Interstate competition and political stability

Previous theories of globalization have examined factor mobility’s effect on the political conflict between social classes. But factor mobility also increases competition between state rulers in provid- ing services for citizens. I ask how this interstate competition affects the process of political change. In a simple model, interstate competition substitutes for democracy, by forcing rulers to invest in pub- lic goods so as to avoid capital and labor leaving the country. As a result, citizens are less willing to struggle for democracy, and rulers are less willing to oppose it, when interstate competition is strong. Therefore, there is less conflict over the level of democracy. The theory is tested on a post-war panel of countries, using neighboring countries’ financial openness as a proxy for factor mobility. As the theory predicts, states experience fewer changes in their level of democracy when their neighbors are financially open

How to waste a crisis : budget cuts and public service reform

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, governments have proposed sav-ing money by reforming public services. This paper argues that tight budget constraints make reform harder. Governments are uncertain which depart- ments are effective. Normally, effective departments can be identified by increasing their budget, since they can use the increase to produce more than ineffective departments. When budgets must be cut, however, ineffective departments can mimic effective ones by reducing their output. Budget cuts thus harm both short-run productive efficiency, and long-run allocative efficiency. These predictions are confirmed in a panel of US libraries. Low marginal productivity libraries reduce output by more than expected in response to a budget cut, and budget setters respond less to observed short-run output elasticity after cutback years

Reputation and Cooperation in Defence

Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Ex- periments confirm that external threats lead to higher cooperation. The psychological literature suggests proximate explanations in the form of group processes, but does not explain how these processes can evolve and persist. We provide an ultimate explanation, in which cooperation is a rational response to an external threat. We introduce a model in which groups vary in their willing- ness to help each other against external attackers. Attackers infer cooperativeness of groups from members’ behaviour under attack, and may be deterred by a group that bands together against an initial attack. Then, even self-interested individuals may defend each other when threatened in order to deter future attacks. We argue that a group’s reputation is a public good with a natural weakest-link structure. We extend the model to cooperative and altruistic behaviour in general.cooperation, conflict, defence, signalling

How to Waste a Crisis: Budget Cuts and Public Service Reform

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, governments have proposed saving money by reforming public services. This paper argues that tight budget constraints make reform harder. Governments are uncertain which departmets are effective. Normally, effective departments can be identified by increasing their budget, since they can use the increase to produce more than ineffective departments. When budgets must be cut, however, ineffective departments can mimic effective ones by reducing their output. Budget cuts thus harm both short-run productive efficiency, and long-run allocative efficiency. These predictions are confirmed in a panel of US libraries. Low marginal productivity libraries reduce output by more than expected in response to a budget cut, and budget setters respond less to observed short-run output elasticity after cutback years.bureaucracy, reform, signaling

Interstate Competition and Political Stability

Previous theories of globalization have examined factor mobility’s effect on the political conflict between social classes. But factor mobility also increases competition between state rulers in providing services for citizens. I ask how this interstate competition affects the process of political change. In a simple model, interstate competition substitutes for democracy, by forcing rulers to invest in public goods so as to avoid capital and labor leaving the country. As a result, citizens are less willing to struggle for democracy, and rulers are less willing to oppose it, when interstate competition is strong. Therefore, there is less conflict over the level of democracy. The theory is tested on a post-war panel of countries, using neighboring countries’ financial openness as a proxy for factor mobility. As the theory predicts, states experience fewer changes in their level of democracy when their neighbors are financially open.

Can group work assist independent work? Psychology ‘ReGrouPs’

[First Paragraph] The rapidly developing interest in qualitative methods in psychology (defined as interpretative studies of specific issues or problems in which the researcher is central to the sense that is made – Elliott, Fischer, & Rennie, 1999) is currently being paralleled by students’ use of qualitative methods in final year research projects, which is itself a piece of independent research required for programme accreditation by the British Psychological Society. Whilst most students produce qualitative projects of a good standard, there is evidence that both students and supervisors of such research experience demands specific to this methodology

Reputation and cooperation in defence

Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Ex- periments confirm that external threats lead to higher cooperation. The psychological literature suggests proximate explanations in the form of group processes, but does not explain how these processes can evolve and persist. We provide an ultimate explanation, in which cooperation is rational response to an external threat. We introduce a model in which groups vary in their willing- ness to help each other against external attackers. Attackers infer cooperativeness of groups from members’ behaviour under attack, and may be deterred by a group that bands together against an initial attack. Then, even self-interested individuals may defend each other when threatened in order to deter future attacks. We argue that a group’s reputation is a public good with a natural weakest-link structure. We extend the model to cooperative and altruistic behaviour in general

Activity and telluric contamination in HARPS observations of Alpha Centauri B

© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society.The Alpha Centauri system is the primary target for planet search as it is the closest star system composed of a solar twin α CenA, a K-dwarf α Cen B, and an M-dwarf Proxima Centauri, which has a confirmed planet in the temperate zone. α CenA and B weremonitored intensively with the HARPS spectrograph for over 10 yr, providing high-precision radial velocity (RV) measurements. In this work, we study the available data to better understand the stellar activity and other contaminating signals.We highlight the importance of telluric contamination and its impact on the RV measurements. Our suggested procedures lead to discarding about 5 per cent of HARPS data, providing a data set with an rms improved by a factor of 2. We compile and quantify the behaviour of 345 spectral lines with a wide range of line shapes and sensitivity to activity.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio