1,284 research outputs found
Modeling the Evolution of Differences in Variability Between Sexes
An elementary mathematical theory based on a “selectivity-variability” principle is proposed to address a question raised by Charles Darwin, namely, how one sex of a sexually dimorphic species might tend to evolve with greater variability than the other sex. Two mathematical models of the principle are presented: a discrete-time one-step probabilistic model of the short-term behavior of the subpopulations of a given sex, with an example using normally distributed perceived fitness values; and a continuous-time deterministic coupled ODE model for the long-term asymptotic behavior of the expected sizes of the subpopulations, with an example using exponentially distributed fitness levels
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on hierarchical lattices
An evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is studied with players located
on a hierarchical structure of layered square lattices. The players can follow
two strategies [D (defector) and C (cooperator)] and their income comes from PD
games with the ``neighbors.'' The adoption of one of the neighboring strategies
is allowed with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. Monte Carlo
simulations are performed to study how the measure of cooperation is affected
by the number of hierarchical levels (Q) and by the temptation to defect.
According to the simulations the highest frequency of cooperation can be
observed at the top level if the number of hierarchical levels is low (Q<4).
For larger Q, however, the highest frequency of cooperators occurs in the
middle layers. The four-level hierarchical structure provides the highest
average (total) income for the whole community.Comment: appendix adde
Altruistic Contents of Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma
We examine the classical contents of quantum games. It is shown that a
quantum strategy can be interpreted as a classical strategies with effective
density-dependent game matrices composed of transposed matrix elements. In
particular, successful quantum strategies in dilemma games are interpreted in
terms of a symmetrized game matrix that corresponds to an altruistic game plan.Comment: Revised according to publisher's request: 4 pgs, 2 fgs, ReVTeX4. For
more info, go to http://www.mech.kochi-tech.ac.jp/cheon
Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we
introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter ,
influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of
the new strategy. For positive players with high payoffs will be considered
more likely, while for negative the opposite holds. Setting equal to
zero returns the frequently adopted random selection of the opponent. We find
that increasing the probability of adopting the strategy from the fittest
player within reach, i.e. setting positive, promotes the evolution of
cooperation. The robustness of this observation is tested against different
levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different
interaction network. Since the evolution to widespread defection is tightly
associated with cooperators having a lower fitness than defectors, the fact
that positive values of facilitate cooperation is quite surprising. We show
that the results can be explained by means of a negative feedback effect that
increases the vulnerability of defectors although initially increasing their
survivability. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of
effectively alters the interaction network and thus also the impact of
uncertainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical
Review
Social Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical
evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among
individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff
computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked
influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can
be established at equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the
populations and their evolutionary stability.Comment: 12 pages, 7 figures. to appea
On Phase Transitions to Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Game theory formalizes certain interactions between physical particles or
between living beings in biology, sociology, and economics, and quantifies the
outcomes by payoffs. The prisoner's dilemma (PD) describes situations in which
it is profitable if everybody cooperates rather than defects (free-rides or
cheats), but as cooperation is risky and defection is tempting, the expected
outcome is defection. Nevertheless, some biological and social mechanisms can
support cooperation by effectively transforming the payoffs. Here, we study the
related phase transitions, which can be of first order (discontinous) or of
second order (continuous), implying a variety of different routes to
cooperation. After classifying the transitions into cases of equilibrium
displacement, equilibrium selection, and equilibrium creation, we show that a
transition to cooperation may take place even if the stationary states and the
eigenvalues of the replicator equation for the PD stay unchanged. Our example
is based on adaptive group pressure, which makes the payoffs dependent on the
endogeneous dynamics in the population. The resulting bistability can invert
the expected outcome in favor of cooperation.Comment: For related work see http://www.soms.ethz.ch
Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation
We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma
game on a square lattice where a fraction of players can spread their
strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching
capability. In addition, players characterized with the larger teaching
capability are allowed to temporarily link with distant opponents of the same
kind with probability , thus introducing shortcut connections among the
distinguished. We show that these additional temporary connections are able to
sustain cooperation throughout the whole range of the temptation to defect.
Remarkably, we observe that as the temptation to defect increases the optimal
decreases, and moreover, only minute values of warrant the best
promotion of cooperation. Our study thus indicates that influential individuals
must be few and sparsely connected in order for cooperation to thrive in a
defection prone environment.Comment: 6 two-column pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in Physical
Review
Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Aging is always present, tailoring our interactions with others and
postulating a finite lifespan during which we are able to exercise them. We
consider the prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice, and examine how
quenched age distributions and different aging protocols influence the
evolution of cooperation when taking the life experience and knowledge
accumulation into account as time passes. In agreement with previous studies,
we find that a quenched assignment of age to players, introducing heterogeneity
to the game, substantially promotes cooperative behavior. Introduction of aging
and subsequent death as a coevolutionary process may act detrimental on
cooperation but enhances it efficiently if the offspring of individuals that
have successfully passed their strategy is considered newborn. We study
resulting age distributions of players, and show that the heterogeneity is
vital yet insufficient for explaining the observed differences in cooperator
abundance on the spatial grid. The unexpected increment of cooperation levels
can be explained by a dynamical effect that has a highly selective impact on
the propagation of cooperator and defector states.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical
Review
Modeling two-language competition dynamics
During the last decade, much attention has been paid to language competition
in the complex systems community, that is, how the fractions of speakers of
several competing languages evolve in time. In this paper we review recent
advances in this direction and focus on three aspects. First we consider the
shift from two-state models to three state models that include the possibility
of bilingual individuals. The understanding of the role played by bilingualism
is essential in sociolinguistics. In particular, the question addressed is
whether bilingualism facilitates the coexistence of languages. Second, we will
analyze the effect of social interaction networks and physical barriers.
Finally, we will show how to analyze the issue of bilingualism from a game
theoretical perspective.Comment: 15 pages, 5 figures; published in the Special Issue of Advances in
Complex Systems "Language Dynamics
Time-Varying Priority Queuing Models for Human Dynamics
Queuing models provide insight into the temporal inhomogeneity of human
dynamics, characterized by the broad distribution of waiting times of
individuals performing tasks. We study the queuing model of an agent trying to
execute a task of interest, the priority of which may vary with time due to the
agent's "state of mind." However, its execution is disrupted by other tasks of
random priorities. By considering the priority of the task of interest either
decreasing or increasing algebraically in time, we analytically obtain and
numerically confirm the bimodal and unimodal waiting time distributions with
power-law decaying tails, respectively. These results are also compared to the
updating time distribution of papers in the arXiv.org and the processing time
distribution of papers in Physical Review journals. Our analysis helps to
understand human task execution in a more realistic scenario.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figure
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