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Dispute Settlement Under the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: An Overview
[Excerpt] The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) follows current U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) practice in containing two types of formal dispute settlement: (1) State-State, applicable to disputes between the Parties to the PTPA, and (2) investor-State, applicable to claims by an investor of one State Party against the other State Party for breach of a PTPA investment obligation. A defending Party in a State-State dispute found to be in violation of a PTPA obligation is generally expected to remove the complained-of measure; remedies for noncompliance include compensation and the suspension of PTPA concessions or obligations (e.g., the imposition of a tariff surcharge on the defending Party\u27s products), with the defending Party having the alternative of paying a fine to the prevailing Party or, in some cases, into a fund that may be used to assist the defending Party in complying with its obligations in the case. An investor-State tribunal may only make monetary awards to the claimant and thus may not direct a PTPA Party to withdraw or modify a violative measure. If the defending State Party does not comply with an award, the investor may seek to enforce it under one of the international conventions for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards to which the United States and Peru are party. State-State dispute settlement may also be initiated against the non-complying Party.
The PTPA State-State dispute settlement mechanism differs from earlier U.S. FTAs in that it applies to all obligations contained in the labor and environmental chapters of the PTPA instead of only domestic labor or environmental law enforcement obligations. In addition, in the event a Party is found to be in breach of one of these obligations and has not complied in the dispute, the prevailing Party may impose trade sanctions instead of, as under earlier agreements, being limited to requesting that a fine be imposed on the non-complying Party with the funds to be expended for labor or environmental initiatives in that Party\u27s territory. The changes stem from a bipartisan agreement on trade policy between Congress and the Administration finalized on May 10, 2007 (May 10 agreement), setting out various provisions to be added to completed or substantially completed FTAs pending at the time. Among the aims of the agreement was to expand and further integrate labor and environmental obligations into the U.S. free trade agreement structure. The same approach to labor and environmental disputes is found in FTAs entered into with Colombia, Korea, and Panama, each of which continue to await congressional approval.
Implementing legislation approving the PTPA and providing legislative authorities needed to carry it out was signed into law on December 14, 2007 (P.L. 110-138). The agreement entered into force on February 1, 2009. A protocol of amendment revising the PTPA to incorporate provisions involving labor, the environment, intellectual property, port services, and investment, as set out in the May 10 agreement, entered into force on the same day.
To date, there have not been any disputes brought under either PTPA dispute settlement mechanism. In general, resort to panels under FTA State-State dispute settlement has been uncommon, and thus there has been relatively little experience with the operation of this mechanism over a range of agreements and issues. FTA investor-State claims have been filed under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) against each of the three agreement Parties. Four claims have been filed by U.S. investors under the Dominican Republic - Central America - United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), one against the Dominican Republic, two against El Salvador, and one against Guatemala. To date, no investor-State claims have been filed under other U.S. FTAs
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Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO): An Overview
[Excerpt] Dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is carried out under the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). In effect since January 1995, the DSU provides for consultations between disputing parties, panels and appeals, and possible retaliation if a defending party fails to comply with a WTO decision by an established deadline. Automatic establishment of panels, adoption of panel and appellate reports, and authorization of requests to retaliate, along with deadlines and improved multilateral oversight of compliance, are aimed at producing a more expeditious and effective system than had existed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). To date, 405 complaints have been filed, approximately half involving the United States as complainant or defendant.
Expressing dissatisfaction with WTO dispute settlement results in the trade remedy area, Congress, in the Trade Act of 2002, directed the executive branch to address dispute settlement in WTO negotiations. WTO Members have been negotiating DSU revisions in the currently stalled Doha Development Round of trade negotiations but no final agreement on the DSU has been reached. Use of the DSU has revealed procedural gaps, particularly affecting the compliance phase of a dispute. These include a failure to coordinate procedures for requesting retaliation with procedures for tasking a WTO panel with determining whether a defending Member has complied in a case and the absence of a procedure for withdrawing trade sanctions imposed by a complaining Member where the defending Member believes it has fulfilled its WTO obligations. As a result, disputing Members have entered into bilateral agreements permitting retaliation and compliance panel processes to progress on an agreed schedule and have initiated new dispute proceedings aimed at removing retaliatory measures.
Where a U.S. law or regulation is at issue in a WTO case, the adoption by the WTO of a panel or Appellate Body report finding that the measure violates a WTO agreement does not give the report direct legal effect in this country; thus federal law is not affected until Congress or the executive branch, as the case may be, takes action to remove the offending measure. Where a restrictive foreign trade practice is at issue, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides a mechanism by which the United States Trade Representative (USTR) may challenge the measure in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding and authorizes the USTR to take retaliatory action if the defending Member has not complied with the resulting WTO decision. Although Section 301 was challenged in the WTO on the ground that it requires the USTR to act unilaterally in WTO-related trade disputes in violation of DSU provisions requiring resort to multilateral WTO dispute settlement, the United States was ultimately found not to be in violation of its DSU obligations.
H.R. 496 (Rangel) would create an Office of the Congressional Trade Enforcer that would, inter alia, investigate restrictive foreign trade practices in light of WTO obligations and call on the USTR to pursue WTO cases where alleged violations are found; express congressional dissatisfaction with WTO decisions; and restrict implementation of a revised methodology for calculating dumping margins adopted by the Commerce Department in 2007 in response to adverse WTO decisions. S. 363 (Snowe) would grant the U.S. Court of International Trade exclusive jurisdiction to review de novo certain USTR determinations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which may in some cases involve the initiation and conduct of WTO disputes, and would amend various Section 301 authorities themselves. S. 1466 (Stabenow) and S. 1982 (Brown) would establish mechanisms under the Trade Act of 1974 requiring the USTR to identify particularly harmful foreign trade practices and, where appropriate, to initiate WTO cases to remedy these practices
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Dispute Settlement in the Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA)
[Excerpt] The KORUS FTA State-State dispute settlement mechanism differs from most earlier U.S. FTAs in that it applies to all obligations contained in the labor and environmental chapters of the KORUS FTA instead of only domestic labor or environmental law enforcement obligations. In addition, in the event a Party is found to be in breach of one of these obligations and has not complied, the prevailing Party may impose trade sanctions instead of, as under earlier agreements, being limited to requesting that a fine be imposed on the non-complying Party with the funds to be expended for labor or environmental initiatives in that Party’s territory. The changes stem from a bipartisan understanding on trade policy between congressional leaders and the George W. Bush Administration finalized on May 10, 2007, setting out provisions that were to be added to completed or substantially completed FTAs pending at the time. Among the aims of the understanding was to expand and further integrate labor and environmental obligations into the U.S. FTA structure. The same approach to labor and environmental disputes is found in FTAs entered into with Colombia and Panama, each of which continue to await congressional approval,and in the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, which entered into force in 2009
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World Trade Organization (WTO) Decisions and Their Effect in U.S. Law
[Excerpt] Congress has comprehensively dealt with the legal effect of World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements and dispute settlement results in the United States in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), P.L. 103-465. The act provides that domestic law prevails over conflicting provisions of WTO agreements and prohibits private remedies based on alleged violations of these agreements. As a result, provisions of WTO agreements and WTO panel and Appellate Body reports adopted by the WTO Members that are in conflict with federal law do not have domestic legal effect unless and until Congress or the executive branch, as the case may be, takes action to modify or remove the conflicting statute, regulation, or regulatory action. Violative state laws may be withdrawn by the state or, in rare circumstances, invalidated through legal action by the federal government.
The URAA also contains requirements for agencies to follow where a change in a regulation or the issuance of a new agency determination in a trade remedy proceeding is needed to comply with a WTO decision and existing law may be sufficient to carry out the action.
While the URAA prohibits private rights of action based on Uruguay Round agreements, plaintiffs, in cases brought under other statutes, have argued that the agency actions they are challenging in court are inconsistent with a WTO agreement or a WTO decision and should conform with U.S. WTO obligations. Although courts have deemed WTO decisions to be persuasive, they have also held that they are not binding on the United States, U.S. agencies, or the judiciary, leaving the issue of whether and how the United States complies in a particular WTO proceeding to the executive branch.
Legislation introduced in recent Congresses generally reflected congressional concerns that the WTO Appellate Body had interpreted WTO agreements in an overly broad manner to the detriment of the United States and that the executive branch had in some cases too readily used existing statutory authorities to comply with these decisions, particularly where U.S. trade remedies were involved. Legislation particularly focused on WTO decisions finding the U.S. use of “zeroing” in antidumping proceedings to be in violation of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and an administrative modification instituted by the Department of Commerce in original anti-dumping investigations in response to one of the earliest of these decisions. Under the practice, the department calculates dumping margins by taking into account only sales below fair market value—generally the price in the exporting country—and assigns a zero value to sales at or above this price. While it is argued that zeroing improperly creates or inflates dumping margins, U.S. courts have consistently upheld the department’s use of the practice as valid under U.S. antidumping law
Molecular dissection of I(A) in cortical pyramidal neurons reveals three distinct components encoded by Kv4.2, Kv4.3, and Kv1.4 alpha-subunits
The rapidly activating and inactivating voltage-gated K(+) (Kv) current, I(A), is broadly expressed in neurons and is a key regulator of action potential repolarization, repetitive firing, backpropagation (into dendrites) of action potentials, and responses to synaptic inputs. Interestingly, results from previous studies on a number of neuronal cell types, including hippocampal, cortical, and spinal neurons, suggest that macroscopic I(A) is composed of multiple components and that each component is likely encoded by distinct Kv channel alpha-subunits. The goals of the experiments presented here were to test this hypothesis and to determine the molecular identities of the Kv channel alpha-subunits that generate I(A) in cortical pyramidal neurons. Combining genetic disruption of individual Kv alpha-subunit genes with pharmacological approaches to block Kv currents selectively, the experiments here revealed that Kv1.4, Kv4.2, and Kv4.3 alpha-subunits encode distinct components of I(A) that together underlie the macroscopic I(A) in mouse (male and female) cortical pyramidal neurons. Recordings from neurons lacking both Kv4.2 and Kv4.3 (Kv4.2(-/-)/Kv4.3(-/-)) revealed that, although Kv1.4 encodes a minor component of I(A), the Kv1.4-encoded current was found in all the Kv4.2(-/-)/Kv4.3(-/-) cortical pyramidal neurons examined. Of the cortical pyramidal neurons lacking both Kv4.2 and Kv1.4, 90% expressed a Kv4.3-encoded I(A) larger in amplitude than the Kv1.4-encoded component. The experimental findings also demonstrate that the targeted deletion of the individual Kv alpha-subunits encoding components of I(A) results in electrical remodeling that is Kv alpha-subunit specific
Direct MN Test on Peripheral Blood to Detect Chromosomal Breakage: Application in Smokers
The purpose was to assess chromosomal damage in blood mononuclear cells of smokers. Smoker’s peripheral blood samples were screened for micronuclei. Samples from smokers who had an illness were excluded. From each sample, 500 swelled mononuclear leucocytes were screened using a light microscope, with 400x magnification. Frequency distribution of subjects having 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 micronuclei (MN) according to age and condition were tabulated. From the 102 samples, 5 were excluded, and only 97 were analyzed. There was an increase in MN count in 12.8%, 12.9%, 33.3%, and 25% of normal smokers living in unpolluted area, hypertensive smokers living in unpolluted area, normal smokers living in polluted area, and hypertensive smokers living in polluted area, respectively. Therefore, there was a tendency of increasing MN count in smokers in the productive age group, hypertensive people, and people living in polluted area. 
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