Intelligence within BAOR and NATO's Northern Army Group

During the Cold War the UK's principal military role was its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) through the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), together with wartime command of NATO's Northern Army Group. The possibility of a surprise attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces ensured that great importance was attached to intelligence, warning and rapid mobilisation. As yet we know very little about the intelligence dimension of BAOR and its interface with NATO allies. This article attempts to address these neglected issues, ending with the impact of the 1973 Yom Kippur War upon NATO thinking about warning and surprise in the mid-1970s. It concludes that the arrangements made by Whitehall for support to BAOR from national assets during crisis or transition to war were - at best - improbable. Accordingly, over the years, BAOR developed its own unique assets in the realm of both intelligence collection and special operations in order to prepare for the possible outbreak of conflict

Market Exchange and the Rule of Law:Confidence in predictability

Law and economics is a significant field of analysis in legal studies and in economics, although there have been a number of controversies about how best to understand the relationship between economic relations and the regulatory role of law. Rather than surveying this field and offering a criticism of various theories and engaging in the dispute between different perspectives on the relationship between the two, in this article I take an approach rooted in neither mainstream economics nor in formal legal philosophy. Rather drawing on a recent well-rounded statement of behavioural economics and a synthesis of previous work on the narrative of the rule of law, I seek to explore how and why contemporary capitalism seems to have become so tied up with the rule of law, and what this might tell us more generally about the role of law in market relations. This analysis goes beyond the relatively commonplace observation that capitalism requires property rights, contract law and market institutionalisation to function, to ask ‘what exactly is it about the rule of law that seems so necessary to establishing and maintaining market exchange(s)?

Justice delayed? Internationalized criminal tribunals and peacebuilding in Lebanon, Bosnia and Cambodia

In countries emerging from violent conflict and/or mass atrocity, there is an urgent need to promote stability and often also widespread demand for accountability for abuses which have taken place. Debate has raged among scholars and practitioners about whether justice should be sacrificed or delayed for the sake of peace, or should be promoted even if it is in the short term destabilising. In many countries emerging from conflict processes of accountability, or transitional justice processes, operate almost simultaneously alongside processes of peace-building such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, reform of the security sector and rule of law promotion, in the immediate aftermath of conflict. These can include domestic processes of truth-telling, prosecution, reparation and amnesty, or internationally promoted processes such as international criminal tribunals. They can also include internationalised criminal tribunals, which have mixed national–international staff. While scholarship has increasingly focused on the engagement between transitional justice and peace-building processes in the relatively near term, far less has examined the role of processes of accountability that follow conflict termination by a significant period of time, justice delayed. Drawing on recent fieldwork, the authors examine three internationalised criminal tribunals developed some 15 years after the termination of conflict in countries that experienced three very different types of conflict, conflict resolution and peace-building or reconstruction in Bosnia, Lebanon and Cambodia. They find that despite claims made by advocates for such institutions, such tribunals may only have limited impact on longer term peace-building and that the effects of flawed peace-building activities affect the operating environment of the tribunals