Influencing the world of practice: CCPR in Scotland

Interview with Philip Schlesinger conducted by and with an introduction and commentary by Jan Strycharz

Adverse Selection in an Insurance Market with Government-Guaranteed Subsistence Levels

We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that individuals receive the benefit of some type of potential government assistance that guarantees them a minimum level of wealth. For example, this assistance might be some type of government-sponsored relief program, or it might simply be some type of limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This alters the individuals’ demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of markets with adverse selection.adverse selection, insurance, government relief

Coevolutionary immune system dynamics driving pathogen speciation

We introduce and analyze a within-host dynamical model of the coevolution between rapidly mutating pathogens and the adaptive immune response. Pathogen mutation and a homeostatic constraint on lymphocytes both play a role in allowing the development of chronic infection, rather than quick pathogen clearance. The dynamics of these chronic infections display emergent structure, including branching patterns corresponding to asexual pathogen speciation, which is fundamentally driven by the coevolutionary interaction. Over time, continued branching creates an increasingly fragile immune system, and leads to the eventual catastrophic loss of immune control.Comment: main article: 16 pages, 5 figures; supporting information: 3 page

Henri Temianka Correspondence; (schlesinger)

https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/temianka_correspondence/2751/thumbnail.jp

Henri Temianka Correspondence; (schlesinger)

https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/temianka_correspondence/2750/thumbnail.jp