Learning to Love Globalization? Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade

Recent studies of public attitudes toward trade have converged upon one central finding: support for trade restrictions is highest among respondents with the lowest levels of education. This has been interpreted as strong support for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the classic economic treatment of the income effects of trade which predicts that trade openness benefits those owning factors of production with which their economy is relatively well endowed (those with skills in the advanced economies) while hurting others (low skilled workers). We re- examine the available survey data, showing that the impact of education on attitudes toward trade is almost identical among respondents in the active labor force and those who are not (even those who are retired). We also find that, while individuals with college-level educations are far more likely to favor trade openness than others, other types of education have no significant effects on attitudes, and some actually reduce the support for trade, even though they clearly contribute to skill acquisition. Combined, these results strongly suggest that the effects of education on individual trade preferences are not primarily a product of distributional concerns linked to job skills. We suggest that exposure to economic ideas and information among college-educated individuals plays a key role in shaping attitudes toward trade and globalization. This is not to say that distributional issues are not important in shaping attitudes toward trade – just that they are not clearly manifest in the simple, broad association between education levels and support for free trade.International Trade, Trade Preferences, Stolper-Samuelson, Education Effects

Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe

Recent studies of individual attitudes toward immigration emphasize concerns about labor market competition as a potent source of anti- immigrant sentiment, in particular among less-educated or less-skilled citizens who fear being forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants willing to work for much lower wages. We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social Survey. In contrast to predictions based upon conventional arguments about labor market competition, which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own, but support immigration of workers with different skill levels, we find that people with higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question. Across Europe, higher education and higher skills mean more support for all types of immigrants. These relationships are almost identical among individuals in the labor force (i.e., those competing for jobs) and those not in the labor force. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, the connection between the education or skill levels of individuals and views about immigration appears to have very little, if anything, to do with fears about labor market competition. This finding is consistent with extensive economic research showing that the income and employment effects of immigration in European economies are actually very small. We find that a large component of the effect of education on attitudes toward immigrants can be accounted for by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs. More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole. Together, these factors account for around 65% of the estimated effect of education on support for immigration.Immigration Preferences, Immigration Attitudes, Trade Preferences, Factor-Proportion Model, Education Effects, Skill Effects

Immigration, public opinion and the recession in Europe

It is widely believed that the recent recession has soured public attitudes towards immigration. But most existing studies are cross-sectional and can shed little light on the economy-wide forces that shift public opinion on immigration. In this paper I use the six rounds of the European Social Survey (2002-2012) to test the effects of macro-level shocks on immigration opinion for 20 countries. For Europe as a whole the shifts in opinion have been remarkably mild but with differences between countries that reflect the severity of the recession. Pro-immigration opinion is negatively related to the share of immigrants in the population and to the share of social benefits in GDP, but only weakly to unemployment. These effects are common across different socioeconomic groups and there is little evidence of divergence in opinion. The continuing rise in support for right wing populist parties during the recession owes more to growing Euro-scepticism than to a surge in anti-immigrant sentiment

MiFID II Unbundling and Sell Side Analyst Research

We examine the effect of MiFID II, which mandated the unbundling and separate pricing of analyst research in Europe beginning in 2018. We find that the requirements of MiFID II were associated with a reduction in analyst following for European firms relative to US firms, with decreases in coverage greatest for firms that were larger, older and less volatile, and had greater coverage and more accurate consensus forecasts. Remaining analysts follow fewer firms and issue fewer forecasts, consistent with increased focus, and appear to increase their efforts on the firms they continue to cover. In particular, forecasts become more accurate, are more likely to be disaggregated and include recommendations, and are accompanied by larger stock price reactions. Consistent with increased effort to curry favor with management, analysts issue more optimistic recommendations and beatable earnings forecasts. While individual forecasts are more informative, the overall information environment for the average firm tends to deteriorate, with less aggregate information conveyed by analyst forecasts, a greater proportion of information delayed to earnings announcements and higher average bid-ask spreads. Taken as a whole, results are consistent with a reduction in analyst following mitigated by an increase in focus and effort by remaining analysts, but with an overall negative effect on the information environment

Can narratives of white identity reduce opposition to immigration and support for Hard Brexit? A survey experiment

Britain’s vote to leave the European Union highlights the importance of white majority opposition to immigration. This article presents the results of a survey experiment examining whether priming an open form of ethno-nationalism based on immigrant assimilation reduces hostility to immigration and support for right-wing populism in Britain. Results show that drawing attention to the idea that assimilation leaves the ethnic majority unchanged significantly reduces hostility to immigration and support for Hard Brexit in the UK. Treatment effects are strongest among UKIP, Brexit and white working-class voters. This is arguably the first example of an experimental treatment leading to more liberal immigration policy preferences

Improving SNR and reducing training time of classifiers in large datasets via kernel averaging

Kernel methods are of growing importance in neuroscience research. As an elegant extension of linear methods, they are able to model complex non-linear relationships. However, since the kernel matrix grows with data size, the training of classifiers is computationally demanding in large datasets. Here, a technique developed for linear classifiers is extended to kernel methods: In linearly separable data, replacing sets of instances by their averages improves signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and reduces data size. In kernel methods, data is linearly non-separable in input space, but linearly separable in the high-dimensional feature space that kernel methods implicitly operate in. It is shown that a classifier can be efficiently trained on instances averaged in feature space by averaging entries in the kernel matrix. Using artificial and publicly available data, it is shown that kernel averaging improves classification performance substantially and reduces training time, even in non-linearly separable data

More and More Restrictive-But Not Always Populist: Explaining Variation in the British Conservative Party's Stance on Immigration and Asylum

This is the Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in the Journal of Contemporary European Studies Vol. 21, Iss. 1, copyright Taylor & Francis 2013, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/14782804.2013.766474Centre-right parties are commonly inclined towards appeals and policies on immigration that are both restrictive in nature and populist in tone-in part because this is what they believe in, in part because it affords them an electoral advantage over their rivals on the centre-left. One would expect, however, that the extent to which they focus on immigration and asylum will vary according to public opinion, according to who leads them, and according to whether they are in government or in opposition. This would appear to be the case for the British Conservative Party, but the relationship is not an entirely consistent one. Moreover, while the Party has, for half a century, pursued ever more restrictive policies, the extent to which it has couched its approach in populist rhetoric varies considerably over time-and not always in line with the severity of its stance on immigration. The reason for this lies partly in the social and economic liberalism of some of its leaders (and in their related concern to act 'responsibly' on race and immigration) but also in their anxiety not to alienate key sections of the middle classes who must be persuaded to support the Party if it is to win elections. These considerations are likely to weigh heavily with other centre-right parties, too. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

Emigration, remittances, and the subjective well-being of those staying behind

© 2018, The Author(s). We offer the first global perspective on the well-being consequences of emigration for those staying behind using several subjective well-being measures (evaluations of best possible life, positive affect, stress, and depression). Using the Gallup World Poll data for 114 countries during 2009–2011, we find that having family members abroad is associated with greater evaluative well-being and positive affect, and receiving remittances is linked with further increases in evaluative well-being, especially in poorer contexts—both across and within countries. We also document that having household members abroad is linked with increased stress and depression, which are not offset by remittances. The out-migration of family members appears less traumatic in countries where migration is more common, indicating that people in such contexts might be able to cope better with separation. Overall, subjective well-being measures, which reflect both material and non-material aspects of life, furnish additional insights and a well-rounded picture of the consequences of emigration on migrant family members staying behind relative to standard outcomes employed in the literature, such as the left-behind’s consumption, income, or labor market outcomes