Polymorphic evolution sequence and evolutionary branching

We are interested in the study of models describing the evolution of a polymorphic population with mutation and selection in the specific scales of the biological framework of adaptive dynamics. The population size is assumed to be large and the mutation rate small. We prove that under a good combination of these two scales, the population process is approximated in the long time scale of mutations by a Markov pure jump process describing the successive trait equilibria of the population. This process, which generalizes the so-called trait substitution sequence, is called polymorphic evolution sequence. Then we introduce a scaling of the size of mutations and we study the polymorphic evolution sequence in the limit of small mutations. From this study in the neighborhood of evolutionary singularities, we obtain a full mathematical justification of a heuristic criterion for the phenomenon of evolutionary branching. To this end we finely analyze the asymptotic behavior of 3-dimensional competitive Lotka-Volterra systems

Omeprazole does not alter plasma methotrexate clearance.

We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides which players are going to be serviced and how much each one of them is going to pay. We determine three conditions: \emph{Fence Monotonicity}, \emph{Stability} of the allocation and \emph{Validity} of the tie-breaking rule that are necessary and sufficient for group-strategyproofness, regardless of the cost function. Fence Monotonicity puts restrictions only on the payments of the mechanism and stability only on the allocation. Consequently Fence Monotonicity characterizes group-strategyproof cost-sharing schemes. Finally, we use our results to prove that there exist families of cost functions, where any group-strategyproof mechanism has unbounded approximation ratio.Comment: 29 page