Scientific Opinion on Flavouring Group Evaluation 63, Revision 3 (FGE.63Rev3): aliphatic secondary alcohols, ketones and related esters evaluated by JECFA (59th and 69th meetings) structurally related to saturated and unsaturated aliphatic secondary alcohols, ketones and esters of secondary alcohols and saturated linear or branched-chain carboxylic acids evaluated by EFSA in FGE.07Rev4

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Scientific Opinion on Flavouring Group Evaluation 7, Revision 5 (FGE.07Rev5) : saturated and unsaturated aliphatic secondary alcohols, ketones and esters of secondary alcohols and saturated linear or branched‐chain carboxylic acids from chemical group 5

Acknowledgements: The Panel wishes to thank the members of the Working Group on Flavourings: Ulla Beckman Sundh, Leon Brimer, Karl-Heinz Engel, Paul Fowler, Rainer Gürtler, Trine Husøy, Wim Mennes and Gerard Mulder for the preparatory work on this scientific opinion and the Working Group on Genotoxicity: Mona-Lise Binderup, Claudia Bolognesi, Riccardo Crebelli, Rainer Gürtler, Francesca Marcon, Daniel Marzin and Pasquale Mosesso for the preparatory work on this scientific opinion and the hearing experts: Vibe Beltoft and Karin Nørby, and EFSA staff: Maria Anastassiadou, Maria Carfi and Annamaria Rossi for the support provided to this scientific opinion.Publisher PD

Scientific Opinion on Flavouring Group Evaluation 57, Revision 1 (FGE.57Rev1): consideration of isopulegone and three flavouring substances evaluated by JECFA (55th meeting)

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Super Unleaded Malbec? A Case Study in Flawed International Standard Setting at the Codex Alimentarius

The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) provides rules on the adoption and enforcement of SPS measures. It also presumes that food safety regulations adopted by WTO Members that conform to relevant international standards are consistent with the SPS Agreement. The relevant international standard setting body for food safety is the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which conducts most of its food safety risk management work through subsidiary bodies such as the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Food (CCCF). CCCF establishes maximum limits for food contaminants and codes of practice for reducing food contamination. These subsidiary bodies in turn delegate risk management work to electronic working groups (EWG) that are comprised of relevant food safety authorities of Codex member states

Scientific Opinion on Flavouring Group Evaluation 302 (FGE.302): N-(2-methylcyclohexyl)-2,3,4,5,6-pentafluoro-benzamide from Chemical Group 30

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Dispersants and Seafood Safety Assessment of the potential impact of Corexit® oil dispersants on seafood safety

The April 20, 2010 explosion and subsequent sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil production platform (DWH) resulted in the largest oil spill in U.S. history. On April 29th, a Spill of National Significance was declared as roughly 53 thousand barrels of oil per day flowed into the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). The U.S. Coast Guard estimated 4.9 million barrels of crude oil escaped before the damaged DWH wellhead was sealed on July 15, 2010 (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2010). Oil spill clean-up methods included skimming operations, burning of surface oil, siphoning oil into tankers directly from the wellhead, and the application of chemical dispersants. The first 3 methods mentioned above physically removed spilled oil from GOM waters. The last method, chemical dispersion, distributed insoluble fractions of the oil into the water-column. This was done for 3 reasons: 1) to reduce the exposure of response personnel at-sea to volatile organic compounds emanating from the surface slick; 2) to prevent concentrated surface oil from reaching, and damaging, fragile coastal wetlands, beaches and shoreline communities; and 3) to accelerate the break-down of spilled oil by natural microorganisms in the environment. The oil spill response contingency plan (RCP) applicable to the GOM (EPA Regions 4 and 6 within the National Response Plan framework) pre-authorized the use of Nalco Co. (Naperville, IL) oil dispersants Corexit® 9527 and Corexit® 9500 among other pre-approved product formulations. From April 22 to July 19, 2010 an estimated 1.1 million gallons of Corexit® dispersant were applied over approximately 300 square miles of oiled surface waters in the GOM and 771,000 gallons were injected directly into the oil free-flowing from the wellhead 5,100 feet beneath the surface (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2010). Corexit® 9527 comprised approximately 215,000 gallons (~11%) of the total dispersant volume applied to the surface oil slick and was discontinued on May 22. The unprecedented volume of chemical dispersants used to combat the DWH oil spill elicited public concerns for the health of responders, coastal communities, marine life, and the safety of seafood from impacted areas of the GOM. This document will address the latter of these concerns

Science in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Dispute Resolution

The World Trade Organization Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS Agreement) relies heavily on science and expert organizations to avoid and resolve trade disputes over measures enacted under the rationale of food safety or plant and animal health protection. However, the state of science for sanitary and phytosanitary risk analysis is highly uncertain, and the SPS Agreement leaves many science policy issues unsettled. The international agencies charged under the SPS Agreement with harmonizing standards and forging international scientific consensus face a daunting and politically-charged task. Two case studies are briefly developed. In the first case, the international scientific consensus strongly supports the U.S. challenge of the European Union’s ban on cattle growth hormones, but the root causes of the dispute go much deeper. The case suggests that establishing a precedent for SPS measures based solely on "sound science" may be a slippery objective. In the second case, domestic avocado producers challenged a U.S. Department of Agriculture assessment which concluded that a partial lifting of the ban on Mexican avocado imports posed a negligible plant pest risk. Although the Department’s phytosanitary risk assessment gained endorsement by independent scientists, a contributing factor to resolving this dispute was the threat of retaliation against U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico. A recent survey of current and proposed technical barriers to U.S. agricultural exports suggests that the trade impacts could approach $5 billion a year and that the most common SPS disputes in the future will be over biological hazards�particularly plant pests and food-borne microbial pathogens. This poses a tremendous challenge, however, because the practice of risk assessment for biological stressors is much less developed than that for chemical substances. The paper concludes with some proposed criteria for evaluating the weight of scientific evidence in SPS risk assessment.