The U.S. Gulf of Mexico Pink Shrimp, Farfantepenaeus duorarum, Fishery: 50 Years of Commercial Catch Statistics

U.S. Gulf of Mexico, pink shrimp, Farfantepenaeus duorarum, catch statistics have been collected by NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service, or its predecessor agency, for over 50 years. Recent events, including hurricanes and oil spills within the ecosystem of the fishery, have shown that documentation of these catch data is of primary importance. Fishing effort for this stock has fluctuated over the 50-year period analyzed, ranging from 3,376 to 31,900 days fished, with the most recent years on record, 2008 and 2009, exhibiting declines up to 90% relative to the high levels recorded in the mid 1990’s. Our quantification of F. duorarum landings and catch rates (CPUE) indicates catch have been below the long-term average of about 12 million lb for all of the last 10 years on record. In contrast to catch and effort, catch rates have increased in recent years, with record CPUE levels measured in 2008 and 2009, of 1,340 and 1,144 lb per day fished, respectively. Our regression results revealed catch was dependent upon fishing effort (F=98.48df=1, 48, p<0.001, r2=0.67), (Catch=1,623,378 + (520) × (effort)). High CPUE’s measured indicate stocks were not in decline prior to 2009, despite the decline in catch. The decrease in catch is attributed in large part to low effort levels caused by economical and not biological or habitat related conditions. Future stock assessments using these baseline data will provide further insights and management advice concerning the Gulf of Mexi

Self-Love and the Judicial Power to Appoint a Special Prosecutor Symposium on Special Prosecutions and the Role of the Independent Counsel

Judicial appointment of private attorneys as special prosecutors has occurred and is permitted to occur in a variety of contexts other than when the executive branch is faced with a potential or actual conflict of interest. Until recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and, of course, district courts within the Second Circuit, have interpreted Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit judicial appointment of a private attorney to prosecute conduct allegedly violative of a court order as criminal contempt. Courts have been most active in appointing private attorneys as special prosecutors in cases involving counterfeit trademark products. This discussion will focus on three major areas of disagreement between the Court and Justice Scalia in Young v. U.S. ex rel Vuitton et Fils: (1) the scope of the contempt power, (2) the role of the judge in contempt proceedings, and (3) the Court\u27s justification for its holding. At its core, the disagreement stems from the definition of judicial power embodied in article III of the Constitution. For Justice Scalia, the role of the prosecutor is inconsistent with the judge\u27s role as a neutral adjudicator. He believes neutrality is the essence of the judicial function and, thus, judicial power. The judicial power is the power to decide, in accordance with law, who should prevail in a case or controversy. \u27 This includes the power to act as a neutral adjudicator but does not include the power to prosecute

Psychiatric Boarding in New Hampshire: Violation of a Statutory Right to Treatment

[Excerpt] New Hampshire law provides for the involuntary commitment of a patient such as Jane when she is a danger to herself or others as a result of mental illness. The patient has a right to treatment under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135-C:1, et seq. Specifically, the patient should receive adequate and humane treatment pursuant to an individual service plan and in the least restrictive environment necessary. However, appropriate facilities often are not available for patients waiting in emergency rooms, and patients can become trapped for hours or even days. This phenomenon is called psychiatric boarding. New Hampshire is not alone in providing a statutory right to treatment, and the problem of psychiatric boarding is common in other states. While enforcement of statutory rights to treatment often is elusive, the Washington Supreme Court delivered a landmark ruling on psychiatric boarding in August 2014, finding that it violated the state laws protecting involuntarily committed patients. Could the Washington court\u27s rationale lead to similar conclusions in other states? Looking to New Hampshire as an example, the state statutes for commitment and treatment rights are analogous to Washington\u27s, and this suggests that the Washington ruling could prove a valuable precedent for barring psychiatric boarding in other states. This Note will compare Washington\u27s involuntary commitment law to New Hampshire\u27s, argue that psychiatric boarding is illegal under New Hampshire law, and propose solutions for complying with the statute, including the continued implementation of community-based services. If New Hampshire implemented its statutory scheme as written, it would satisfy patients\u27 rights to treatment. tion of community-based services. If New Hampshire implemented its statutory scheme as written, it would satisfy patients\u27 rights to treatment