A Pluralist Account of Knowledge as a Natural Kind

In an attempt to address some long-standing issues of epistemology, Hilary Kornblith proposes that knowledge is a natural kind the identification of which is the unique responsibility of one particular science: cognitive ethology. As Kornblith sees it, the natural kind thus picked out is knowledge as construed by reliabilism. Yet the claim that cognitive ethology has this special role has not convinced all critics. The present article argues that knowledge plays a causal and explanatory role within many of our more fruitful current theories, diverging from the reliabilist conception even in disciplines that are closely related to cognitive ethology, and thus still dealing with knowledge as a natural as opposed to a social phenomenon, where special attention will be given to cognitive neuroscience. However, rather than discarding the natural kind approach altogether, it is argued that many of Kornblith’s insights can in fact be preserved within a framework that is both naturalist and pluralist

Efficacy of vitamin D3-fortified-yogurt drink on anthropometric, metabolic, inflammatory and oxidative stress biomarkers according to vitamin D receptor gene polymorphisms in type 2 diabetic patients: a study protocol for a randomized controlled clinical trial

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Development of type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) is determined by the interactions of genetic and environmental factors. This study was designed to evaluate the possible role of VDR single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) on different aspects of diabetic host response (anthropometric, metabolic, oxidative stress and inflammatory) to daily intake of vitamin D through fortified yogurt drink for 12 weeks.</p> <p>Methods/Design</p> <p>This study comprises two parts: (i) a case-control study; and (ii) an intervention trial. In the first part, VDR polymorphisms <it>(Taq1</it>, <it>FokI</it>, <it>Apa1</it>, <it>Bsm1</it>, and <it>Cdx2) </it>are determined in 350 T2DM patients and 350 non-diabetic subjects. In the second part, the possible effects of daily intake of two servings of vitamin D3-fortified yogurt drink (FYD; 500 IU vitamin D/250 mL) on some selected metabolic (including insulin resistance), inflammatory and oxidative stress biomarkers in 135 T2DM patients are assessed. To relate the resulted changes in the biomarkers to vitamin D replenishment, another group of diabetic patients (n = 45) are also included in the study who receive 2 servings of plain yogurt drink (PYD) a day. The primary outcome is serum level of 25(OH) D, which it is expected to be elevated only in FYD group. Secondary outcomes include improvements in glycemic, metabolic, inflammatory and oxidative stress biomarkers in FYD group compared to PYD group. Three VDR <it>FokI </it>polymorphisms are determined only in FYD group followed by comparison of changes in the biomarkers among these genotypic variants.</p> <p>Discussion</p> <p>The present study, at least in part, elucidates the discrepancies in the results of different vitamin D-diabetes studies pertaining to the genetic variations of the population. If VDR polymorphisms are found to influence the response to our intervention, then knowing distribution of VDR polymorphisms in both diabetic and non-diabetic populations can give a picture of the proportion of the community in whom up to 1000 IU/d vitamin D may not be effective enough to improve insulin resistance and related morbidities. Therefore, they should ideally receive further nutritional support according to their genotype.</p> <p>Trial Registration</p> <p>ClinicalTrials.gov: <a href="http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01236846">NCT01236846</a></p

Benign Infinity

According to infinitism, all justification comes from an infinite series of reasons. Peter Klein defends infinitism as the correct solution to the regress problem by rejecting two alternative solutions: foundationalism and coherentism. I focus on Klein's argument against foundationalism, which relies on the premise that there is no justification without meta-justification. This premise is incompatible with dogmatic foundationalism as defended by Michael Huemer and Time Pryor. It does not, however, conflict with non-dogmatic foundationalism. Whereas dogmatic foundationalism rejects the need for any form of meta-justification, non-dogmatic foundationalism merely rejects Laurence BonJour's claim that meta-justification must come from beliefs. Unlike its dogmatic counterpart, non-dogmatic foundationalism can allow for basic beliefs to receive meta-justification from non-doxastic sources such as experiences and memories. Construed thus, non-dogmatic foundationalism is compatible with Klein's principle that there is no justification without meta-justification. I conclude that Klein's rejection of foundationalism. fails. Nevertheless, I agree with Klein that when in response to a skeptical challenge we engage in the activity of defending our beliefs, the number of reasons we can give is at least in principle infinite. I argue that this type of infinity is benign because, when we continue to give reasons, we will eventually merely repeat previously stated reasons. Consequently, I reject Klein's claim that the more reasons we give the more we increase the justification of our beliefs