Evolution: Complexity, uncertainty and innovation

Complexity science provides a general mathematical basis for evolutionary thinking. It makes us face the inherent, irreducible nature of uncertainty and the limits to knowledge and prediction. Complex, evolutionary systems work on the basis of on-going, continuous internal processes of exploration, experimentation and innovation at their underlying levels. This is acted upon by the level above, leading to a selection process on the lower levels and a probing of the stability of the level above. This could either be an organizational level above, or the potential market place. Models aimed at predicting system behaviour therefore consist of assumptions of constraints on the micro-level – and because of inertia or conformity may be approximately true for some unspecified time. However, systems without strong mechanisms of repression and conformity will evolve, innovate and change, creating new emergent structures, capabilities and characteristics. Systems with no individual freedom at their lower levels will have predictable behaviour in the short term – but will not survive in the long term. Creative, innovative, evolving systems, on the other hand, will more probably survive over longer times, but will not have predictable characteristics or behaviour. These minimal mechanisms are all that are required to explain (though not predict) the co-evolutionary processes occurring in markets, organizations, and indeed in emergent, evolutionary communities of practice. Some examples will be presented briefly

Party finance reform as constitutional engineering? The effectiveness and unintended consequences of party finance reform in France and Britain

In both Britain and France, party funding was traditionally characterized by a laissez faire approach and a conspicuous lack of regulation. In France, this was tantamount to a 'legislative vacuum'. In the last two decades, however, both countries have sought to fundamentally reform their political finance regulation regimes. This prompted, in Britain, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and in France a bout of 'legislative incontinence' — profoundly transforming the political finance regime between 1988 and 1995. This article seeks to explore and compare the impacts of the reforms in each country in a bid to explain the unintended consequences of the alternative paths taken and the effectiveness of the new party finance regime in each country. It finds that constitutional engineering through party finance reform is a singularly inexact science, largely due to the imperfect nature of information, the limited predictability of cause and effect, and the constraining influence of non-party actors, such as the Constitutional Council in France, and the Electoral Commission in Britain

Carbon regulation and pathways for institutional transition in market-led housing systems : a case study of English housebuilders and zero carbon housing policy

In this paper, we argue that current research on carbon regulation neglects the complex interactions of institutional norms and market behaviour that characterise responses to regulatory change. We draw on empirical research undertaken with English housebuilders and housing market stakeholders to examine how transitional pathways towards a low-carbon housing future might be advanced and consider the implications of such for carbon regulation and low-carbon economies. Our core proposition is that carbon regulation research can no longer ignore the impact of institutionally constituted market behaviour in shaping pathways and transitions towards low-carbon futures

Giving risk management culture a role in strategic planning

WOS: 000413939000023Strategically planned and implemented risk management paves the way for competitive advantage and a decisive edge for global financial institutions. The importance of risk management becomes more evident in financial instability periods. The failure of global financial institutions in the recent financial crisis revealed that firms with strong risk management and culture were more prepared and economically less damaged. As financial institutions have been criticized severely about risk management practices, it also becomes clear that most financial institutions have difficulties in developing a risk management culture. To have a clear understanding of risk management culture, the chapter aims to highlight a need to extend our understanding of risk management culture and how it can find a voice in the strategic planning of global financial institutions