Clustering of spectra and fractals of regular graphs

We exhibit a characteristic structure of the class of all regular graphs of degree d that stems from the spectra of their adjacency matrices. The structure has a fractal threadlike appearance. Points with coordinates given by the mean and variance of the exponentials of graph eigenvalues cluster around a line segment that we call a filar. Zooming-in reveals that this cluster splits into smaller segments (filars) labeled by the number of triangles in graphs. Further zooming-in shows that the smaller filars split into subfilars labelled by the number of quadrangles in graphs, etc. We call this fractal structure, discovered in a numerical experiment, a multifilar structure. We also provide a mathematical explanation of this phenomenon based on the Ihara-Selberg trace formula, and compute the coordinates and slopes of all filars in terms of Bessel functions of the first kind.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figure

Solving generic nonarchimedean semidefinite programs using stochastic game algorithms

A general issue in computational optimization is to develop combinatorial algorithms for semidefinite programming. We address this issue when the base field is nonarchimedean. We provide a solution for a class of semidefinite feasibility problems given by generic matrices. Our approach is based on tropical geometry. It relies on tropical spectrahedra, which are defined as the images by the valuation of nonarchimedean spectrahedra. We establish a correspondence between generic tropical spectrahedra and zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information. The latter have been well studied in algorithmic game theory. This allows us to solve nonarchimedean semidefinite feasibility problems using algorithms for stochastic games. These algorithms are of a combinatorial nature and work for large instances.Comment: v1: 25 pages, 4 figures; v2: 27 pages, 4 figures, minor revisions + benchmarks added; v3: 30 pages, 6 figures, generalization to non-Metzler sign patterns + some results have been replaced by references to the companion work arXiv:1610.0674

Tropical polyhedra are equivalent to mean payoff games

We show that several decision problems originating from max-plus or tropical convexity are equivalent to zero-sum two player game problems. In particular, we set up an equivalence between the external representation of tropical convex sets and zero-sum stochastic games, in which tropical polyhedra correspond to deterministic games with finite action spaces. Then, we show that the winning initial positions can be determined from the associated tropical polyhedron. We obtain as a corollary a game theoretical proof of the fact that the tropical rank of a matrix, defined as the maximal size of a submatrix for which the optimal assignment problem has a unique solution, coincides with the maximal number of rows (or columns) of the matrix which are linearly independent in the tropical sense. Our proofs rely on techniques from non-linear Perron-Frobenius theory.Comment: 28 pages, 5 figures; v2: updated references, added background materials and illustrations; v3: minor improvements, references update

Discounting in Games across Time Scales

We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model hierarchical and sequential decision making under uncertainty across different time scales. We show the existence of pure memoryless optimal strategies for both players and an ordered field property for such games. We show that if there is only one player (Markov decision processes), then the values can be computed in polynomial time. It follows that whether the value of a player is equal to a given rational constant in two-level discounted games can be decided in NP intersected coNP. We also give an alternate strategy improvement algorithm to compute the value

Non-Zero Sum Games for Reactive Synthesis

In this invited contribution, we summarize new solution concepts useful for the synthesis of reactive systems that we have introduced in several recent publications. These solution concepts are developed in the context of non-zero sum games played on graphs. They are part of the contributions obtained in the inVEST project funded by the European Research Council.Comment: LATA'16 invited pape

Probabilistic Model Checking for Energy Analysis in Software Product Lines

In a software product line (SPL), a collection of software products is defined by their commonalities in terms of features rather than explicitly specifying all products one-by-one. Several verification techniques were adapted to establish temporal properties of SPLs. Symbolic and family-based model checking have been proven to be successful for tackling the combinatorial blow-up arising when reasoning about several feature combinations. However, most formal verification approaches for SPLs presented in the literature focus on the static SPLs, where the features of a product are fixed and cannot be changed during runtime. This is in contrast to dynamic SPLs, allowing to adapt feature combinations of a product dynamically after deployment. The main contribution of the paper is a compositional modeling framework for dynamic SPLs, which supports probabilistic and nondeterministic choices and allows for quantitative analysis. We specify the feature changes during runtime within an automata-based coordination component, enabling to reason over strategies how to trigger dynamic feature changes for optimizing various quantitative objectives, e.g., energy or monetary costs and reliability. For our framework there is a natural and conceptually simple translation into the input language of the prominent probabilistic model checker PRISM. This facilitates the application of PRISM's powerful symbolic engine to the operational behavior of dynamic SPLs and their family-based analysis against various quantitative queries. We demonstrate feasibility of our approach by a case study issuing an energy-aware bonding network device.Comment: 14 pages, 11 figure

The Impatient May Use Limited Optimism to Minimize Regret

Discounted-sum games provide a formal model for the study of reinforcement learning, where the agent is enticed to get rewards early since later rewards are discounted. When the agent interacts with the environment, she may regret her actions, realizing that a previous choice was suboptimal given the behavior of the environment. The main contribution of this paper is a PSPACE algorithm for computing the minimum possible regret of a given game. To this end, several results of independent interest are shown. (1) We identify a class of regret-minimizing and admissible strategies that first assume that the environment is collaborating, then assume it is adversarial---the precise timing of the switch is key here. (2) Disregarding the computational cost of numerical analysis, we provide an NP algorithm that checks that the regret entailed by a given time-switching strategy exceeds a given value. (3) We show that determining whether a strategy minimizes regret is decidable in PSPACE

Stock predictions and population indicators for Australia's east coast saucer scallop fishery

This project undertook analyses to understand the roles of overfishing and the environment on saucer scallops. Results of this study indicated a decline in numbers of spawning scallops. High levels of fishing effort since the 1980s contributed to stock depletion. In addition, environmental influences such as increased sea surface temperatures (SST) may have amplified scallop mortality rates. These findings can be applied to efforts for stock rehabilitation for the scallop fishery between Yeppoon and K’gari (Fraser Island). Recommended management actions include reduction of the spatial intensity of fishing effort applied, and ensuring sufficient annual spawning to support the scallop population and fishery

The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Simple Stochastic Multiplayer Games

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game G, does there exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of G where player 0 wins with probability 1. Moreover, this problem remains undecidable if it is restricted to strategies with (unbounded) finite memory. However, if mixed strategies are allowed, decidability remains an open problem. One way to obtain a provably decidable variant of the problem is restricting the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively.Comment: 23 pages; revised versio