011).Sumario: "The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy was founded in 1995 for the purpose of providing detailed, scholarly information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy." Articles are currently from three sources: (1) original contributions by specialized philosophers around the Internet; (2) adaptations of material written by the editors for classroom purposes; and (3) adaptations from public domain sources (typically from two or more sources for per article). The IEP offers access to a keyword site search engine and is free of charge to all Internet users. It is continuously revised and updated.Sumario: La Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy se creó en 1995 con el fin de proporcionar información académica más detallada sobre temas clave y filósofos en todos los ámbitos de la filosofía. Los artículos son en la actualidad de tres fuentes: (1) las contribuciones originales de filósofos especializados en torno a Internet, (2) adaptaciones de material escrito por los editores para sus clases, y (3) adaptaciones de fuentes de dominio público (por lo general a partir de dos o más fuentes por artículo). El IEP ofrece acceso a un motor de búsqueda de palabras clave del sitio y es gratis para todos los usuarios de Internet. Se actualiza y modifica constantemente.Mode of access: World Wide Web.Modo de acceso: World Wide Web