Efficiency versus Risk Dominance in an Evolutionary Model with Cheap Talk

Cheap talk;evolutionary game theory;coordination games;risk dominance

Does it take Three to Make Two Happy? An Experimental Study on Bargaining with Mediation

Mediation is a conflict resolution method in which a third neutral party provides assistance to the conflict parties.The process of mediation as well as any solution to the conflict arising from it is implemented only by the consent of all conflict parties.It is the role of a mediator to stimulate communication that leads to mutual understanding of the feasible conflict outcomes, i.e. to complete information on solution consequences among the parties of the conflict. This information is used by the parties of the conflict to evaluate their own as well as the others consequences of a proposed solution to the conflict.However, it is not clear whether the information itself, or the way it was obtained (by voluntary participation in a process in which it was collected) leads to a con ict resolution.This paper concentrates on the bargaining behavior in a conflict, abstracting from the mediators methods and techniques.We design an experiment where two-person conflicts are resolved in an unstructured bargaining and study whether the way of obtaining information on the relative payoffs influences the conflict resolution process.We also study the demand for such information by individuals with various types of social preferences.This allows us to address the role of self-selection in the mediation process.information in unstructured bargaining;conflict resolution;mediation;experiment

Strategic vs Non-Strategic Motivations of Sanctioning

We isolate strategic and non-strategic motivations of sanctioning in a repeated public goods game. In two experimental treatments, subjects play the public goods game with the possibility to sanction others. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment, each subject learns about the sanctions received in the same round as they were assigned, but in the SECRET sanctions treatment, sanctions are announced only after the experiment is finished, removing in this way all strategic reasons to punish. We find that sanctioning is similar in both treatments, giving support for nonstrategic explanations of sanctions (altruistic punishment). Interestingly, contributions to the public good in both treatments with sanctioning are higher than when the public goods game is played without any sanctioning, irrespective of announcing the sanctions to their receivers during the play of the game, or only after the game is finished. The mere knowledge that sanctions might be assigned increases cooperation: subjects correctly expect that nonstrategic sanctioning takes place against freeriders.altruistic punishment;nonstrategic sanctions;strategic sanctions;public goods;economic experiment

Centralized common pool management and local community participation

cooperative games

Team incentives in public organisations; an experimental study

Using a simple production game, we investigate whether public firms perform better when they increase the power of their workersââ¬â¢ incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, subjects choose between a ‘public firm’ and a ‘private firm’ with team and individual incentives, respectively. When exposed to individual incentives, workers in the public firm increase effort in one parametrisation, but show a decrease in another. One reason for the latter observation is that reciprocators self-select in the public firm, rendering cooperation profitable.

Does it take Three to Make Two Happy? An Experimental Study on Bargaining with Mediation

Mediation is a conflict resolution method in which a third neutral party provides assistance to the conflict parties.The process of mediation as well as any solution to the conflict arising from it is implemented only by the consent of all conflict parties.It is the role of a mediator to stimulate communication that leads to mutual understanding of the feasible conflict outcomes, i.e. to complete information on solution consequences among the parties of the conflict. This information is used by the parties of the conflict to evaluate their own as well as the others consequences of a proposed solution to the conflict.However, it is not clear whether the information itself, or the way it was obtained (by voluntary participation in a process in which it was collected) leads to a con ict resolution.This paper concentrates on the bargaining behavior in a conflict, abstracting from the mediators methods and techniques.We design an experiment where two-person conflicts are resolved in an unstructured bargaining and study whether the way of obtaining information on the relative payoffs influences the conflict resolution process.We also study the demand for such information by individuals with various types of social preferences.This allows us to address the role of self-selection in the mediation process.

The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences

We analyse gender differences in the trust game in a "behind the veil of ignorance" design.This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments.We observe that, on averge, men and women do not differ in "trust", and that women are slightly more "trustworthy".However, men's strategies are bimodal, peaking at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the Pareto efficient frontier, while women's strategies are single peaked at moderate tranfers.Moreover, if a man [woman] exhibits low trust, he [she] is likely to be a money-maximizer [a risk or betrayal averse reciprocator].gender differences;trust game;experiment;strategy method behind the veil of ignorance

Beliefs and Trust: An Experiment

In this paper, we address the concept of trust by combining (i) the self-reported trust and belief in trustworthiness of others from a general unpaid questionnaire, (ii) choices made in a social valuation task designed to measure subjects' distributional preferences, (iii) strategies submitted in the trust game in both roles of the game, and (iv) subjects' beliefs about the strategies of their co-player submitted in the form of probability distributions nad incentivized by the quadratic scoring rule.We show that trust can be expressed as a belief in positive reciprocity of the trustee, and answers to general questionnaire lack predictive power.Distributional preferences also play a role in the decision to trust in that they affect the subjects' beliefs about the positive reciprocity of others.Cooperative subjects are more optimistic in their beliefs and therefore trust more.experimental economics;trust;beliefs;distributional preferences