3 research outputs found
Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can
evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or
defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy
adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity
characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent.
Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied with an increase in
the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment
this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the
teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the
prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.Comment: 10 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of
Physic
From Local to Global Dilemmas in Social Networks
Social networks affect in such a fundamental way the dynamics of the population they support that the global, population-wide behavior that one observes often bears no relation to the individual processes it stems from. Up to now, linking the global networked dynamics to such individual mechanisms has remained elusive. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in networked populations and let individuals interact via a 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma – a characteristic defection dominant social dilemma of cooperation. We show how homogeneous networks transform a Prisoner's Dilemma into a population-wide evolutionary dynamics that promotes the coexistence between cooperators and defectors, while heterogeneous networks promote their coordination. To this end, we define a dynamic variable that allows us to track the self-organization of cooperators when co-evolving with defectors in networked populations. Using the same variable, we show how the global dynamics — and effective dilemma — co-evolves with the motifs of cooperators in the population, the overall emergence of cooperation depending sensitively on this co-evolution