Facts and distortions in an endogenous growth model with physical capital, human capital and varieties

This article studies a model with physical and human capital accumulation and varieties. The model includes several distortions: duplication effects, spillovers, creative destruction, surplus appropriability, and an erosion effect. We show that the duplication effect in R&D is essential to make the model replicate several stylized facts linked with R&D. We evaluate the distance to the optimal solution, comparing the strength of each distortion.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Agent-Based Modeling of a Non-tâtonnement Process for the Scarf Economy: The Role of Learning

In this paper, we propose a meta-learning model to hierarchically integrate individual learning and social learning schemes. This meta-learning model is incorporated into an agent-based model to show that Herbert Scarf’s famous counterexample on Walrasian stability can become stable in some cases under a non-tâtonnement process when both learning schemes are involved, a result previously obtained by Herbert Gintis. However, we find that the stability of the competitive equilibrium depends on how individuals learn—whether they are innovators (individual learners) or imitators (social learners), and their switching frequency (mobility) between the two. We show that this endogenous behavior, apart from the initial population of innovators, is mainly determined by the agents’ intensity of choice. This study grounds the Walrasian competitive equilibrium based on the view of a balanced resource allocation between exploitation and exploration. This balance, achieved through a meta-learning model, is shown to be underpinned by a behavioral/psychological characteristic

Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

Allocation problem, Indivisibilities, Single-peaked preferences, Priority standard, Temporary satisfaction methods, D61, D63, D74,

A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule that has played a central role in the analysis of the problem is the so-called uniform rule. Chun (2001) proves that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying pareto optimality, no-envy, separability, and ?-continuity. We obtain an alternative characterization by using a weak replication-invariance condition, called duplication-invariance, instead of ?-continuity. Furthermore, we prove that the equal division lower bound and separability imply no-envy. Using this result, we strengthen one of chun’s (2001) characterizations of the uniform rule by showing that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying pareto optimality, the equal division lower bound, separability, and either ?-continuity or duplication-invariance

Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences

We consider the problem of allocating multiple social endowments (estates) of a perfectly divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences when each agent's share can come from at most one estate. We inquire if well-known single-estate rules, such as the Uniform rule, the Proportional rule or the fixed-path rules can be coupled with a matching rule so as to achieve efficiency in the multi-estate level. On the class of problems where all agents have symmetric preferences, any efficient single-estate rule can be extended to an efficient multi-estate rule. If we allow asymmetric preferences however, this is no more the case. For nondictatorial single-estate rules that satisfy efficiency, strategy proof-ness, consistency, and resource monotonicity, an efficient extension to multiple estates is impossible. A similar impossibility also holds for single-estate rules that satisfy efficiency, peak-only, and a weak fairness property