Can minimalism about truth embrace polysemy?

Paul Horwich is aware of the fact that his theory as stated in his works is directly applicable only to a language in which a word, understood as a syntactic type, is connected with exactly one literal meaning. Yet he claims that the theory is expandable to include homonymy and indexicality and thus may be considered as applicable to natural language. My concern in this paper is with yet another kind of ambiguity - systematic polysemy - that assigns multiple meanings to one linguistic type. I want to combine the characteristics of systematic polysemy with the Kaplanian insight that meanings of expressions may be defined by semantic rules which assign content in context and to ask the question if minimalism about truth and meaning is compatible with such rule-based systematic polysemy. I will first explain why the expressions that exhibit rule-based systematic polysemy are difficult to combine with a truth theory that is based on a use theory of meaning before proceeding to argue that indexicals and proper names are such expressions

On the Role of Senses in the Ontology-Lexicon

Cimiano P, McCrae J, Buitelaar P, Montiel-Ponsoda E. On the Role of Senses in the Ontology-Lexicon. In: Oltramari A, Vossen P, Qin L, Hovy E, eds. New Trends of Research in Ontologies and Lexical Resources. Ideas, Projects, Systems. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer; 2013: 43-62