Option Pricing Kernels and the ICAPM

We estimate the parameters of pricing kernels that depend on both aggregate wealth and state variables that describe the investment opportunity set, using FTSE 100 and S&P 500 index option returns as the returns to be priced. The coefficients of the state variables are highly significant and remarkably consistent across specifications of the pricing kernel, and across the two markets. The results provide further evidence that, consistent with Merton's (1973) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model, state variables in addition to market risk are priced

Analogy making and the structure of implied volatility skew

An analogy based option pricing model is put forward. If option prices are determined in accordance with the analogy model, and the Black Scholes model is used to back-out implied volatility, then the implied volatility skew arises, which flattens as time to expiry increases. The analogy based stochastic volatility and the analogy based jump diffusion models are also put forward. The analogy based stochastic volatility model generates the skew even when there is no correlation between the stock price and volatility processes, whereas, the analogy based jump diffusion model does not require asymmetric jumps for generating the skew

Institutional investors and corporate governance

We provide a comprehensive overview of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance with three main components. First, we establish new stylized facts documenting the evolution and importance of institutional ownership. Second, we provide a detailed characterization of key aspects of the legal and regulatory setting within which institutional investors govern portfolio firms. Third, we synthesize the evolving response of the recent theoretical and empirical academic literature in finance to the emergence of institutional investors in corporate governance. We highlight how the defining aspect of institutional investors – the fact that they are financial intermediaries – differentiates them in their governance role from standard principal blockholders. Further, not all institutional investors are identical, and we pay close attention to heterogeneity amongst institutional investors as blockholders