The Self-Selection of Democracies into Treaty Design: Insights from International Environmental Agreements

Generally, democratic regime type is positively associated with participating in international environmental agreements. In this context, this study focuses on the legal nature of an agreement, which is linked to audience costs primarily at the domestic level that occur in case of non-compliance and are felt especially by democracies. Eventually, more legalized (\hard-law") treaties make compliance potentially more challenging and democratic leaders may anticipate the corresponding audience costs, which decreases the likelihood that democracies select themselves into such treaties. The empirical implication of our theory follows that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law. This claim is tested using quantitative data on global environmental treaties. The results strongly support our argument, shed new light on the relationship between participation in international agreements and the form of government, and also have implications for the \words-deeds" debate in international environmental policy-making

Saving Human Lives: What Complexity Science and Information Systems can Contribute

We discuss models and data of crowd disasters, crime, terrorism, war and disease spreading to show that conventional recipes, such as deterrence strategies, are often not effective and sufficient to contain them. Many common approaches do not provide a good picture of the actual system behavior, because they neglect feedback loops, instabilities and cascade effects. The complex and often counter-intuitive behavior of social systems and their macro-level collective dynamics can be better understood by means of complexity science. We highlight that a suitable system design and management can help to stop undesirable cascade effects and to enable favorable kinds of self-organization in the system. In such a way, complexity science can help to save human lives.Comment: 67 pages, 25 figures; accepted for publication in Journal of Statistical Physics [for related work see http://www.futurict.eu/

Democracy and Global Governance. The Internal and External Levers

2noThe paper explores the methods to introduce democratic devices in global governance. The first part makes an attempt to define what a democratic deficit is. The second part provides some benchmark to identify when and how international organizations, the most important and visible part of global governance, correspond to the values of democracy. The third part presents the internal and the external levers. The internal lever is defined as the ways in which democratization within countries helps to foster more transparent, accountable and participatory forms of global governance. The external lever is defined as the ways in which international organizations contribute to promote democratic transition and consolidation in their members. Neither the internal nor the external levers work effectively if they are left to inter-governmental bargaining only. An active participation of non-governmental actors is needed in order to make them effective. The paper finally discuss a list of proposals to democratize global governance.openopenDaniele, Archibugi; Cellini, MarcoArchibugi, Daniele; Cellini, Marc

Regime type and international conflict: towards a general model

The authors take a new look at the relationship between regime type and deadly militarized conflict among pairs of states (dyads) in the international system. With the goal of describing the general functional form, they evaluate three perspectives: democratic peace, regime similarity and regime rationality. They employ both standard logistic regression (logit) and a recently developed machine learning technique, a support vector machine (SVM). Logit is dependent on assumptions that limit flexibility and make it difficult to discern the appropriate functional form. SVM estimation, on the other hand, is highly flexible and appears capable of discovering a relationship that is contingent on other variables in the model. SVM results indicate that regime similarity and joint democracy are important in most dyadic interactions. However, for the special but important case of the most dangerous dyads, regime rationality plays a role and the democratic peace effect is dominant. The results suggest that models of international conflict excluding distinct indicators for political similarity, joint democracy and joint autocracy may be misspecified. SVMs are an especially useful complement to conventional statistical methods