Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater

According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, your immediate perceptual evidence is limited to facts about your own visual experience, from which conclusions about the external world must be inferred. Cartesianism faces well-known skeptical challenges. But this chapter argues that any anti-Cartesian view strong enough to avoid these challenges must license a way of updating one’s beliefs in response to anticipated experiences that seems diachronically irrational. To avoid this result, the anti-Cartesian must either license an unacceptable epistemic chauvinism, or else claim that merely reflecting on one’s experiences defeats perceptual justification. This leaves us with a puzzle: Although Cartesianism faces problems, avoiding them brings a new set of problems

PORT ELEVATOR CAPACITY AND NATIONAL AND WORLD GRAIN SHIPMENTS

An analysis is conducted on the port component of the United States grain export system. A transshipment model is utilized which covers both United States internal and foreign shipments of corn, soybeans, and wheat during the four quarters of a year. The model suggests that there will be quarter to quarter constraints on port capacity but that annual capacity is adequate. Through sensitivity analysis a number of key factors were found which influence the adequacy of the current port system. Port adequacy is found to depend not as much on export market location as it does on domestic transportation rates and policies.International Relations/Trade,

Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief

This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and so you cannot infer from a premise that you believe the premise unless you do believe it. I argue that this procedure cannot be a source of justification, however, because one can be justified in inferring from p that q only if p amounts to strong evidence that q is true. This is incompatible with the transparency account because p often is not very strong evidence that you believe that p. For example, unless you are a weather expert, the fact that it will rain is not very strong evidence that you believe it will rain. After showing how this intuitive problem can be made precise, I conclude with a broader lesson about the nature of inferential justification: that beliefs, when justified, must be underwritten by beliefs, when justified, must be underwritten by evidential relationships between the facts or propositions which those beliefs represent

The age hardening of copper-manganese-nickel alloys

The Bureau of Mines in conjunction with their Electrolytic Manganese Alloys program has developed a series of age hardening copper-manganese-nickel alloys having properties which compare favorably with those of copper-beryllium alloys...An unusual and highly desirable characteristic of these alloys is their insensitiveness to rate of cooling from the solution temperature. Air cooled and water quenched samples will have identical time hardness curves on being aged. Instead of requiring closely controlled conditions characteristic of many age hardening alloys, these alloys cannot be subjected to a thermal mechanical handling which will prevent hardening on their being subsequently heated to the aging temperature. The reaction of these alloys to heat treatment is of such an unusual nature that the following investigation was undertaken to attempt to clarify the hardening mechanism of these alloys --Introduction, page 1-2

Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?

A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According to this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. This essay rejects the diary model's analogy between memory and testimony from one's former self, arguing first that memory and a diary differ with respect to their psychological roles, and second that this psychological difference underwrites important downstream epistemic differences. The resulting view stands opposed to prominent discussions of memory and testimony, which either, like the diary model, treat memory by analogy to what we naively wish to say about testimony, or which instead attempt to extend to testimony the epistemically preservative role of memory