The EU's Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: An International Law Perspective

Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union establishes that the Union “shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.” In early 2013, negotiators of the 47 Council of Europe member states and the European Union finalised a draft Accession Agreement that would allow the EU to accede to the Convention. In this article I examine the issues and challenges that EU accession poses from an international law perspective. Much of the literature on the EU accession has focused on the effect that this process will have on the EU legal order, including questions regarding its autonomy. Yet EU accession also raises important issues for international law. It is another example of an international organization taking part in a legal system designed exclusively for participation by state parties. To what extent should the EU participate on an equal footing with the other contracting parties, and when are special rules required to take into account the nature of the EU legal order? The article explores the broader issues that arise when the EU seeks to participate in its own right in the international legal order. It is submitted that the EU’s accession to the ECHR is not only an important step for the EU legal order, but also a highly significant development for public international law

Individual Leadership in Guiding Change in Global Governance Institutions: Theory and Practice

It is increasingly accepted that in order for international organizations to address fully the panoply of threats and concerns at the international level the current structure of global governance, particularly the design of major international institutions, requires some level of reform. In different fields and at different levels, this reform has been discussed and debated, but has mostly stalled. Increasingly, it is the executive heads of an organization that are called upon to show stronger leadership during times of crisis and change. No longer viewed as merely managers or administrative posts, the leadership shown byexecutive heads of international organizations is now strongly linked with the effectiveness of these organizations. This working paper seeks to understand the role of leaders in driving, and responding to, change in international organizations. What does leadership, a term often used in relation to national politics, mean in the context of an international organization? How do leaders drive change within these bodies, and how do they effectively respond to external and internal challenges and threats? This paper argues that individual leaders, particularly during times of crisis, can play an important role in guiding change and reform. The first part discusses the concept of leadership in the context of international organizations, and discusses some of the ways in which executive heads can pursue change and reform in their organization. The second part turns to the specific example of the UN Secretary General, an executive head who, despite having a relatively minor role on paper, in some cases has been able to implement meaningful change in the organization. The paper argues that executive heads can and should show greater political leadership in reforming organizations and improving their effectiveness

Comparing the 'Four Pillars' of Global Economic Governance: A Critical Analysis of the Institutional Design of the FSB, IMF, World Bank, and WTO

Why are the intergovernmental organizations referred to as the ‘four pillars’ of international economic governance designed the way they are? Although much of their institutional design—issues like voting, membership, mandate, and funding—can be traced back to the history of the organization and the circumstances in which states established it, the institutional setup of each organization should ideally correspond with the type of public good it seeks to provide. Formal organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) are treaty-based, requiring strict conditions for membership and a high degree of legal rules and enforcement. They were also established to carry out a specific function, such as balance of payment issues for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Bodies such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the new player in the field of economic governance, are less formal, and are concerned with monitoring, advising, and coordination of regulatory efforts. In some cases, the roles of these organizations have expanded into new areas, or they have had functions replaced by other international bodies, especially in the wake of events such as the 1997 and 2008 financial crises. This article seeks to understand how the design of these institutions is influenced not only by the states that established them, but also by the overarching goals the organization seeks to achieve, and its place within the broader framework of global economic governance. The article begins by comparing the institutional design of the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank, and the FSB. It compares the organizations’ legal basis, membership, organs, and decision-making processes, as well as the methods by which they develop and enforce rules for the global economy. The article examines how these very different institutional setups relate to the goals of each organization. How has the design and function of these organizations changed over time, and to what extent has this change been due to the changing role of the organization, especially in light of events such as the 1997 and 2008 financial crises? Particular emphasis is given to the level of formality with which these organizations operate—when does the organization require strict rules regarding funding, voting, and membership, and when are more informal processes more appropriate? Finally, the article seeks to understand to what extent these organizations, despite their differences in terms of mandate, structure, and methods are able to work together effectively and develop policies that are mutually consistent. An understanding of these dynamics will be useful in further discussions about how these organizations might be designed and structured better in order to address the challenges facing the global economy

Multilateralism under Strain: The Challenges of the European Union’s Engagement With International Institutions

Multilateralism is under strain. The election of US President Donald Trump has brought about a new challenge to the rules based international order. The EU, itself a form of multilateral cooperation, also faces internal challenges, including the migration crisis, terrorism, growing populism, and disrespect for the rule of law. This working paper discusses how the EU can respond to such internal and external challenges when engaging with multilateral institutions. At a time when multilateralism is increasingly challenged, the EU requires a clear strategy that links its general support for multilateralism with specific international objectives

The Development of Customary International Law by International Organizations

In his Fourth Report on the Identification of Customary International Law (2016), Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood confirmed that ‘[i]n certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to the expression, or creation, of rules of customary international law’. That the practice of international organizations can be relevant when identifying customary international law is relatively uncontroversial. The issue that is more debated is the extent to which the practice of international organizations as such may contribute to the development of customary international law. Using examples from the European Union's treaty practice and from the Court of Justice of the European Union, this article argues that international organizations may contribute to such practice, not only by representing the collective will of States, but as autonomous actors in their own right