Economics Imperialism in Law and Economics

Non peer reviewe

Routines, genes and program-based behavior

Routines, Genes, Skills, Program-based behavior, Proximate causes of individual and firm behavior, A12, B41, B52, D21, D23,

Playing by whose rules? Institutional resilience, conflict and change in the Roman economy

This chapter addresses the question of deep institutional change in the Roman provinces—how informal social norms and conventions that affect economic performance changed (or not) under the influence of Roman rule. It argues that systems theory, approaching provincial societies as complex adaptive systems, provides us with a new approach to study the problem of raised economic performance in changing institutional environments, such as the Roman provinces. The Roman empire lacked the resources to impose new formal institutions and needed local elites to enforce them. Deep institutional changes resulted gradually from structural changes including monetisation and commoditisation but also social status signalling, connectivity, and landscape modification. These structural changes affected the situational contexts in which social roles were played out and new social rules developed

Four Essays on Economic Evolution : an introduction

This essay is in two parts. The first considers the evolution of evolutionary economics from 1982 to 2012. While enormous advances are acknowledged, it is argued that the field is in danger of fragmentation and that there has been relatively little development in its over-arching theoretical framework since Nelson and Winter (1982). This sets the scene for a 2011 workshop and four of the papers presented at the event. In the second part, each paper is outlined in turn, both in terms of its specific contribution and any light it may shine on the problems raised in the first part.Peer reviewe