Career Development – A Longitudinal Study Into Career Value Change

Career theorists have long suggested that age and life stages have an impact upon our career values. However there is substantial disagreement over how this actually manifests itself. Some suggest these differences are generational with external factors playing an important role (Westerman & Yamamura, 2007). In contrast developmental theories of careers focus on what happens in distinct career stages. These theories provide some structure to careers through the lifespan suggesting that early careerists will focus on exploration, mid careerists are concerned with advancement and the late careerists concentrate on passing their skills to others. Savickas (2002) calls for more longitudinal research in the field of careers to examine in depth what happens to individuals as they progress through these stages rather than taking the more popular cross sectional approach to research. This paper describes the development of a study that aims to examine career values through the lifespan using the career anchor model as a measure of career values

Liberty at the Borders of Private Law

Liberty is both dependent upon and limited by the State. The State protects individuals from the coercion of others, but paradoxically, it must exercise coercion itself in doing so. Unfortunately, the reliance on the State to deter coercion raises the possibility that the State’s powers of coercion might be abused. There is, not surprisingly, therefore, a wide range of literature on the relationship between law and liberty, but most of it focuses on the relationship between public law and liberty. This Article focuses on the relationship between private law and liberty. Private laws are enforced by courts. Since the judiciary is a branch of government, and courts ultimately derive their authority from the State, the State’s power of coercion is implicated by judicial enforcements of private laws. In fact, the State’s role in creating and enforcing private laws is no less important to liberty than its role in creating and enforcing public laws, since private legal arrangements increasingly affect deeply personal and intimate parts of peoples’ lives, including their uses of their own homes as well as their lifestyle choices and moral decisions. This Article observes that the enforcement of some private legal rules and doctrines serves to advance liberty but that the enforcement of others impinges upon it. It also therefore suggests ways in which liberty could be advanced by reforming certain private laws or by limiting the role of courts in the enforcement of some private legal arrangements

The Power to Exclude and the Power to Expel

Property laws have far-reaching implications for the way people live and for the opportunities they and their children will have. They also have important consequences for property developers and businesses, both large and small. It is not surprising, therefore, that modern developments in property law have been so strongly influenced by political pressures. Unfortunately, those with the most economic resources and political power have had the most telling influences on the development of property laws in the United States during the twentieth century. This Article introduces a simple game—the Not-In-My-Backyard Game —to illustrate the motivations of various parties with interests in the direction of American property law. As the analysis indicates, affluent residents and owners of upscale businesses have incentives to pressure suburban governments for zoning regulations that effectively exclude less affluent residents from their neighborhoods. Affluent residents and corporations who want to relocate into urban neighborhoods have incentives to pressure city governments to use eminent domain to facilitate urban redevelopment projects, and the takings that ensue often effectively expel many less affluent residents and smaller businesses from their neighborhoods. The analysis accords with the historical evidence. In the early twentieth century, suburban governments began to use zoning ordinances to exclude poor and less affluent residents from suburban neighborhoods. Around the middle of the twentieth century, city governments began to use takings to effectively expel less affluent residents and smaller businesses from urban neighborhoods. The United States Supreme Court upheld the powers of local governments to exclude and expel, and state courts acquiesced to them. The consequences are high and rising land prices, unaffordable housing, homelessness, and the perpetuation of the de facto segregation of the American people by income, wealth, race, ethnicity, religion, and national origin

Clearing The Clouds On The CISG’S Warranty Of Title

The risk of intellectual property infringement claims poses an increasing threat to international trade. The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is the most prevalent body of law governing international sales. Important questions will inevitably arise, therefore, under the CISG about the scope of the seller’s warranty of title. Courts will be called upon to interpret Article 42 of the CISG, which provides a warranty of title governing third-party intellectual property claims, or the parties’ contract if they execute a customized warranty of title term. This Article analyzes the appropriate scope of the seller’s warranty of title against third party intellectual property claims under the CISG. It draws on the CISG’s legislative history, the CISG case law, the underlying policy of the warranty of title, and an important German Supreme Court precedent in an analogous case to reject the “cloud on title” standard that has been applied in U.S. cases under the Uniform Commercial Code. This Article argues instead that, unless the parties’ contract clearly indicates otherwise, the seller under a CISG contract should only be held liable for third-party intellectual property claims against the buyer if (1) the buyer resells the goods in the seller’s jurisdiction and the claim arises under the intellectual property laws in the seller’s jurisdiction, (2) the buyer informed the seller about the third-party’s intellectual property rights prior to contracting, or (3) due to special circumstances, such as the seller having a branch in the jurisdiction under which the third-party’s intellectual property rights are created, the seller—but not the buyer—knew or should have known about the third-party’s intellectual property rights

Clearing The Clouds On The CISG’S Warranty Of Title

The risk of intellectual property infringement claims poses an increasing threat to international trade. The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is the most prevalent body of law governing international sales. Important questions will inevitably arise, therefore, under the CISG about the scope of the seller’s warranty of title. Courts will be called upon to interpret Article 42 of the CISG, which provides a warranty of title governing third-party intellectual property claims, or the parties’ contract if they execute a customized warranty of title term. This Article analyzes the appropriate scope of the seller’s warranty of title against third party intellectual property claims under the CISG. It draws on the CISG’s legislative history, the CISG case law, the underlying policy of the warranty of title, and an important German Supreme Court precedent in an analogous case to reject the “cloud on title” standard that has been applied in U.S. cases under the Uniform Commercial Code. This Article argues instead that, unless the parties’ contract clearly indicates otherwise, the seller under a CISG contract should only be held liable for third-party intellectual property claims against the buyer if (1) the buyer resells the goods in the seller’s jurisdiction and the claim arises under the intellectual property laws in the seller’s jurisdiction, (2) the buyer informed the seller about the third-party’s intellectual property rights prior to contracting, or (3) due to special circumstances, such as the seller having a branch in the jurisdiction under which the third-party’s intellectual property rights are created, the seller—but not the buyer—knew or should have known about the third-party’s intellectual property rights