HUME\u27S MORAL SKEPTICISM

Abstract

With recent publications by Norton, MacIntyre, Fogelin and others, the issue of Hume\u27s moral skepticism has become a matter of concern. Contrary to the views of Norton and MacIntyre, I argue in my dissertation that Hume is a moral skeptic because his moral theory follows an explicit skeptical methodology or pattern established in his theory of the understanding. In the first chapter I identify an antecedent and consequential skeptical methodology in Book I of the Treatise. The antecedent type is characterized by a three step pattern where, first, boundaries of the understanding are set, second, a theory is defended (such as an internally perceived necessary connection), and, third, a rival vulgar theory is refuted (such as an externally perceived necessary connection). I then argue that the theories Hume defends are ones which proceed from strong natural propensities (or principles of the imagination). Hume\u27s consequential skepticism begins excessively when he shows his own theories to ultimately be contradictory. The problems remain theoretical, however, and he prescribes no doubt. This analysis of skepticism in Book I provides the basis for both identifying and understanding the skeptical features of Hume\u27s moral theory. As a theory of moral sentiment, Hume\u27s account of morality has its epistemological foundation in his theory of the passions. Chapter Two exposes this foundation. In Chapters Three and Four I argue that four features of his moral theory are skeptical in the antecedent sense: first, his denial that a spectator\u27s moral approval is a rational judgment, second, that an agent\u27s moral actions are initiated by a caused or determined will, third that some virtues are matters of convention (e.g. promising), and fourth, that some virtues have an apparent nonmoral character (e.g. wit or good sense). With each of these issues I show how Hume\u27s arguments exhibit the three steps of the antecedent skeptical pattern, and that his theories rest on strong principles of the imagination. In Chapter Five I defend a developmental interpretation of Hume\u27s consequential moral skepticism. I argue that when initially writing the Treatise Hume believed his theories of the passions and morals were free from contradiction. I show further that he changed his mind about this in the Appendix, and that his later moral Enquiry exhibits consequential moral skepticism. I end by noting the metaethical consequences of Hume\u27s moral skepticism